European Germany or a German Europe? Discursive articulation of German nation-state identity in the editorials and commentaries of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung during the first year of the Euro Crisis by Kallasoja, Miika
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Philosophy 
ICS-programme 
Miika Kallasoja 
European Germany or a German Europe? 
Discursive articulation of German nation-state identity in the editorials and 
commentaries of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung during the first year 
of the Euro Crisis 
Master’s Thesis 
Vaasa 2016
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... 2 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... 3 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 7 
1.1 Research Aim ....................................................................................................... 10 
1.2 Material and Method ............................................................................................ 11 
1.3 Structure of the thesis ........................................................................................... 12 
2 EUROPE AND NATION-STATE IDENTITY .......................................................... 13 
2.1 The idea of Europe ............................................................................................... 13 
2.2 The history of European Integration in brief ........................................................ 14 
2.3 The European Monetary Union and the euro ....................................................... 17 
2.4 Europe and the nation-state .................................................................................. 20 
2.4.1 Nation-state identity ...................................................................................... 20 
2.4.2 Transformation of nation-state identity: critical junctures ............................ 22 
2.5 Post-structuralist discourse theory ........................................................................ 24 
2.5.1 Post-structuralist model of nation-state identity and Europe ........................ 30 
2.5.2 Articulation of German nation-state identity from late 19th century to early 
21st century ............................................................................................................. 35
3 EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES ................................................................... 42 
3.1 Journalistic texts and text functions...................................................................... 42 
3.2 Editorial ........................................................................................................... 44 
3.3 Commentary ......................................................................................................... 48 
4 DISCOURSE LINGUISTICS ..................................................................................... 50 
4.1 DIMEAN model ................................................................................................... 50 
4.2 Application of the DIMEAN model: Keywords and semantic roles .................... 53 
4.2.1 Keywords indexing nation-state and Europe ................................................. 54 
4.2.2 Predicate classes and semantic roles ............................................................. 56 
5 DISCURSIVE ARTICULATION OF GERMAN NATION-STATE IDENTITY AND 
EUROPE IN EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES OF THE FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG ............................................................................................ 66 
5.1 Quantitative Analysis of Keywords ...................................................................... 67 
5.1.1 German keywords .......................................................................................... 67 
2 
5.1.2 Europe and EU related keywords .................................................................. 75 
5.1.3 Deictic expressions ........................................................................................ 81 
5.2 Qualitative analysis of keywords .......................................................................... 82 
5.2.1 Germany as an economically strong country ................................................ 82 
5.2.2 Germany as the “pay master” ........................................................................ 88 
5.2.3 D-Mark and the stability promise of the euro ............................................... 92 
5.2.4 The German EMU and culturalization of divergences .................................. 95 
5.2.5 Transfer union, citizens and sovereignty ..................................................... 106 
5.2.6 German interests and the government ......................................................... 112 
5.2.7 Renegotiation of Germany’s pro-European identity ................................... 122 
5.2.8 EU, Europe and Germany ............................................................................ 128 
5.3 Summary of discursive articulations on the transtextual layer ........................... 138 
6 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 144 
WORKS CITED ........................................................................................................... 146 
APPENDIX: Translations of the excerpts from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  159 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The life-cycle of nation-state identities   23 
Figure 2. Relationship between the general concept of nation(-state) and   30
unique nation-state identities 
Figure 3. Theoretical model on the interaction between discursive constructions of     31  
nation-state identities and ‘Europe’  
Figure 4. Different articulations of German nation-state identity. 41 
Figure 5. Semantic map of German keywords       69 
Figure 6. Semantic map of Europe and EU related keywords 76 
Figure 7. Discursive constructions of German nation-state identity and        143   
‘Europe’ in the editorials and commentaries of Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 2010 
3 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Structural theories of editorials  46 
Table 2.  Characteristics of an editorial  47 
Table 3.  Comparison of predicates classes and process types 57 
Table 4.   List of semantic roles 59 ̶ 62 
Table 5.   List of circumstantial elements 63 ̶ 64 
Table 6.   German nation-state and capital 70 
Table 7.   German politicians and institutions 72 
Table 8.   German citizens  73 
Table 9.   Europe and EU related keywords       77 
Table 10.  Member states  78 
Table 11.  Deictic expressions 81 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Philosophy 
Programme: ICS 
Author: Miika Kallasoja 
Master’s Thesis: European Germany or a German Europe?  
Discursive articulation of German nation-state identity in the editorials and 
commentaries of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung during the first year of the Euro 
Crisis 
Degree: Master of Arts 
Date: 2016 
Supervisor: Daniel Rellstab 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The subject of the study is the discursive articulation of German nation-state identity 
and Europe in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung during 2010, the 
first year of the euro crisis. The material consists of editorials and commentaries. As 
evaluative and argumentative text types they both contribute to and reflect the public 
discourse on a given topic, and therefore engage in politics, defined in the broad sense 
as negotiation and struggle over the attribution of meaning within society. 
 
The theoretical background of this study is in post-structuralist discourse theory and its 
application in a model originally designed for foreign policy analysis. The concept of 
nation-state identity is used to describe the relationship between Europe and the nation. 
Although not often contested, nation-state identities are subject to redefinition at times 
of crisis, defined as critical junctures. The euro crisis is treated as a critical juncture that 
has the potential to induce discursive change.  
 
The methods for analyzing these discursive articulations are taken from German 
Diskurslinguistik. The methodological approach include both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of specific keywords. These keywords were partially derived from 
previous research of nationalist discourse in the media and included words related to the 
German nation-state, EU and Europe. These words were then categorized into semantic 
roles, on the basis of which their relationships and positionings could be analyzed. 
 
The study found that the German nation-state identity is articulated in a way that 
emphasizes its economic power while attempting to justify an orientation based on 
national interests, Germany’s leadership role and a break from the country’s pro-
European past by the fact that the euro’s stability is at stake. While the meaning of what 
it means to be “European” becomes thus contested in the light of the country’s past, 
there is also some emphasis on continuity with the past.  
 
KEYWORDS: Discourse analysis, nation-state identity, European integration, euro 
crisis, media 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The euro crisis is a serious political crisis for the entire EU. The crisis has left the EU 
torn between opposing demands for more sovereignty and solidarity, with the 
economically more prosperous member states typically insisting on greater sovereignty 
while the economically weaker member states have usually supported a higher degree 
of European integration in exchange for greater solidarity from the EU (Hayward, 
Rüdiger & Wurzel 2013: 2). 
Germany is undoubtedly the most economically powerful nation-state within the 
European Union. Ever since the end of World War II, it has also been an ardent 
supporter of the process of European integration (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002). 
Thus, when the financial crisis hit Europe, it was from Germany that solidarity and 
European spirit was most expected. It therefore came as a shock to many when, as the 
extent of Greece’s financial plight became clear in early 2010, Angela Merkel’s 
Germany vehemently refused that the country be given aid unless it is at the verge of 
bankruptcy, and even then only under extremely punitive conditions and partially 
administered by International Monetary Fund. In March 2010, an author of the Wall 
Street Journal remarked that “Germany has cooled to European unity, except on its 
terms” (Walker 2010).  
The euro crisis has indeed brought upon a visible shift in Germany’s relationship to 
Europe. It has been stated, for example, that “German nationalism is back in vogue” 
(Gratius 2012). Merkel’s cold pragmatism has been contrasted with the pro-European 
vision of former chancellor Kohl, who unlike Merkel would not likely have threatened 
that the member states which breach the deficit limits enshrined in the Treaty of 
Maastricht should be excluded from the EMU (Walker 2010). Merkel earned both the 
title Eiserne Kanzlerin (Iron Chancellor), a reference to the famous chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck of the 19th century (Kornelius 2010), as well as Eiserne Lady (Iron Lady), a 
comparison with the former, famously tough British premier minister Margaret 
Thatcher (Lob 2010). 
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Merkel’s focus on German interests is a definite break from the previously pro-
European line of German foreign policy. Inklings of a shift were however already in the 
works during the Chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder. By advocating for Germany’s 
right to defend its own interests, he took a more calculating and distancing attitude 
towards Europe than his predecessor Kohl, who in turn had emphasized the interwoven 
nature of German and European interests (Hellmann, Weber & Sauer 2008: 98).  
 
This renewed emphasis on national interests, instead of the common European vision 
that had prevailed during the Cold War, was characteristic of the whole European 
political landscape in the 1990s. In Germany, however, this shift in orientation started to 
take foothold only after the end of Kohl’s chancellorship in 1998 (Milzow 2012). Some 
authors, like Marcussen and Roscher (2002) and Wæver (2005) emphasize however that 
the changes that took place during Schröder’s chancellorship were more at the level of 
style and rhetoric and had less to do with actual policy content. In other words, the 
underlying identity of a “European Germany” that the country had assumed at the end 
of World War II was not questioned. It is possible that the euro crisis has brought about 
a deeper transformation of this identity.   
 
In both foreign and German media, concerns have been raised about whether we are 
hearing the echoes of the past with Europe once again heading towards German 
dominance, albeit this time in economic terms and through the euro (Salminen 2015, 
Mardell 2015, Fischer 2015). The leading German news magazine, Der Spiegel, even 
remarked that for Merkel ”Europe is not a matter of war and peace, but of euros and 
cents” (Blome, Hesse, Pauly, Pfister, Reiermann & Schmitz 2015). In defense of the 
German government’s policies, the German minister of finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
had two years earlier stated in the British newspaper The Guardian that Germany’s wish 
is not to fashion Europe in its image, but the continent must nonetheless be able to 
compete (Schäuble 2013). As the Süddeutsche Zeitung commented, however, 
Germany’s image outside is now that of a “dark puppet master” and “a European 
hegemon”, and what is therefore called for is more humility on Germany’s side 
(Kornelius 2015).   
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Politics involves a constant renegotiation of meanings given to events and actions. This 
negotiation of and struggle over meaning take place both in political speeches as well as 
in the news media, which frame and interpret the statements and actions of political 
actors. The news media’s importance in shaping and setting the agenda for policy 
discussions has been well researched (e.g. Bucher & Straßner 1991; Wittkämper 1992; 
Le 2010). Therefore, the media also plays a significant role in the politics of meaning 
and steering the perception and interpretation of events. The comparisons between 
Merkel and her predecessors, the attributions of nicknames with historical connotations 
and the concern for returning German dominance is an example how political events are 
put into a historical context and thus given a particular meaning: a shifting relationship 
between Germany and Europe.  
 
News coverage is often itself informed by certain world views and ideologies (Van Dijk 
1988; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1995). The perspective of the media also tends to be 
highly nationalized, to the extent that media texts are said to play an important role in 
the reproduction of the “imagined communities” of nation-states (Anderson 1983; Billig 
1995; Higgins 2004; Dekavalla 2010; Mihelj 2011). Even when reporting on European 
issues, the media in different European countries tend to take on a national perspective 
on the issues (Machill, Beiler & Fischer 2006). This has been shown to be the case in 
the coverage of the euro crisis as well (Picard 2015).  
  
There have been several studies investigating the coverage and presentation of the euro 
crisis in the media. By far the largest is a cross-national study by the Reuters Institute 
which studied the perceptions of Europe in the press coverage of the crisis between 
2010 and 2012 (Picard 2015). Tzogopoulos (2013) investigated stereotypes in the 
coverage about the Greek crisis in various European broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, 
while a study by Papathanassopoulos (2015) focused on the reactions on the Greek 
crisis in the international press. A special volume of Discourse & Society titled From 
Grexit to Grecovery: Euro/crisis discourses (Wodak & Angouri 2014) contains seven 
studies that approach the portrayal of the crisis from a discourse analytical perspective.  
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The present study is another contribution to this existing series of studies on the euro 
crisis in the press. It builds on the insight that the media has the power to represent 
reality, and often does so from a national perspective, with this national perspective 
becoming increasingly highlighted during a crisis (Brookes 1999; Mihelj 2011).  
 
 
1.1 Research Aim 
 
This study focuses on Germany and its identity as it is portrayed in German domestic 
press. Following the claims made both in foreign and German press about Germany 
having abandoned its former pro-European path, this study investigates how Germany’s 
identity and its relationship to Europe is represented in the German domestic press 
during the first year of the euro crisis. According to Papathanassopoulos (2015), the 
German press devoted proportionately the largest number of articles to the euro crisis 
compared to the newspapers of other countries. This is not surprising in light of the fact 
that Germany was asked to give the biggest financial contribution towards rescuing 
Greece. If, as earlier studies suggest, reporting on European affairs tends to be projected 
through a national lens and a crisis tends to increase the degree to which this national 
perspective is polarized, Germany’s identity and role in Europe should also come into a 
sharper focus in the domestic press coverage of the crisis.  
 
In order to bridge the relation between media texts, language and the conceptualization 
of Germany’s identity vis-à-vis Europe, this study utilizes the concepts of nation-state 
identity (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002) and discourse in the post-structuralist 
tradition of Foucault (e.g. 1972) as well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985). 
More specifically, the study builds on the post-structuralist framework introduced by 
Wæver (2002, 2005) for the purpose of analyzing the relationship between the 
representations of nation-state identity and Europe. This model has previously been 
used by Bärenreuter (2005) in his study on representation of the Swedish national 
identity in the news coverage of the Jörg Haider affair in Austria in 2000. 
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1.2 Material and Method 
 
The data used in this study consists of 21 editorials and 11 economic commentaries 
dealing with the euro crisis published in the the German Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) in 2010. The FAZ is major center-right, conservative-liberal daily with a 
circulation of 382 000 (Koopmans & Pfetsch 2007: 62). It has one of the world’s largest 
networks of correspondents, which makes it by and large independent from press 
agencies (Voxeurop 2012). It is cooperatively run by five editors. In 2014, it was the 
second widest sold broadsheet nationwide newspaper in Germany (Statista 2015) It has 
also been found to take more critical position both towards the process of European 
integration and European insititutions than most other German media (Koopmans & 
Pfetsch 2007: 77–79).  
 
Editorials and commentaries were selected due to the explicitly evaluative and 
interpretive nature of these text types and because they are most likely to represent the 
official line of the newspaper (cf. section 3.2). This would also make them more likely 
to provide robust material for the analysis of discourses surrounding Germany and 
Europe. The articles were handpicked from the paper copies of the newspaper, which 
were archived at the library of the University of Basel, Switzerland. 
 
The method combines the corpus-driven, multilayered approach from German 
Diskurslinguistik (discourse linguistics) (e.g. Warnke 2007; Warnke & Spitzmüller 
2011a) with a special focus on specific keywords. These keywords will be analyzed 
with the help of semantic roles, a concept originally based on the work of Fillmore 
(1971). The semantic roles in this study are derived from Peter von Polenz (2008) and 
M.A.K. Halliday’s (1985) Systemic Functional Grammar.  
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 presents the overall theoretical framework of the study. It proceeds from a 
brief discussion of the history of the idea of Europe, European integration and European 
Monetary Union (EMU) to introducing the concept of nation-state identity and a 
theoretical approach based on post-structuralist discourse theory. A historical outline of 
Germany’s nation-state identity will also be given at the end of the chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the journalistic text types to be analyzed in the study: editorials 
and commentaries. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a genre-theoretical 
justification for the choice of text types by outlining function, purpose and prevailing 
characteristics. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the methodological tools which help in approaching the research 
question and the theoretical model outlined in chapter 2 by analyzing concrete texts. It 
briefly introduces the DIMEAN model of the German Diskurslinguistik and its 
application within the study with the help of analytical tools provided by previous 
research and the work of von Polenz (2008) and Halliday (1985).  
 
Chapter 5 shows the results of analysis by applying the methods provided in Chapter 4. 
These results will then be interpreted against the theoretical model from chapter 2. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions derived and suggested directions for further 
research.  
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2 EUROPE AND NATION-STATE IDENTITY 
 
This chapter introduces the ideas of Europe and nation-state as well as models for 
conceptualizing their mutual relationship. First, the history of the idea of Europe will 
briefly be outlined, and subsequently the history of the European integration and the 
European Monetary Union will be discussed. Section 2.3 will then focus on the concept 
of nation-state identity and its interrelationship with the idea of Europe. Section 2.3.1 
will introduce a social psychological model of this relationship, while 2.3.2 will present 
a post-structural model that serves as the theoretical framework upon which the analysis 
will be based. 
 
 
2.1 The idea of Europe 
 
In the course of history, there have been different conceptions of what Europe is, both 
geographically and culturally. According to Ruonala (2011: 15), while the EU has 
become almost synonymous with Europe itself in more modern times, especially in 
other parts of the world, these two are nonetheless distinct. 
 
According to Wintle (2013), the EU can be seen as just one manifestation of Europe in 
recent centuries, but not the only representation of what Europe is or should be. Just as 
many thinkers over the centuries have expressed their ideas about the essence of 
Europe, there have also been many proposals on how to bring about its political unity, 
beginning in the Middle Age (Morgan 1996). The EU can be seen as the first relatively 
successful attempt of realizing the idea of Europe in a political and institutional form. 
 
While the EU lends itself more readily to a clear definition in terms of its institutions 
and member states, this is less the case with ‘Europe’. In official policy documents, 
‘Europe’ and the ‘peoples of Europe’ are used as more or less self-evident 
constructions, but both historically and in contemporary usage the denotations of the 
term are anything but clear and unambiguous (Boxhoorn 1996: 134; Ruokonen 1996: 
22).  
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Europe has been imagined in many different ways over time and across countries: 
Europe as a community of nation-states (e.g. De Gaulle’s vision of Europe “from the 
Atlantic to the Urals”); Europe as a set of values; Europe as a “third force”, a kind of 
democratic socialist alternative to both capitalism and Communism; a modernising 
(Western) Europe as part of the Western community, based on liberal democracy and 
social market economy; or a Europe based on Christian, and in particular, Catholic 
values, including strong social obligations. (Stråth 2002: 38)  
 
Although many claims have been made and continue being made for what Europe is, 
where it lies and what its borders are, it remains an unstable term (Pagden 2002: 45). It 
is less a concrete entity and a clearly defined geographical space than an “idea and a 
normative center” (Stråth 2002: 14). Europe can be defined in terms of geography, 
cultural heritage, religion, economics or politics, but none of these dimensions lend 
themselves to an exhaustive and uncontested definition (Smith 1992: 68 ̶ 70). Europe is 
a contested concept whose meaning is not yet fixed (Diez 1999); not a single fact but a 
word figuring in many constellations (Ruokonen 1996: 32). It could be said that as long 
Europe has been conceptualized, its experience of itself is a question – the question of 
Europe (Burgess 2002: 432).  
 
 
2.2 The history of European integration in brief 
 
The EU was built on the ruins of World War II, with the goal of establishing permanent 
peace on the continent. In Euro-nationalistic narratives, the continuity between the ideas 
of European unity existing before 1950 and the founding of the European Union is often 
exaggerated, as if the EU was a culmination of a teleological process (Swedberg 1994). 
According to Passerini (2002: 192), on the other hand, scholarly literature on the history 
of the EU typically underrates the link between previous ideas of unity and institutional 
reality of the EU. In order to not to overestimate the continuity, therefore, the ideas can 
be seen as a fertile soil, as necessary but not a sufficient condition for the realization of 
the EU sprout.  
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A testimony to the role of ideas are the memoirs of Robert Schuman, one of the 
founding fathers of European integration: He saw that the “choice” of Europe by France 
was the fruit of a community of spirits, saved from both “Hitlerism” and Communism; 
the concretization of this community of spirits being the erection of a system of 
economic co-ordination and regulation based on the principles of market liberalism 
(Burgess 2002: 430). According to Burgess, here in the words of Schuman first 
manifest the two perhaps irreducibly different discourses that underlie the European 
project: the discourses of cultural community and economic rationality (ibid.: 431).  
 
However one might see the link between previous ideas and the EU of today, the EU is 
nonetheless the most important of all attempts to date to bring about European unity and 
to realize the “idea of Europe” (Wintle 2013: 9). The official foundation of the EU was 
the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Burgess 2002: 
424–425). Its founding was based on pragmatic considerations of nation-states 
concerning the conditions that would ensure peace in Europe  ̶  a large part of which 
was about controlling Germany via coordination of the industries relevant for warfare 
(Mikkeli 1999: 122–123). 
 
Robert Schuman’s original vision was explicitly federalist, aiming towards a United 
States of Europe. Jean Monnet, however, the principal architect of the Schuman Plan, 
understood that a federal Europe would not be created overnight,  but a united Europe 
would be the result of concrete, incremental achievements, which will cumulatively 
create a sense of solidarity (Mikkeli 1999: 128). Through this “Monnet Method” of 
integration, political unity and peace would be achieved “less by grand design and more 
by stealth” (Rosamond 2000: 53).  
 
After the Treaty of Paris in 1950–51, the the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the creation of 
the European Economic Community paved the way for deepening integration in various 
policy areas, such as agriculture and transportation. With the fusing together of the 
treaties on the ECSC and the Euratom (collaboration in nuclear energy) in 1967, the 
term European Community came to be used more and more frequently. In 1973, Britain, 
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Denmark and Ireland joined the Community, followed by Greece, Portugal and Spain in 
1980. (Mikkeli 1999: 123–125) 
 
In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA), which had the aim of creating a single 
European market (SEM) within the next five years, was ratified by the member states.  
With the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, the European Community was 
transformed into the European Union, which was joined by Austria, Finland and 
Sweden in 1995. (Mikkeli 1999: 124) In 1999 and 2001, the treaties of Amsterdam and 
Nice were signed, which both had as their partial goal to prepare for the expected 
Eastern enlargement (Weidenfeld 2004: 38–39). This enlargement took place in 2004–
07 with the accession of 12 new states.  
 
The history of European integration to this day is a continuous dialectic between the 
national and supranational, of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. According 
to Weidenfeld (2004), even the whole history of Europe, not just of the integration, can 
be characterized as a dialectical conflict between between nations, interests and world-
views, and between differentiation and unification. The EU has not eradicated these 
tendencies, but has become a vehicle in which these tendencies play out in a peaceful 
manner while striving towards harmonization. (Weidenfeld 2004: 25–26) 
 
Another way Weidenfeld describes this dialectic is as that of crisis and reform: 
whenever a status quo is reached, the nation-states tend to be reluctant to give it up by 
making reforms, even if required to do so by the appearance of novel problems. Such 
postponed and neglected reforms contribute to the regular crisis experiences with which 
the EU finds itself confronted from time to time. Sooner or later, these crises and 
problems finally bring about attempts at reform, which lend the EU the form it has 
today. (Weidenfeld 2004: 25–26) 
 
With every furthering enlargement it has become more and more difficult to find 
convergence in both economic and political sense. Institutions and policies framed with 
the original six in mind are less applicable to a Union of a significantly larger number of 
member states, all with their different historical experiences, political traditions, 
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conceptions of nationhood, ethnicity and religion, economic development and policy 
structures. (Fella 2002: 3) 
 
The member states have different reasons for having joined the Union and different 
ideas about the direction the integration should take: The British, the Danish, the Irish 
and even the French have each in their own way signaled the limits of their willingness 
to engage in a further integration. This is because of the implied loss of national 
sovereignty brought about by every further step. The question of sovereignty has indeed 
been central to all objections to European integration. (Cohen 2002: 260)  
 
According to Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 344–345), Germany has traditionally been 
an eager advocate of further integration, and France, with the exception of the De 
Gaulle regime, has also pursued pro-European policy lines; Britain, on the other hand, 
has always preferred a looser form of cooperation. The Nordic states, with the exception 
of Finland, have also tended to view Europe as their “Other” (Hansen & Wæver 2002).  
 
 
2.3 The European Monetary Union and the euro 
 
The introduction of the euro was justified by two important needs: firstly, as a way to 
counter wild fluctuations in exchange rates; secondly, as a way of completing the single 
market; and thirdly, as a both technical and symbolic step towards a political union 
(Pisani-Ferry 2011: 23). While the explicitly stated motive behind introducing the euro 
was the gain of wealth and influence for Europe, it was also seen as the potential core 
for a more federalistic Europe (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 35). The euro therefore 
has great symbolic value for the European project. To borrow the ideas of Burgess 
(2002: 431), it can be viewed as a meeting point of economic rationality and cultural 
community.  
 
Already in the 1960 there had been plans for a monetary union. The reason for these 
plans was the incompleteness of the common market: It was realized that in order for a 
true single market to exist, there had to be a common currency. The EEC treaty had 
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mentioned the need for coordinating economic policies, but the Community had been 
given no powers to realize this coordination. Furthermore, a single currency meant a 
significant loss of sovereignty for the states adopting it and would have constituted 
another step towards a political union. (Vanthoor 1997: 71–86)  
 
Given impetus by the turbulences in the international monetary system in the 1960s, in 
1969, Community leaders discussed the principle of an economic and monetary union 
(EMU) in Hague and agreed to control fluctuations in the value of their currencies and 
make more effort towards coordinating their national economic policies. These plans for 
achieving EMU were shelved at the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates and the ensuing international monetary turbulences. (Vanthoor 1997: 
75–89) 
 
In 1979 a new initiative was launched, carrying the name European Monetary System. It 
had the goal of creating a zone of monetary stability and controlling fluctuations in 
exchange rates. It used an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) based around an 
accounting tool called the European currency unit (ecu). In 1989, the Commission 
president Jacques Delors wanted to bring the EMU a step further by conceiving a plan 
with the aim of fixing exchange rates and turning the ecu into a single currency. He 
convinced both German and French leaders of the necessity of creating a single 
currency together with a single market. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany agreed, on 
condition of a further political integration in a federal model. (Villes 2001: 18) 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht established the completion of the EMU as a formal aim. A 
number of economic convergence criteria concerning inflation rate, public finances, 
interest rates and exchange rate stability were set in the treaty. The “no bail out” clause 
of the treaty prohibited member states overtaking each other’s liabilities. All this was to 
ensure the stability and credibility of the common currency in the long term. The rules 
and regulations surrounding the common currency inscribed in the Treaty of Maastricht  
all in all carried a German signature, with the exception that the German demand for a 
political union to accompany the monetary union was not realized. (Hillenbrand 2004: 
251)  
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In 1997 the European Council decided to adopt the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
was designed to ensure budgetary discipline after the euro had been created. In 1998, 
the independent European Central Bank (ECB) was established, modeled after the 
German Bundesbank, whose monetary policy had been deemed superior to all other 
European banks in the preceding decades (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 26). Like the Bundesbank, 
the ECB had the sole aim of ensuring price stability (Patomäki & Minkkinen 1997: 64).  
In January 1999, the third stage of the EMU was entered, whereupon the euro became a 
real currency (Pihkala 2008: 228).  
 
The currency union had its critics at the time of its planning, mainly in the USA and 
Germany (Patomäki & Minkkinen 1997: 62; Pisani-Ferry 2011: 22). The biggest reason 
to reject the euro was the lack of economic convergence – dissimilar economic policies 
and unequal levels of competitiveness – among the states participating in the EMU. The 
Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact both aimed towards achieving 
convergence, but both have been insufficiently adhered to by the member states:. 
Germany and France were the first members to break the deficit limits established by 
the Pact, which lead to reforming the treaty to a more lenient direction. (Pisani-Ferry 
2011: 54) 
 
The European financial crisis that began in late 2009 has constituted a major crisis for 
not just the EMU but also the EU: what began as a sovereign debt crisis has turned into 
an existential crisis for the project of European integration. Even if not all member 
states are members of the EMU, the currency union is a key aspect of the EU: so much 
so that the impending collapse of the EMU during the financial crisis has put the 
legitimacy and viability of the whole European project into question. The crisis has 
revealed the faults of the EMU, and for some commentators it marks a crossroads 
between disintegration on one hand and further integration towards a federal state on the 
other (e.g. Patomäki 2013).  
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2.4 Europe and the nation-state 
 
While the EU was founded in order to overcome the destructive effects of nationalism 
by means of introducing a supranational order, nations continue to play a role in the 
shaping of the EU. The EU has also shaped the nations participating in the integration 
project, not just by them having to adopt its rules and regulations, but also by shaping 
their identity. In this sense, EU has become synonymous with Europe, and during the 
process of integration the member states (and even non-member states), have had to 
define their relationship vis-à-vis Europe: this relationship can be conceptualized with 
the help of the term nation-state identity (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002; Marcussen 
& Roscher 2002), based on Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory. This 
will pave way for introducing the post-structuralist model of Waever (2002, 2005) in 
section 2.5.1. 
 
2.4.1 Nation-state identity 
 
According to Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002: 292) nation-state identities are social 
identities defining social groups on the basis of mostly territorial criteria; they construct 
the “imagined community” of a nation-state (see also Anderson 1986). They are closely 
linked to ideas about sovereignty and statehood, and often contains visions of just 
political and social orders (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 292). 
 
Any identity is defined in relation to what it is not, so every identity requires an 
“Other”: an “us” requires a “them” (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 291). In order for 
an identification process to occur – a sense of inclusion and belonging – a simultaneous 
construction and exclusion of the ‘Other’ is necessary (Olausson 2010: 143). Creating 
internal cohesion by means of establishing an external threat has been a universal 
feature of nation- and state-building in Europe and elsewhere (Wintle 1996: 20): France, 
Germany and Britain have each derived their identity partially from their mutual 
historical rivalry. Similarly, ‘Europe’ can become the “other” against which the national 
community is demarcated (Stråth 2002).  
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The focus of Risse’s and Engelmann-Martin’s (2002) as well as Marcussen’s and 
Roscher’s (2002) investigation is on the historically shifting conceptualizations of the 
nation-state identity vis-à-vis Europe in France, Germany and Britain. The authors 
stress the role of political elites in formulating, manipulating and bringing about shifts 
in the nation-state identity. Especially in defining the relationship between the nation-
state identity and Europe, shifts in this relationship are the result of instrumental and 
power-related interests.  However, existing nation-state identities also define how actors 
view their instrumental interests (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 293).  
 
According to all the authors, nation-state identities tend to be enduring and not subject 
to frequent re-negotiation. This is explained partly by social identity theory: social 
identities are unlikely to change frequently, and partly because nation-state identities are 
embedded into existing formal and informal political institutions. (Risse & Engelmann-
Martin 2002: 293; Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 330)  
 
Since the beginning of European integration after World War II, member states 
participating in the integration project have had to define their nation-state identities not 
just in relation to themselves, but also in relation to Europe and its deepening 
integration. Political visions and identity constructions about “Europe” and European 
order influence and are incorporated into collective nation-state identities to the degree 
that they resonate with national political cultures, with national political institutions and 
the ideas about political order embedded in them (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 
293).  
 
According to Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 333–334), ideas about Europe usually 
appear in various national colors in order to appeal to elite groups and to wider public 
opinion. Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002: 293) also state that each nation has 
different ideas of what Europe is or should be, based on the ideas of political order and 
identity embedded in their own nation-state concept. Marcussen and Roscher delineate 
five ideal-typical identity constructions, which have been prevalent in different 
countries during different points in history: 
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• Liberal-nationalist: “we” confined to the nation-state, political  
sovereignty in the nation-state; “Europe of Nation States”  (Great-Britain, De 
Gaulle’s France) 
• Europe as a community of values (early years of Cold War, re-emerged to some 
extent after the end of east-west conflict) 
• Europe as a third force: a democratic socialist alternative between capitalism and 
communism, overcoming the boundaries of the Cold War order (French socialist 
and German social democrats in the early 1950s) 
• Modern Europe as a part of the Western Community based on liberal democracy 
and social market economy (consensual in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
late 1950s and underlies more recent changes in French collective nation-state 
identity) 
• Christian Europe (Abendland) based on Christian, particularly Catholic, values 
including strong social obligations. This identity construction of Europe was 
common among the Christian Democratic Parties in France and Germany during the 
1950s, but then increasingly amalgamated with the modern Westernized idea of 
Europe. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 333). 
 
According to the authors (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 333–334), these five conceptions 
were heavily contested during the 1950s, and only two of them remained in the 
dominant discourses of the three countries in the 1990s: the liberal nationalist Europe 
and the modern Western idea of Europe as a liberal democracy. The authors point out 
however that both of these concepts come in their own distinct national colors.  
 
2.4.2 Transformation of nation-state identity: critical junctures 
 
According to Risse and Engelmann Martin (2002) and Marcussen and Roscher (2002), 
nation-state identities, like all social identities, are unlikely to change frequently. This is 
due to the fact that the complex and contradictory inputs from the social world are 
usually integrated into existing cognitive schemes and stereotypes or rejected if they do 
not fit existing world-views. Therefore nation-state identities are not constantly being 
renegotiated or questioned and tend to be enduring. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 330) 
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Change is still possible, however. According to Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 331– 
332), there is always some leeway for political elites to make changes in the nation-state 
identity. This happens particularly at so-called critical junctures, when attempts at re-
articulating the nation-state identity will have the strongest likelihood of succeeding.  
 
Marcussen and Roscher (2002: 331) define critical junctures as perceived crisis 
situations that can be complete policy failures, but they can also be triggered by external 
events: examples in the case of German nation-state identity are World War II and the 
Nazi regime; for the French nation-state identity, it was the end of the Cold War. The 
authors claim that in such instances, when old ideas about political order and nation-
state have either become irrelevant or failed, elites start promoting new ideas that are 
more fitting to the newly emerged situation and are line with their own instrumental and 
power interests (ibid.). The euro crisis can also be held as an instance of a critical 
juncture. Figure 1 is graphic representation of the life-cycle of nation-state identity, in 
which a critical juncture represents an opening for redefinition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The life-cycle of nation-state identities. Reproduced from Marcussen & 
Roscher (2002: 330). 
 
According to Marcussen and Roscher, due to the enduring nature of nation-state 
identities, which have their basis in national myths that have become embedded in 
national institutions and political cultures, there is never complete freedom in 
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formulating a new station-state identity. The authors state that in order to be considered 
legitimate, the new identities need to resonate in some way with what was already in 
place. The authors call this fit between the nation-state identity and “Europe” 
resonance. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 331)  
 
In this study, the European financial crisis is treated as an instance of a critical juncture, 
which has the potential to introduce a shift in how the German nation-state identity is 
redefined and renegotiated in relation to “Europe”. This renegotiation takes place in 
both the public statements of elites themselves, in the ways they justify their actions, 
and also in the media that report, contextualizes, interprets and evaluates these 
statements. In order to better understand how such renegotiation takes place, the 
concept of discourse needs to be introduced. The next section will introduce the general 
discourse theoretical framework used in this study, while in 2.5.1, a more specific 
model will be introduced which serves as the foundation of the analysis. This model 
also has many commonalities with the social psychological approach in the preceding 
sections, but has the advantage of being more detailed and, due to being based on post-
structural discourse theory, lends itself better to an analytical approach based on 
language.    
 
 
2.5 Post-structuralist discourse theory 
 
In linguistics, the traditional definition of the term discourse is a linguistic unit, whether 
written or spoken, which extends beyond the level of individual sentences, i.e. what is 
often referred to as ‘text’ (Warnke 2007b). Discourse analysis in this sense investigates 
the way individual sentences or stretches of speech form coherent wholes (Mills 2001: 
132). The definition of the term discourse within this study, however, is based on the 
work of Michel Foucault (e.g. 1972) and other post-structural theorists, most notably 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985).  
 
The post-structural definition of discourse refers to structures of knowledge that extend 
beyond the level of individual statements and texts, forming a kind of ultimate context 
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that delineates what can meaningfully be said about any given topic in a society, 
whereby they “systematically form the objects about which they speak” (Focault 1972: 
48). This definition has influenced a wide variety of disciplines from philosophy, 
history, and literary theory, to sociology and social psychology.  
 
Post-structuralism is based on a theoretical paradigm called structuralism. According to 
structuralist theory, phenomena of human cultural and societal life are only 
understandable in terms of their interrelations. These interrelations form an underlying 
structure, in which each individual element receives its meaning through its relationship 
to other elements within the system.  Within linguistics the structuralist paradigm was 
first introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure in his seminal work Course in General 
Linguistics (1988). According to Saussure’s theory, the signs of a language derive their 
meaning not from reference to an external world, but from their relationships to each 
other. The network of signs that constitute a sign system can be visualized as a fishing 
net, of which each sign forms a knot (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 11).  
 
While in the Saussurean tradition the meaning of each sign is fixed as in an immovable 
crystal grid of sign relations (langue), post-structural theory has moved away from this 
notion towards seeing meanings as arising from fluid web of interrelations, which 
means change in meanings is possible over time. In post-structuralist thought, signs 
form open-ended chains (Derrida 1977) and their meaning can shift in accordance with 
the contexts in which they are articulated. The interest of structuralism in underlying 
structures has been traded for the focus on practice, language in use, and on the 
possibility for meaning to change. While not a post-structuralist thinker himself, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later work summarizes the view of language characteristic 
of post-structuralism: “the meaning of a word is in its use” (Wittgenstein 1990: 18). 
 
In the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), which is the theory underlying the 
model introduced in the next section, the signs forming the web of interrelations are 
potentially subject to struggles and negotiations which attempt to modify and redefine 
their meaning. These struggles and negotiations for meaning take place in actual social 
contexts where language is used. There is a constant attempt to fix the meanings of 
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signs by placing them in relation to each other, that is, as if trying to freeze the web of 
sign relations into place. The fixation of meaning can never be completely attained, 
however, since meaning is ultimately inherently contingent: possible, but not necessary. 
The aim of discourse analysis is to map out struggles to fix the meaning of signs in 
particular ways, and the processes by which some fixations of meanings become so 
conventionalized so as to be regarded as natural. (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 25) 
 
A discourse is the fixation of meaning in a particular domain (Jorgensen & Phillips 
2002: 26). It is the structured totality resulting from articulatory practices that establish 
a relation among signs, modifying their identity in the process. When signs in their 
differential positions are articulated within a discourse, they are called moments; in 
contrast, signs not discursively articulated are called elements. (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 
105)  
 
Moments are nodes in the web of meanings, which acquire their meaning from their 
relationship to other signs in the web. Every discourse is formed by the partial fixation 
of meaning around certain nodal points (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 112). A nodal point is 
a privileged sign from which the other signs acquire their meanings. As an example, in 
medical discourse, ‘the body’ forms a nodal point from which signs such as 
‘symptoms’, ‘tissue’, and ‘scalpel’ acquire their meanings by being related to ‘the body’ 
in particular ways. ‘Democracy’ is a nodal point in (some) political discourses, and in 
nationalist discourse it is ‘the people’. (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 26) 
 
Since the specific meaning of a discursive nodal point is derived from their position in a 
certain discourse, they are in themselves empty, for instance the sign ‘body’ in medical 
discourse. Therefore ‘body’ is both a nodal point within a specific discourse as well as 
an element. Elements that are particularly open for different meaning ascriptions are 
called floating signifiers. So while nodal points are points of crystallization within a 
specific discourse, floating signifiers are signs that different discourses struggle to 
define in their own way. In the case of medical discourse, the nodal point ‘body’ is also 
a floating signifier since it is subject to alternative definitions within other discourses. 
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(Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 28–29) The sign ‘Europe’ has also been called a floating 
signifier (Diez 1999, 2002).  
 
In discourse theory, the reproduction and transformation of meaning are understood as 
political acts, be it in language or in other forms of action. Politics is defined broadly as 
the manner in which the social world is constituted in ways that exclude other ways. 
Politics is the struggle over who has the power to define the way society is organized, 
and therefore it is also a struggle over whose meanings are accepted as the ‘right’ 
meanings.  
 
The aphorism “One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” points to the fact 
that descriptions are not neutral, but rather can represent the phenomenon from different 
angles and points of view and are therefore attempts to ascribe meaning in differing and 
sometimes mutually excluding ways.  
 
Every descriptive statement is essentially informed by a certain perspective and certain 
interests, bound to the socio-cultural position of a social actor (Habscheid 2009: 82). 
Floating signifiers are the particular junctions in which different actors and different 
discourses try to promote their own interpretations. ‘Democracy’ and ‘freedom’ could 
be such ‘hot’ and contested concepts. (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 36) ‘Europe’ 
represents another such contested concept (Diez 2002).  
 
Since a fixation of signs in a certain way typically excludes all other possible meanings 
the signs could have, a discourse is effectively a reduction of possibilities. It is an 
attempt to create a unified system of meaning by fixing the signs in their mutual 
relationships (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 27). Like signs themselves, discourses are 
defined by what they are not. In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, what is excluded from the 
discourse is called the field of discursivity (1985: 111). The field of discursivity of a 
given discourse contains all the surplus meaning that was excluded from that discourse.  
 
Sometimes, some representations of the world seem so natural that there appear to be no 
alternatives. Their seeming naturalness obscures the fact that they too are contingent 
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products of past discursive articulation, and could possibly be different. In discourse 
theory, those discourses that have established themselves as natural or common sense 
are called objective (Laclau 1990: 34, cited in Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 36).  The 
meanings produced by such discourses are considered as facts of everyday life. As 
Berger and Luckmann (1966: 23) state about the reality of everyday life, “It is simply 
there, as self-evident and compelling facticity.” The authors refer to the process 
whereby the source of the social world in human action becomes forgotten as 
reification, which means that “[h]uman meanings are no longer understood as world-
producing but being, in their turn, products of the ‘nature of things’” (ibid.: 89).  
 
Objectivity can be understood as the process of reifying that which is contingent as 
essential and natural. Objectivity is the historical outcome of political struggle; it is a 
sedimented discourse that is not presently subject to being problematized in new 
articulations, but could become so in the future. The concept of a nation-state, which is 
also the object of this study, has often been described as something that is regarded as 
self-evident, natural and objective part of the world (Greenfeld 1992; Billig 1995; 
Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli 2010)  
 
In discourse theory, objectivity is equated with ideology. In the Marxist tradition (e.g. 
Althusser 1971), ideology is regarded as ‘false consciousness’ that distorts true social 
relations. Ideology in this view is therefore something that obscures truth, a position 
which has been criticized by Foucault (1979). This view implies that truth is attainable, 
and it is the specifically the analyst’s viewpoint that is objective and ‘scientific’, For 
Foucault, all knowledge is discursively constituted, and in his conception knowledge is 
intimately tied with power. Truth is not something that can be established 
extradiscursively – as Foucault (1981: 67) famously states, “There is no prediscursive 
providence disposing the world in our favor”. According to Foucault, it is through the 
effects of power that some claims (such as those made by science) attain the label of 
truth.  
 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse theory adopts a position similar to Foucault that truth 
is unattainable, since all social relations, all perspectives and the idea of what is true is 
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discursively constructed. Ideology, defined as objectivity, is simply that which is seen 
as self-evident. Since there are at any given point in time large aspects of our social 
world that are taken for granted, on which the functioning of society is dependent, a 
society completely devoid of ideology would inconceivable in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
terms (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 18). 
 
One such ideology is nationalism: many authors, such as Greenfeld (1992), Billig 
(1995), Calhoun (1997) and Özkirimli (2010) have argued that the ideology of 
nationalism is not something to be relegated only to extremist and secessionist 
movements, but is instead a more fundamental part of how humans have given meaning 
to and thereby organized their social world in the last 200 years. They define 
nationalism as “style of thought” (Greenfeld 1992) or as a “discursive formation” 
(Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli 2010), which serves as a legitimation for the existence of 
nation-states. 
 
The notion that nation-states are seen as self-evident and enduring part of the social 
world is also in line with the Social Identity Theory introduced in the previous section, 
according to which nation-state identities, like all social identities, tend to be enduring 
and not subject to frequent renegotiation. Although a distinction must hereby be 
introduced between the concept of nation(-state) and particular variations of it (nation-
state identities), from the point of view of discourse theory both the general concept and 
particular variations originate from and partake in the same discourse of nationalism. 
According to Greenfeld (1992), the fundamental idea shared by all particular variations 
of nationalism is the idea of a “unique sovereign people”, which in discourse theoretical 
terms can be defined as the nodal point of the nationalist discourse. A particular nation-
state identity (e.g. Germany) may however have multiple different discourses which 
combine to form it. This is illustrated in figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2. Relationship between the general concept of nation(-state) and unique nation-
state identities 
 
 
The next section will introduce a model developed by Ole Wæver (2002, 2005), which 
is based on the post-structuralist discourse theory discussed in this section. This model 
provides a more detailed account on the interrelationship of the ideas of nation and 
state, and how the way this relationship is defined gives rise to different types of nation-
state identities. The model also explains how these different kinds of nation-state 
identities are compatible with differing articulations of “Europe”.  
 
 
2.5.1 Post-structuralist model of nation-state identity and Europe 
 
The post-structuralist model of Wæver (2002, 2005) is a tool to analyze the 
relationships between the discourses of “nation” and “Europe”, developed for a 
discourse analytical approach to foreign policy analysis (see figure 2 below). In addition 
to Wæver, this model has been used by Bärenreuter (2002) to study the articulation of 
Swedish nation-state identity and its relationship to Europe in the Swedish daily press. 
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Figure 3. Theoretical model on the interaction between discursive constructions of  
nation-state identities and ‘Europe’ (adopted from Bärenreuter 2005: 304, based on 
Wæver 2002) 
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The model rests on the notion of layered structures, an idea based on the discourse 
theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). According to the model, some layers of discourse 
are “deeper” and more “sedimented” owing to their higher level of abstraction. The 
deeper levels of discourse can serve as a foundation for higher orders of discourse, 
which can stand in opposition to each other while still sharing codes on the level below. 
These deeper layers can be said to be objective to varying degrees (Laclau 1990: 34, 
cited in Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 36).   
 
In Wæver’s model, discourses on the nation-state are treated as the bottom-most layer in 
relation to discourses on Europe, which means that discourses on the nation-state have a 
higher degree of sedimentation or objectivity than discourses on Europe. The discourses 
on Europe, on the other hand, have a more recent origin, due to which they are less 
sedimented and more subject to contestation. Europe can be seen as a “contested 
concept” (Diez 2002), which is given meaning more or less based on the more 
fundamental idea of the nation-state.  
 
Wæver conceptualizes the differences between various discourses of the nation-state in 
terms of basic constellations of the concepts of state and nation. The question is posed: 
"What is the idea of the state, what is the idea of the nation, and how are the two tied 
together?" (Wæver 2002: 33) According to Wæver, the differences in the possible 
discursive articulations of the relationship between the nation and state can be divided 
into the ideal types of Kulturnation and Staatsnation, which originate with Heinrich 
Meinecke (1911). In a Kulturnation, the state and the nation are regarded as separate, 
with Germany as the paradigmatic example; in a Staatsnation, the concepts of the state 
and nation are fused in a civic conception of nationhood, France as a prototype. 
Kulturnation and Staatsnation are therefore ideal types of nation-state identities. 
 
Discourses on nation-state identity reflecting a Staatsnation-type understanding will 
focus on political notions that the state is said to stand for, on common moral concepts 
(Wertvorstellungen), state institutions, and a shared vision of political consciousness. A 
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Kulturnation-type nation-state identity, on the other hand, will focus on ethnicity or 
culture as the decisive criteria for belonging to a nation. However, it should be 
remembered that these two concepts serve as ideal types and that in discourses on 
national identity, elements of Staatsnation and Kulturnation are frequently combined. 
(Bärenreuter 2005: 195) 
 
Wæver  points out that at this level of the model, not only the use of discursive elements 
of Staatsnation and Kulturnation should be considered, but also the discursive 
construction of the state’s relation to both other states and international organizations 
(external dimension) as well as the “state idea as projected ‘backwards’ onto its 
constituency” (internal dimension) (Wæver 2002: 36). The external dimension of the 
state consists of the state’s relations to other countries and international organizations. 
For instance, it is a question of whether a state’s foreign policy characterized by a 
“raison d’état logic” and “power politics” or rather considered as a “moral enterprise 
leading to, for example, peacekeeping and support for development policies” (ibid.: 36). 
The state’s internal dimension consists in its relation to its constituency. Wæver names 
three examples that imply very different ways of discursively constructing the relation 
between the state and its constituency: The welfare state, the socialist state and the 
liberal-capitalist state (ibid.: 36). 
 
In order to show how these basic characteristics of the discursive construction of 
national identities influence discourses on Europe, one has to move further up in the 
model. At layer 2 we find the “relational position of the state/nation vis-à-vis Europe” 
(Wæver 2002: 37). At the second layer of analysis, attention should be paid to how 
“Europe” is constructed at a general level (as opposed to discourses on day-to-day 
politics) and how this construction fits with the respective concepts of state/nation. 
Questions that help to grasp the general presentation of Europe include the following: 
“Is Europe an arena for intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign states? Is 
Europe a market ungoverned by state intervention? Is Europe integrating around a 
Western core? Is Europe all European?” (ibid.: 38). 
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Wæver (2002: 38) points out that for discourses on Europe to be successful, they must 
be constructed in a way in which they are perceived as being in accordance with the 
basic state-nation constellation at layer 1. This is similar to the concept of resonance in 
the social psychological account of Marcussen and Roscher (2002). If the discursive 
construction of Europe is in conflict with the various national understandings of state 
and nation, there is a fairly strong likelihood that these European narratives will be 
rejected, in whcih case pro-European discourses, in order to be successful, have to 
assure that this supposed threat is not “true” and that accession to the EU is thus not 
contradictory to (cultural) national self-understanding (Bärenreuter 2005: 197). 
 
Lastly, on a third analytical layer, Wæver  locates “the more specific European policies 
pursued by specific groups of actors, often political parties, thereby adding more 
specificity to the very general level of abstraction of level 2” (Wæver  2002: 38). It is on 
this layer that most day-to-day discourses are located. According to Wæver, changes on 
the third layer are the most minor ones and represent the type of change which can be 
observed in everyday political debates when politicians change their line of 
argumentation concerning a particular political issue. Changes on the second layer, on 
the other hand, already require a more profound change in the discursive structure and 
presuppose actors that try to reformulate the discursive connections between the basic 
definition of state/nation and Europe (ibid.: 38). Wæver points out however that 
although the three discursive layers are distinguished analytically, this does not imply 
that three distinct discourses can be found. “Rather, each discourse on Europe 
comprises – or articulates itself around – all three levels simultaneously” (ibid.: 33). In 
Bärenreuter's view, the focus can however be different depending on the text analyzed 
(Bärenreuter 2005: 197).  
 
According to Wæver  (2002: 38), the most resistant to change are discourses located on 
the first layer, as the fundamental conceptions of state and nation tend to have a long 
history, only change gradually, and are often heavily laden with emotion. This is of 
course in line with the assertion of Social Identity Theory made in section 2.4.2 that 
nation-state identities, because they are embedded in political culture and institutions, 
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are less likely to be subjected to renegotiation. It is also in line with approaches to 
nationalism which see it as an all-pervading ideology that renders the idea of nation-
state as a self-evident reality. Diez (2002: 15) argues however that Wæver generally 
overestimates the continuity of the nation-state concept, as it too is continually 
reconstructed through discursive practice.  
 
Diez  (2002: 14) also points out that the emphasis that Wæver and other theorists of the 
Copenhagen school of foreign policy analysis lay on the nation-state concept as the 
fundamental organizing principle of discourses on Europe is insofar misplaced that 
there can be other discourses at play, such as that of the economy. This issue was 
already hinted at in figure 1 in the last section, where particular nation-state identities 
were pictured as being formed at the intersection of both the more universal discourse 
of nationalism as well as other discourses that might be different in the case of each 
nation-state. This is an important point to keep in mind. While the general focus of the 
analysis can be on the concepts of nation and state, it should also be observed how they 
configure in other discourses to articulate a nation-state identity at a particular point in 
history.  
 
The next section will give a specific account of how the German nation-state identity 
has been articulated over time, in terms of its state and nation components, and in terms 
of its relationship to Europe. This historical outline is mostly based on the accounts of 
Wæver (2005), Marcussen and Roscher (2002) and Risse and Engelmann-Martin 
(2002), as well as other authors. This account provides a historical context for the 
analysis of chapter 5.   
 
2.5.2 Articulation of German nation-state identity from late 19th century to early 21st 
century 
 
According to Wæver (2005), the German concept of nation-state is characterized by the 
separation between the state and the nation. At a time when the ideology and discourse 
of nationalism was gaining a foothold in Europe, the experience of Germany was 
characterized by the fact that it was not a unified state, in contrast to important 
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neighbors such as France. Because of this, Germany had to found its nationhood on the 
existence of a community bound by language and culture instead of on the existence of 
a state. (Wæver 2005: 46) 
 
According to Brubaker (1992: 1), since the development of national feeling preceded 
the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally conceived politically 
nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation was 
conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, 
linguistic, or racial community, and as an irreducible particular Volksgemeinschaft.  
 
The German Romantics like Herder did not even conceive of the importance of the 
state: their focus was more on the nation as an ethno-cultural phenomenon. For a while 
statehood was not even aspired to, but the current state of affairs was idealized as it 
allowed for the cultivation of a deeper, truer nation. (Wæver 2005: 46) 
 
It was later in the wake of Napoleonic wars that the necessity of state was seen The 
German idea of the state was by itself shaped by romanticism and German idealism. 
According to Wæver, German idealism involved the thinking of “strong concepts”: 
therefore, the state that was thought of was characterized by power. In the definition of 
the historian Heinrich von Treitschke, “the nature of the state is first power, then 
secondly power, and thirdly again power.” This concept of a power state is a German 
creation: more abstract, more absolute and more defined by power than elsewhere. 
(Wæver 2005: 46–47) 
 
The German nation-state identity underwent a complete overhaul after World War II. 
The form this reconstruction took is summed up by the novelist Thomas Mann: “We do 
not want a German Europe, but a European Germany”.  This became the mantra of 
West German elites in the post WWII Germany and was generally shared by the public 
opinion (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 340). To be a “good German” even today means 
to be a “good European” and to wholeheartedly support European integration; to be a 
“good European German” also means to have overcome the country’s militarist and 
nationalist past and to have learned the right lessons from history (Risse & Engelmann-
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Martin 2002: 287).  
 
According to Wæver (2005: 47), after WWII the concept of the power state was 
problematized; negated, but not forgotten. This manifested itself in a constitutional 
system that counteracted any concentration of power and by tying Germany to 
international organizations, mainly the EU. At the same time, in the wake of the Nazi 
regime, the nation was just as problematic a concept as the state. The solution was to 
adopt the identity of the Holocaust nation, as the only responsible way to being German 
was now to fight nationalism, war and power politics. First and foremost, the re-
emergence of a strong and exalted German state had to be prevented. (ibid.: 48) 
 
After 1945 the newly founded CDU, with Konrad Adenauer in its lead, embraced 
European unification as an alternative to the nationalism of the past. Christianity, 
democracy and social market economy became the three pillars onto which a collective 
European identity was based, sharply distinguished from the past. Germany’s Nazi past 
was seen as Europe’s “Other”. Supporting European integration was a means of 
integrating Germany into the West and overcoming the Nazi legacy (Marcussen & 
Roscher 2002: 340–341). The postwar Germany had also embraced federalism as its 
own administrative model and with it a new identity: German citizens would refer to 
their country as “Federal Republic” (Bundesrepublik) more often than they would call it 
“Germany” (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 33–34)  
 
Throughout the early 1950s there was no elite consensus on German post-war identity, 
however: different conclusions were drawn from the legacy of WWII. From the 1960s 
onwards a federalist consensus prevailed. Political elites embraced the modern Western 
view of Europe, with Germany’s past and Communism as Europe’s “Other”. 
(Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 342) 
 
German unification did not result in reconsideration of the European orientation (Risse 
& Engelmann-Martin 2002: 308). Even though the reunification can be said to have 
“normalized” Germany and reinstated its national sovereignty, it was still the elite 
consensus to sacrifice actual sovereignty in order to further European integration and to 
38 
 
prevent Germany from becoming isolated (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 63).  
 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, like his French colleague Jacques Delors, was largely in favor 
of European integration and saw it natural to extend the German federalist model to the 
European level (Pisani-Ferry 2011: 34). The political elite shared the consensus of 
dropping the D-Mark in favor of the euro, even if the majority of the public was against 
it (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 62). 
 
For the German citizens, the D-Mark was more than just an economic instrument: it was 
a national symbol (Minkkinen & Patomäki 1997: 64). According to Pisany-Ferry the D-
Mark was an emblem of national pride, much like the football team and the export 
industry, and acted as a substitute for a national flag that the Germans could not, owing 
to their history, make into symbol of the nation. Pisany-Ferry states that  the decision to 
accept that the Mark would in essence be shared with others was a meaningful decision, 
since this is what it meant if the euro was introduced (Pisany-Ferry 2011: 34).  
 
Chancellor Kohl succeeded in framing the question about the Euro as the symbol of 
European integration and its adoption as an existential question between more Europe 
or a return to nationalism. Even those who opposed the EMU did not dare to touch the 
German consensus on European integration, but their criticism took the form of asking 
for a delay or demanding that the convergence criteria be strictly applied.  To the extent 
that there was debate on the Euro, it was framed in terms of German Europeanness 
versus Deutsche Mark patriotism.  Supporters of the EMU tried to emphasize that the 
Euro would be equal in strength and stability to the D-Mark, whereas critics doubted 
this could be possible. The insistence on the convergence criteria was to reassure the 
German public of the stability of the single currency, mainly because the hyperinflation 
prior to World War II still lingered in its collective memory. (Risse & Engelmann-
Martin 2002: 308–312)  
 
According to Wæver, post-unification Germany is an emerging battle about the nature 
of the state. There have been two types of arguments in the German political discourse 
for the continuing negation of the power state. One line of argument, represented by 
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pacifist Greens and Social Democrats, is that the power state must be avoided for moral 
reasons, because the danger of it leading to power politics, nationalism, and wars. 
Another argument from the Center-Right of the political spectrum also takes the anti-
state position, but is based more historical and geographical grounds. According to this 
line of argument, should a balance of power pattern re-emerge in Europe, Germany 
would be in a losing position for being in the center. Both lines of argument, although 
their reasoning is different, end up at the same conclusion: Germany must strive for a 
different Europe (beyond the nation-state, not characterized by a balance of power) and 
a different Germany (not a power state). (Wæver 2005: 55) 
 
Nonetheless, there is also a third line of argumentation that challenges the anti-state 
position of the former two. According to this position, a nation-state has to have space 
for maneuvering politically and a political-military profile, because that is the nature of 
the nation-state.  Because Germany was now unified, it had to reclaim its position as a 
‘normal’ nation-state. On the whole, the key word in the debates has been ‘normality’. 
This normalization has been articulated on a more philosophical level by a strand of 
thinkers who are called neostatists. Their aim is to rehabilitate the state, and break the 
negation surrounding the power state. (Wæver 2005: 56–57) 
 
Although the elite consensus concerning a “European Germany” has largely remained 
untouched up to the 21th century, the former chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) 
is said to have embodied the neostatist position in defending Germany’s right to have its 
own way and its own national interests and by initially raising concerns regarding the 
continuity in German policy towards the European Union (Wæver 2005: 57). The 
changes on the whole have however been at the level of style and rhetoric and not so 
much in content. (Marcussen & Roscher 2002: 344). According to Wæver (2005: 57), 
as of 2004, the German government was still far from adopting the old power state 
logic, even if isolated statements from chancellors and opinion could lead one to 
conclude that neostatism was the new direction. However in Wæver’s (2005: 57–58) 
view the public discourse suggests that the leading elite in years of the 21st century was 
still behind the idea of an anti-power state: Germany did have own views and interests, 
but these were viewed through the lens of the European vision. Any solution for 
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Germany was European.  
 
German Europeanness does contain unique national elements. Europe’s “other” is not 
another part of the world, but both Germany’s and Europe’s past of militarism and 
balance of power. This new Europe is therefore seen in the first place as a stable peace 
order in an almost Kantian vein, combining cooperation with external partners with 
liberal democracy internally. The German vision of European order is also characterized 
by the German domestic model of cooperative federalism: the “United States of 
Europe” are not seen as a unitary state with a strong central government, but as a 
distinctively federalist order. (Risse & Engelmann-Martin 2002: 314–315).  
 
According to Wæver (2005: 42), Europe and the EU are essential for the central 
narration of what Germany is and where it is heading, and should the integration project 
collapse, the meaning of “Germany” would have to be radically rearticulated. The 
financial crisis in Europe therefore not only has the future and identity of the “project 
Europe” at stake, but also presents a turning point for the formulation of Germany’s 
identity and position in Europe.  
 
The figure below displays different articulations of Germany’s nation-state identity in 
different periods of time. The basic ideas of German state and nation are formulated as 
“state is power” and “nation is culture”. The different articulations of nation-state 
identity are based on either affirming or suppressing these basic components, denoted 
by the +/- signs on the second row. Each of these couplings also entails different 
conceptualizations of Europe. The articulations of the Merkel era 
(2005 – today) are yet to be studied. The present study will however contribute to an 
understanding of the euro crisis as a turning point in how Germany’s identity is 
understood. 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. Different articulations of German nation-state identity  
(adopted from Wæver 2005) 
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3 EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES 
 
This chapter introduces the types of texts analyzed in this study: editorials and 
commentaries. The aim is to provide an overview of these text types in terms of their 
function and structure, which will provide an understanding of these texts as particular 
kinds of communicative acts with a certain status in the constellation of communicative 
acts within a society. This will better allow to both justify the choice of material in this 
study as well as to contextualize the findings. We will first look at the general category 
of media texts, its subcategory journalistic texts and how these can be classified into 
several text types (genres) according to both the communicative functions they realize 
and other criteria. Then we will investigate the functions and characteristics of editorials 
and commentaries.  
 
 
3.1 Journalistic texts and text functions 
 
Editorials and commentaries are a genre of journalistic texts, which themselves are a 
subcategory of media texts (Burger 2005: 64). Media texts in general intend to engage 
their audience, convey information and produce reactions in their audiences (Briggs & 
Cobley 2002). Media texts and especially journalistic texts play a significant role in 
both formulating and shaping political opinion (Wittkämper 1992; Bucher & Straßner 
1991; Le 2010) and acting as “fourth power” and a mediator between the state and the 
people (Stober 1992). According to Thompson (1995: 15), media wield symbolic power 
within society, which is interconnected with political power. Media texts are therefore 
also important loci for the manifestation of ideology and discourse (Van Dijk 1988; 
Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1995), also pertaining to the nation(-state) (e.g. Anderson 
1983; Billig 1995; Higgins 2004; Dekavalla 2010; Mihelj 2011) and Europe (e.g. 
Bärenreuter 2005; Olausson 2010).  
 
According to Burger, journalistic texts can be categorized both in terms of their 
structure and function (2005: 207). Structurally journalistic texts can take both 
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monological and dialogical forms; interviews are an example of the latter. As functions 
Burger names the list of Brinker (2001): information, appeal, obligation, contact and 
declaration. Burger also introduces the text type typology of Lüger (1995), which is also 
based on communicative functions. According to this typology, journalistic texts 
typically fall into the following categories: 
 
 Texts with a focus on information  
 Texts with a focus on expressing opinion  
 Texts with a call to action  
 Texts with the aim of instructing  
 Contact-oriented texts with the aim of gaining attention 
 
This typology can be seen as an inventory of ideal types based on and corresponding to 
text functions. Burger groups information-oriented texts with the communicative 
function of informing and both texts with an opinion orientation and texts with the 
instruction orientation under the appeal function (2005: 209), henceforth called 
informative and appellative texts. Burger does not consider all the text classes as 
relevant for categorizing journalistic texts; for instance, contact-oriented texts and texts 
calling to action do not stand out for him as independent text classes within the 
journalistic sphere (2005: 209). Burger finally narrows down his selection of 
informative and appellative text classes. 
 
Located below text types in the order of specificity are genres. A genre can be defined 
as a routinized communicative action within a society (Günthner & Knoblauch 1995) or 
as “standardized models” of texts (Burger 2005: 208). According to Brinker (2010: 
125), genres are conventional models for complex linguistic actions, which can be 
described as typical combinations of contextual (situational), communicative-functional 
and structural (grammatical and thematical) characteristics.  
 
Burger lists the following journalistic genres: news message, report, coverage, editorial, 
commentary and interview. As per Brinker’s (2010) definition, all these genres have 
44 
 
specific defining characteristics and predominantly manifest one or more of the 
communicative functions. In addition to the communicative functions, Burger (2005) 
differentiates genres according to the following criteria: 
 
 The type of thematic unfolding (narrative, descriptive, argumentative). 
 The breadth of internal details, i.e. to what extent the text answers the questions 
what, where, who, when etc.  
 Intertextual text history: how did the text come to be and is there a specific 
individual author? 
 Synchronic intertextuality: is the text referring to other texts in the newspaper? 
 The perspective from which the text is written, and whether it is that of the 
author or someone else’s. 
 The presence of the author in the text, the role (s)he takes and the type of 
situation in which it is taken. 
 
In accordance with these criteria, Burger distinguishes a simple news message from a 
report (both informative texts), and both from a coverage, which has characteristics of a 
both informative and an appellative text due to the strong perspective of the journalist 
(Burger 2005: 211). On the other end of the spectrum Burger places commentaries, 
which are characterized by a strong emphasis on the appellative function.  
 
Burger’s typology does not include editorials, but as we shall see, they have many 
features in common with the commentary. Before discussing the definition of a 
commentary as given by Burger, let us first have a look at the characteristics and 
functions of an editorial. 
 
 
3.2 Editorial 
 
Research on the history and functions of the editorial is very limited (Lagonikos 2005). 
The existing research has been summarized well by Lagonikos (2005). Accounts of the 
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structure and function of the editorial have been formulated by MacDougall (1973), 
Stonecipher (1979) as well as Van Dijk (1996). Their accounts will be presented here 
briefly. 
 
The editorial is usually located in the same position every day, clearly distinguished 
from the other sections of the newspaper, which has an important symbolic function in 
separating the editorial from more purely informative articles (Fowler 1991: 208). The 
editorial is the place within a newspaper where the ideology of the newspaper is 
clarified, re-established and reasserted in relation to troublesome events, and where the 
paper speaks in the most direct manner to its readership, presenting its perception of 
reality in the form it deems most suitable for the readers (Le 2010: 17). Through 
editorials, newspapers use their "expert voices" to interpret news but at the same time 
implicitly construct reality from a particular world-view (Jaworski-Galasinski 2002: 
643). Editorial writers decide what events and issues are important and how they should 
be interpreted (Hulteng 1973) 
  
According to van Dijk (1996: 2), editorials “play a role in the formation and change of 
public opinion, in setting the political agenda, and in influencing social debate, decision 
making and other forms of social and political action.” Van Dijk (ibid.: 15) ascribes 
editorials to a larger class of opinion discourse. Hulteng (1973: 13) states that the 
purpose of the editorial is often to stimulate readers into action, but in an implicit way, 
and to provide “benchmarks” for the readers in order to test thinking against and shape 
conclusions about events and what they mean.  
 
According to Rystrom (1983), the editorial writer’s position within a newspaper is more 
prestigious than that of a normal journalist. Hulteng (1973) characterizes the editorial 
writer as "a combination of philosopher, historian, advocate and educator”. Hulteng 
(1973) points out however that the editorial writer does not have complete freedom in 
what (s)he chooses to write, but is to a certain extent under pressure to follow the 
newspaper’s policy, decided by the newspaper's editorial boards.  
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However, the editorial of today may have less power than it used to, according to 
Seymour-Ure (1991: 43): Compared to the editorial of the past, which was “the 
definitive corporate statement of a paper’s opinions, the editorial today is less special 
owing to the increasing personalization of the press. This means that editorials are often 
signed, as is the case with the editorials of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung used in 
this study.   
 
Additionally, newspapers include analyses in more sections of their newspapers, and as 
a result the editorial pages are competing with news sections, which means that one 
single editorial voice is slowly becoming less powerful than when the opinion article 
first appeared in newspapers (Lagonikos 2005: 23). Commentaries, discussed below, 
can be seen a section that shares many characteristics with the editorial, as we shall see.  
 
There are several accounts of the structure of an editorial. Here, three will be presented. 
According to Stonecipher (1979: 40), an editorial is like an essay, in that it consists of 
an introduction, a body and a conclusion, where these parts do not have to appear in the 
order every time like in an essay. MacDougall (1973: 60), on the other hand, delineates 
the editorial into a subject or news peg, the reaction and the reasons. According to Van 
Dijk (1996: 2), a modern editorial has the following parts: 1) Summary of the event; 2) 
evaluation of the event (especially of actions and actors, in terms of good and bad, right 
and wrong, involving the opinions, values and underlying ideologies of the newspaper), 
and 3) pragmatic conclusion as a recommendation, advice or warning (answering the 
question “What’s next?”). These models are all presented in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1. Structural theories of editorials (reproduced from Lagonikos 2005: 27) 
MacDougall 1973 Stonecipher 1979 Van Dijk 1996 
Subject / News Peg Introduction Summary 
The Reactions Body Evaluation 
The Reasons Conclusion Pragmatic Conclusion 
 
Taking Van Dijk’s model as a basis as the most recent of these models, we can see that 
each section realizes a different textual function in terms of the functions listed in the 
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last section. The summary serves the informative function, and evaluation and 
pragmatic conclusion both serve the appellative function, as per Burger (2005). Using 
Burger’s questions for determining the characteristics genre, we can come to the 
following types of answers based on everything that has been said so far: 
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of an editorial 
Main communicative function Appellative 
Type of thematic unfolding Descriptive-argumentative 
The breadth of internal details 
Answers to what, where, who, when 
included in the summary of the event, 
which form the basis of an evaluation 
Intertextual text history 
Based on the stance of the editorial board 
of a newspaper on an issue, has an author 
but can be unsigned 
Synchronic intertextuality 
The literature is not clear on whether an 
editorial can refer to other texts in the 
newspaper 
Perspective of the text 
Reflects the policy of the whole 
newspaper 
Presence and role of the author in the 
text 
The author does not refer to himself, but 
might refer to the newspaper as a “we” 
 
Now we have come to a better understanding of what constitutes an editorial. 
Understood as a communicative act, it has the primary function of taking an evaluative 
stance on a current issue, while bringing forth arguments to back up this stance. 
Because of this and because of the position an editorial has in the larger universe of 
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texts – the status and the prestige the editorial section of especially a large newspaper is 
attributed with – it is a political communicative act due to its none too insignificant role 
in the negotiation of meaning within society.  
 
 
3.3 Commentary 
 
The function of commentaries is very similar to that of editorials. They are opinion 
articles which have the function of putting worth certain preferred perspectives about 
the world (Lavid, Arús & Moratón 2012). According to Wang (2008: 170), the purpose 
of commentaries is to offer the readers a perspective on important public matters, 
delivered in a distinctive and sometimes authoritative voice. Commentaries are typically 
written by academics, journalists and other experienced native language writers (Wang 
2007: 3) and exert an important influence on political opinion-formation, both on the 
everyday reader and on the institutional and/or elite members of a society (Van Dijk 
1998). 
 
According to Burger (2005: 215), a commentary has the following characteristics: 
 
 it is a “dependent” text type acting as complement to a report, the information of 
which is assumed to be known 
 it carries its author’s name 
 a subjective viewpoint expressed in a commentary is not only tolerated but 
demanded, even if it often concurs with the official line of the newspaper 
 there is a prevalent use of evaluating language, not bound to a specific part of 
the text, and these evaluations are often emotionally loaded 
  Accordingly, the language is expressive with a wide use of metaphors, idioms 
etc.  
 The evaluations are supported by an argumentative text structure, and the 
argumentation can turn out into an exhortation (although it is not a rule), 
whereby it is directed not so much at the reader as to politicians and institutions. 
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From this list we can see that the commentary shares many features with the editorial: 
subjective viewpoint and an evaluative style supported by argumentation. The 
exhortation, which according to Burger is not a necessary feature of the genre, is similar 
to the pragmatic conclusion at the end of an editorial according to Van Dijk’s (1996) 
model. The main differences between the two genres are that the commentary is 
dependent on an accompanying report and carries its author’s name, whereas an 
editorial is an independent piece of writing and can be unsigned.  
 
Most importantly, however, both of these text types are consciously participating in and 
shaping public political discourse and can therefore be considered as important 
expressions of and contributions to the official discourse – both in the sense of 
discussion as well as in the sense used in this study – on any given topic. This is also the 
reason why they have been chosen as the material of this study. 
. 
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4 DISCOURSE LINGUISTICS 
 
The model introduced here comes from German Diskurslinguistik (discourse linguistics, 
DL) that uses a thoroughly linguistic methodology (as opposed to an interdisciplinary 
approach in some other forms of discourse analysis) in order to study discourses as they 
appear across a large number of texts. DL has concerned itself with applying Foucault’s 
ideas of discourse within a linguistic framework (Warnke 2007). While it is understood 
that discourse encompasses necessarily more than language, and that linguistic 
discourse analysis is therefore a sub-field for interdisciplinary discourse analysis, there 
have been attempts to specify discourse as a linguistic object and to provide a set of 
tools for grasping as much of discourse by linguistic means as possible (e.g. Warnke & 
Spitzmüller  2011a).  
 
Within DL, discourse is understood as the collective socially stratifying and action-
shaping knowledge of specific cultures and collectives (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011b: 
8). According to Gardt (2007: 30), discourses are social stocks of knowledge 
surrounding a particular topic which are expressed in different kinds of statements and 
texts, are shared by social groups of varying sizes, reflect as well as influence the 
attitudes of the groups to this topic and thereby shape social reality as regards this topic.  
 
DL utilizes a broad set of tools based on established linguistic concepts. Warnke and 
Spitzmüller (2011a, 2011b) have systematized these tools into what they call the 
DIMEAN model (German acronym for ‘discourse multi-level analysis). This model will 
be presented in the following.   
 
 
4.1 DIMEAN model 
 
The DIMEAN model is a methodological framework for linguistically oriented 
discourse analysis. The model consists of three basic layers: 
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 intratextual layer (texts) 
 agent layer (actors) 
 transtextual layer (knowledge, discourse) 
 
Any discourse analysis starts at the level of individual texts, understood broadly as “all 
communicates, notwithstanding modality or mediality, if they are perceived as being 
concluded and autonomous to a significant degree” (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 91). 
Texts are the material manifestation of discourse, and therefore textual analysis is the 
entrance point into the actual matter of discourse analysis, which is the transtextual 
layer. Between the textual and the transtextual layer, the DIMEAN model posits the 
agent layer. This layer mediates between the two other layers, and consists of actors, i.e. 
people and social groups engaged in discourse, attempting to make their voice and put 
forward their definition of social reality.  
 
The intratextual, agent and transtextual layer can themselves be further subdivided in a 
way that provides tools and perspectives for textual analysis. For instance, the 
intratextual layer is sub-divided into word-oriented analysis, proposition-oriented 
analysis and text-oriented analysis. These can be further divided into the analysis of 
keywords, stigmatized words and ad hoc formations on the word level; syntactic 
configuration (e.g. active vs. passive voice), rhetorical figures and tropes (especially 
metaphors), presuppositions, implicatures and speech acts on the proposition level; and 
text type, text strategies, topic development as well as metaphorical and lexical fields on 
the text level. (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 83–85)   
 
The agent layer includes the analysis of the roles of interaction, i.e. the authors and 
anticipated addressees of the texts. Warnke and Spitzmüller emphasize the point that 
the interest here lies specifically in the roles, or the discursively constructed personae. 
In structuralist and post-structuralist terms, it is the subject positions rather than the 
actual individuals behind the texts that are of interest (see Chandler 2002: 180–181; 
Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 14–15). Warnke and Spitzmüller name several examples for 
how roles or subject positions are constituted within a text. They include self-
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attributions of certain social groups, claims of expertise or authority (e.g. academic titles 
in signatures of letters sent to the editor), or the creation of a specific habitus such as 
that of a responsible citizen. Roles of interaction can also be constructed by referring to 
social groups that are addressed or explicitly not addressed. What also need to be 
considered are extrinsic attributions, such as expert quotes, critique on third parties, and 
so on. The key question is always how actors can be positioned or how they position 
themselves in the discourse under study. (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 85–86) 
 
The transtextual layer, the layer of the actual discourse, is discovered at at the end of the 
analysis of multiple texts. Discovering the transtextual layer amounts to extrapolating 
from the cumulative findings of the previous stages. Just as the meaning of words and 
sentences is ultimately determined by their context, discourse can similarly be 
understood as context in the broadest sense (Busse 2007). Discourse is the ultimate 
determinant for what counts as meaningful statements (cf. Foucault 1972).  In DL, the 
transtextual layer is equated to knowledge: it is that which counts as true from the point 
of view of specific social groups in a certain domain of life. Warnke and Spitzmüller 
(2011a: 87) name the following phenomena as elements of the transtextual layer: 
 
1) Intertextuality and intermediality  
2) Schemata, i.e. collective cognitive routines that organize scenes (frames) or 
procedures (scripts) 
3) Discourse-semantic ground figures (Busse 1997), prime figures of thought used 
to categorize and organized reality (e.g. ‘us’ and ‘them’) 
4)  Topoi (culturally rooted preconceptions) 
5) Metapragmatic evaluation (ascriptions of value to linguistic and non-linguistic 
action, e.g. ‘talking posh’, ‘acting polite’) 
6) Signals for historicity (the use of ‘old’ language as well as references to 
historicity, such as ‘globalese’, ‘anachronistic wording)’ 
7) Ideologies as sets of values and beliefs and mentalities as that which social 
groups ‘feel’, ‘want’ or ‘wish’ 
8) The context of general debates to which the discourse relates.  
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Some of the features on the above list involve their own sets of methods (such as frame 
analysis and topoi). However, since this is the level of discourse itself, it is possible to 
depart here from the DIMEAN model and apply the model outlined in 2.5.1 on this 
layer. This model amounts to analyzing the articulations of the concepts “nation”, 
“state”, “Europe”, “EU” and their mutual relationships. 
 
To summarize, concrete discourse analysis starts at the most basic layer (texts) and from 
there “ascends” upwards to the more complex issues until the level of discourse is 
reached (Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 82). Only elements that systematically appear 
on the lower layers and run through the corpus can extrapolated as discursive 
knowledge on the transtextual layer. 
 
The DIMEAN model as a whole is very detailed. In their own words, Warnke and 
Spitzmüller have proposed the DIMEAN model as a collection and systematization of 
what can be done in a linguistic discourse analysis rather than what must be done 
(Warnke & Spitzmüller 2011a: 86). The model is meant as an analytical toolbox, the 
application of which is determined by the research goal. The following section will 
outline the analytical approach used within this study, which is based on the DIMEAN 
model.  
 
 
4.2 Application of the DIMEAN model: Keywords and semantic roles 
 
This study focuses mainly on the intratextual layer for the discovery of discursive 
articulations, i.e. how the signs “Germany”, “Germans”, “German”, “EU” and “Europe” 
are defined. The focus is therefore on keywords, defined in the broad sense as words 
indexing the (German) nation and state. For the purpose of analysis, it first worth 
making an inventory of the types of words that are typical indices for the discourse of 
nationalism that constructs nation-state identity. This inventory will be constructed on 
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the basis of previous studies that have examined the presence of nationalist discourse in 
the media. An analogous inventory can also be created for “Europe”.  
 
Another important analytic tool that will be used consists in semantic roles. The concept 
of semantic roles is based on the theory of Fillmore (1971), but a similar concept of 
participant roles appears also in M.A.K. Halliday’s (1985) systemic functional 
grammar. While grammatical roles such as Subject and Object and grammatical cases 
(nominative, genitive, accusative etc.) pertain to the syntactic function of a word, 
semantic roles attempt to map the function of a word in terms of its meaning in the 
sentence, to some extent (but not completely) independent of the grammatical role of 
the word. This approach allows to analyze propositional content on a level that is at 
once abstract but also highly relevant in terms of shedding light on the way that 
phenomena are represented. The list of semantic roles used in this study is based on the 
work of both Halliday (1985) and von Polenz (2008). Although Halliday represents the 
tradition of systemic functional grammar while von Polenz aligns himself with valence 
grammar, their approaches overlap so that their approaches may be combined into a 
comprehensive analytical toolkit.  
 
4.2.1 Keywords indexing nation-state and Europe 
 
For the purpose of building an inventory of relevant word categories, some of the most 
important studies concerning the discourse of nationalism, also named “banal 
nationalism” by the pioneer of these types of studies, Michael Billig (1995), were 
reviewed. Billig’s study focused on his native Britain; later studies have focused both 
on Britain and its regions (Brookes 1999; Bishop & Jaworski 2003; Rosie, McInnes, 
Condor, Petersoo & Kennedy 2004; Higgins 2004; Dekavalla 2010), on Greece 
(Demertzis, Papathanassopoulos & Armenakis 1999; Madianou 2002), Turkey (Yumul 
& Özkirimli 2000), Taiwan and South Korea (Chung 2000), China (Guo, Cheong & 
Chen 2007) as well as Slovenia and the US (Mihelj 2011).  The studies have found that 
the following linguistic elements may act as indices of the nationalist discourse: 
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 National name (e.g. Germany) or capital city 
 References to “country”, “nation”, “the people” or origin (e.g. “German” as an 
adjective) 
 References to the state, its organs and politicians 
 3rd person plural (“we”) 
 Deictic words (“here”, “there” etc.) 
 
The above list of word categories can be used as a basis of locating keywords that 
provide an entry point into analyzing discursive articulations pertaining to the nation 
and state. A few specifying remarks still have to be made concerning the nature of some 
of these keywords. In the case of personal pronouns, deictic words and definite articles, 
the context is of great importance. When attempting to establish a link between the use 
of these words and a nationalist discourse, the whole context in which the words are 
used needs to be taken into account. For instance, the study of Rosie, McInnes, Condor, 
Petersoo & Kennedy (2004) found that in the case of the UK, the “we” in Scottish 
newspaper most often indexed the Scottish nation rather than the whole UK 
 
In the above list a distinction has been made between words indexing the state organs 
(i.e. government) and words referring to the nation or the country. Billig (1995) as well 
as Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2009) have however shown that both the country name as 
well as the capital name can be used in a metonymic fashion to denote the government, 
whereby they can – and frequently do – occupy the position of a grammatical subject in 
a sentence.  
 
The same principles and categories applied to analyzing the nationalist discourse can 
also be applied to analyzing “European” discourse. The EU or Europe is an “imagined 
community” (Anderson 1983) of a larger scope than the nation-state, and there have 
been studies analyzing the discursive construction of this European community and how 
it interacts with the discursive construction of the national community in the media and 
in political speeches (e.g. Bärenreuter 2005; Olausson 2010; Krizsán 2011). These 
studies have typically focused on the analysis of the first person plural and its referents. 
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This study also takes the first person plural into account, while also analyzing the usage 
and referents of the words EU, Europe, and other EU and Europe related words.  
 
4.2.2 Predicate classes and semantic roles 
 
Almost all sentences consist of a propositional content and an action content (von 
Polenz 2008: 101). In terms of Halliday’s (1985) functional grammar, language can be 
said to have an ideational metafunction, which corresponds to von Polenz’s 
propositional content, as well as an interpersonal metafunction, which corresponds to 
the action content. The propositional content or ideational metafunction concerns 
statements about reality. The most important element of a proposition is the predication, 
because the predicate determines what can be said. The predicate is most often a verb, 
although the predicate can also be realized through an adjective or a noun (von Polenz 
2008: 105). In systemic functional grammar, the predicate on the level of the ideational 
metafunction is called the process.  
 
The semantic role of any noun, adjective or adverb is determined by two factors: 1) its 
position in relation to the predicate and 2) the nature of the predicate itself. Because the 
list of semantic roles drawn upon in this study stems from both von Polenz (2008) and 
Halliday (1985), the predicate typologies of both authors will also be presented. Von 
Polenz proposes five categories or classes of predicates: 
 
 Action predicates: denote either individual or continuous type of action by an 
actor of some sort. 
 Process predicates: denote events and happenings which take place without 
agency. Also included are events of perception, cognition and affect. 
 Status predicates: denote alterable physical and psychological states of living 
beings, objects or abstract concepts. 
 Quality predicates: denote unalterable states and qualities of living beings, 
objects or abstract concepts. These are expressed through predicative nouns, 
verbs and adjectives.  
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 Genus predicates: denote the ascription of an object to a class, expressed solely 
through predicative nouns.  
 
In Halliday’s (1985) systemic functional grammar verbs are categorized in terms of 
several kinds of processes: 
 
 Material processes (doing): doing (action), happening (event) 
 Behavioral (behaving) 
 Mental (sensing): seeing (perception), feeling (affection), thinking (cognition) 
 Verbal (saying) 
 Relational (being): attributing, identifying 
 Existential (existing) 
 
Table 3 shows how these process types can be mapped onto the predicate classes of von 
Polenz (2008). 
  
Table 3. Comparison of predicates classes and process types 
Predicate classes (Von Polenz 2008) Process Types (Halliday 1985) 
Action predicates Material, Behavioral & Verbal processes 
Process predicates Material & Mental processes 
Status predicates  Relational processes, Existential 
processes 
Genus predicates Relational processes 
 
 
From this comparison it is evident that for von Polenz, the term process denotes a 
subclass of predicates which stand for events and “happenings” which do not involve 
intentional agency, while for Halliday the term process encompasses all types of 
predicates, which are divided into various subcategories. With von Polenz, the term 
process also stands for mental processes of perceiving, thinking and feeling, which 
Halliday puts under mental processes. Henceforth the terms action and process will be 
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utilized in the sense given by von Polenz, with the Hallidayan definitions being 
employed when needed to explain semantic roles specific to Halliday’s theory.  
 
Semantic roles pertain to the roles that nouns denoting living beings, objects and 
abstract concepts take in combination with verbs of different predicate classes. What 
follows is the list of semantic roles used within this study with their explanations. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the names and the definitions of the roles have been 
adopted from von Polenz (2008). The roles and their definitions have in part been 
complemented with participant roles from Halliday’s (1985) systemic functional 
grammar.  
 
In addition to semantic roles, a number of circumstantial elements from Halliday (1985) 
have been adopted. While some of these circumstantial elements find their equivalents 
in von Polenz’s list of semantic roles, there is an important enough distinction between 
them and the participant roles in Halliday’s systemic functional grammar. In Halliday’s 
words, the participant roles are typically directly involved with the action or process 
indicated by the verb (1985: 131), whereas circumstantial processes – as their name 
indicates – reflect the circumstances in which the actions and processes take place, 
specifying and modifying the action or process in question. Typically these are 
expressed through either a preposition or an adverb.  
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The above lists of semantic roles and circumstantial elements constitute an analytical 
toolkit with which texts can be approached. Firstly, they provide a useful means of 
categorization which allows to quantitatively trace patterns in how certain words appear 
in texts (as a doer, sayer, experiencer, object etc.). Secondly, they are also a helpful tool 
for qualitatively analyzing propositional content, even in ways which go beyond the 
level of an individual clause and touch upon cohesion and argumentative structure. The 
next chapter presents the results of analyzing the texts from the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung with the help of semantic roles.     
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5 DISCURSIVE ARTICULATION OF GERMAN NATION-STATE IDENTITY AND 
EUROPE IN EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES OF THE FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 
 
 
This section presents the results of the analysis of the material. At the focal point of the 
analysis are selected keywords, which are analyzed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. The keywords selected were those related to the German nation-state, its 
leaders, institutions and citizens. A range of Europe and EU related keywords was also 
selected. 
 
In the quantitative phase of the analysis, the frequencies of important keywords 
pertaining to the research question have been counted. The next step was to categorize 
these keywords according to the semantic roles they occupy in their textual context. 
Along with the relative frequencies of the keywords, this kind of data already reveals 
something about how the keywords are being articulated in the corpus: the frequency 
points to the relative importance of the keyword in question, while the classification 
scheme based on semantic roles tells something very general about the semantic 
positioning of that keyword. For instance, if a keyword most frequently occupies the 
Agent position, we can deduce that it is assigned a very “active” role in the corpus.  On 
the other hand, should a keyword appear most often in the Patient role, we could say 
that its role in the corpus is more passive, since the role carries the sense of “being done 
to”.   
 
The next step in the analysis is qualitative, taking the keywords in their full context. 
This includes not only taking the semantic role into account, but also investigating the 
type of verbs, collocations, attributes, modifiers and other linguistic information which 
goes into the articulation of the concept behind a particular keyword in its specific 
context. The adjective deutsch (German) and its collocations deserve special attention, 
as they will indicate the concepts and qualities associated with “Germanness”. The 
semantic roles and circumstantial elements of words other than the selected keywords 
will also be utilized as an aid to the analysis when necessary. It is also important to 
analyze the elements that create cohesion across clauses and sentences, as this is key to 
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articulations that may be merely implied. Other factors to take into account are 
connotation (in case of synonyms), modifying attributes, modality, metaphorical 
expressions, implicature, presuppositions and argumentative structure. Keywords and 
their appearance are therefore treated as gateways from which a deeper investigation 
can proceed, revealing lexical oppositional lines on the level of the text and finally more 
fundamental patterns of discursive articulation on the level of the whole corpus. 
 
The qualitative section of the analysis is based on themes that have emerged from thus 
analyzing the keywords in their context. These themes have been found to be partially 
overlapping due to the interlocking quality in the articulation of certain keywords. At 
the end of each section, the articulations discovered in that section will be recapitulated 
to provide a brief overview before moving on to the next section. While some themes 
might occasionally be repeated across sections, overall the aim is to progressively 
weave descriptions of interlocking threads of discourse which in the end will be put 
together to form a complete picture of discursive patterns.  
 
 
5.1 Quantitative Analysis of Keywords 
 
The quantitative phase of the analysis focuses on mapping out the frequencies of the 
selected keywords from the categories Germany and Europe, assigning them semantic 
roles and observing the trends that emerge. The keywords from both categories will be 
discussed in separate sections. Deictic words will also be discussed.  
 
5.1.1 German keywords 
 
Figure 4 presents the most common keywords related to Germany in a semantic map. 
The keywords have been encoded as per their relationship to the concepts of nation-
state, state and nation. The relationships between the concepts has been marked as 
either synonymic (e.g Deutschland vs. Bundesrepublik), metonymic (e.g. Berlin vs. 
Bundesregierung vs. Deutschland), historical (Deutschland vs. D-Mark or qualitative 
(Deutschland vs. the adjective deutsch).   
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The words Deutschland and Bundesrepublik can both be taken to denote the nation-state 
as a whole. The category state encompasses words related to state organs and politicians 
(“the elite”), although the country name can also be used to denote the government. The 
capital name Berlin also bears a metonymic relationship to the government.  
 
The category nation encompasses the nouns Deutsche and words denoting the people or 
citizens. Although the word Deutsche can be used to refer to the “common people” and 
citizens distinct from the government, it can also include those in the “elite”: the scope 
of the referent depends on the given context. The adjective deutsch refers to qualities 
relating to nation or state.  
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Figure 5. Semantic map of German keywords 
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The following tables will give a detailed account of the keywords used, including the 
three most frequent semantic roles occupied by any given keyword. The categorization 
of the keywords into these tables follows roughly the categories in figure 4.  
 
 
Table 6. German nation-state and capital 
 
 
 
From Table 6 it can be seen that the term Deutschland is clearly preferred over the 
rather more formal Bundesrepublik. As can be seen, in the case of Deutschland, the 
Agent role clearly predominates, followed by the Locative circumstantial element and 
the Counteragent. The same also applies to the capital name Berlin. From this we can 
already conclude that these two keywords are in an active position; in other words, their 
role in a sentence is most often that of a “doer”. This confirms the general observation 
of previous studies that country names frequently occupy the position of a subject in a 
sentence and can act as a metonymic index for the government.  
 
One important point about the Agent position is that it does not always mean the action 
is free, so to speak, as sometimes the action is modified by a modal verb or an adverb, 
thereby adding an element of volition, possibility, obligation, permissibility or 
necessity. Take the following sentences for example: “Germany can and must do its 
part” 1 , “Why must Germany assume liability for Greece’s debts?” 2 , “That is why 
                                                        
1 Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010 
2 In Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010 
                                                
                                                     Semantic roles (n / %) 
Word n Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Germany (Deutschland) 70 
Agent 
 (29 / 41 %) 
Locative 
(18 / 25 %) 
Counteragent 
(8 / 11 %) 
Federal Republic 
(Federalrepublik) 
3 
Agent  
(1 / 33 %) 
Locative  
(1 /33 %) 
Possessor  
(1 / 33 %) 
Berlin 13 
Agent 
 (5 / 38 %) 
Locative  
(4 / 31 %) 
Experiencer  
(2 / 15 %) 
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Germany must now pay for Greece”3. In the corpus we find the modality of necessity 
most often tied to Agent processes involving Germany and making payments.  
 
That the capital is also often in the Agent role confirms another common trend in 
political and newspaper discourse, which takes the capital name as a metonymic index 
of a country’s government. The Locative is the second most popular position for both 
Deutschland and Berlin. Here we find an indication of the double articulation possible 
for country names: as states, they are both actors as well as bounded territories in which 
actions and processes take place, although in the case of Berlin, the Locative also holds 
the sense of being the place where the government is located (“the leaders in Berlin and 
Paris”4). The Experiencer role indicates thinking, feeling and perceiving and is the 
tertiary role for Belin. 
 
The Counteragent role again signifies being a conscious partner in an interaction, 
towards which some action is directed. In the international arena, states are seen as 
participating in mutual interactions as conscious agents, even if, as in the case of the 
Agent role, this action is often mediated by the state leadership. However, like with the 
Agent position, a country can be a participant of interaction where the state is only 
indirectly involved, such as “Germany is criticized for its export surplus”5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Griechische Wette. FAZ April 25th 2010 
4 Ein Debakel. FAZ June 6th 2010 
5 Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010 
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Table 7. German politicians and institutions 
         Semantic Roles (n / %) 
Word n Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Angela Merkel (Frau 
Merkel, 
(Bundes)kanzlerin) 
58 
 
Agent  
(27 / 47 %) 
 
Sayer  
(21 / 44 %) 
Counteragent 
(6 / 12 %) 
/ Swabian housewife 
(schwäbische 
Hausfrau) 
2 
Agent  
(1 / 50 %) 
Possessor  
(1 / 50 %) 
 
/ Iron Chancellor 
(eiserne Kanzlerin) 
1 
Identified 
 (1 / 100 %) 
  
Federal government 
(Bundesregierung) 
20 
Agent  
(10 / 50 %) 
Counteragent  
(2 / 10 %) 
 
Helmut Kohl 10 
Agent  
(6 / 60 %) 
Sayer  
(2 / 20 %) 
Experiencer 
(2 / 20 %) 
Parliament 
(Bundestag) 
9 
Locative  
(8 / 88 %) 
Agent  
(1 / 12 %) 
 
Minister of Finance, 
Wolfgang Schäuble 
8 
Agent 
 (6 / 75 %) 
Counteragent 
 (1 / 12,5 %) 
Comitative 
(1 / 12,5 %) 
Gerhard Schröder 1 Sayer (1 / 100 %)   
Helmut Schmidt 1 Agent (1 / 100 %)   
Federal Council 
(Bundesrat) 
1 
Locative (1 / 100 
%) 
  
D-Mark 9 
Patient 
 (4 / 44 %) 
Comparison  
(2 / 22 %) 
 
Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungs-
gericht) 
7 
Agent  
(5 / 71 %) 
Counteragent 
 (2 / 29 %) 
 
German politicians 
(deutsche Politiker) 
5 
Agent  
(2 / 40 %) 
Counteragent  
(2 / 40 %) 
Experiencer 
(1 / 20 %) 
German politics 
(deutsche Politik) 
1 
Counteragent 
 (1 / 100 %) 
  
 
 
 
Table 7 shows the list of words related to German politicians and institutions. Angela 
Merkel is by far the most frequently named German politician. She is also twice 
referred to as schwäbische Hausfrau (Swabian housewife). Schwäbisch is an adjectival 
rendering of the term Schwabe, which occurs in the corpus 2 times, refers to the 
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inhabitants of southeastern Germany, known for their thriftiness. Once she is referred to 
as eiserne Kanzlerin (Iron Chancellor), which is an allusion to the famous German 
Chancellor in the 19th century, Otto von Bismarck. 
 
It is also worth taking note of the occurrence of Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder, the 
former Federal Chancellors of Germany. Kohl appears 10 times and Schröder once. The 
D-Mark, Germany’s former currency, also appears 10 times. The fact that they are 
mentioned indicates the presence of a historical perspective in some parts of the corpus.  
 
As for semantic roles, with all the politicians and political organs except the Bundestag 
(parliament) and the Bundesrat (federal council) we can see a clear preference for the 
Agent role. With Merkel the Bundesregierung, Bundesverfassungsgericht and the 
general noun deutsche Politiker the Agent role is predominant. For Merkel, a significant 
part of her actions are verbal, amounting almost to half of them, as signified by the 
secondary role Sayer. This is because as a leading politician and Germany’s head of 
state, her statements are often quoted in the media. Bundesregierung, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and deutsche Politiker all have a secondary preference for 
the Counteragent role.  Politicians or state organs are therefore most often depicted as 
“doers” and secondly as partners in an interaction.  
 
The Locative role predominating for the parliament and for the Federal Council (which 
however occurs only once in the whole corpus) can be explained by the fact that these 
are often conceptualized not only as active organs, but as places where debates, 
discussions etc. take place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
 
Table 8. German citizens 
 
             Semantic Roles (n / %) 
Word n Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Germans 
(Deutsche) 
21 
Experiencer  
(11 / 52 %) 
Agent  
(6 / 29 %) 
Counteragent 
(5 / 24 %) 
Swabians 
(Schwaben) 
2 
Identifier 
 (2 / 100 %) 
  
Citizens 
(Bürger) 
6 
Experiencer  
(3 / 50 %) 
Counteragent 
 (3 / 50%) 
 
People (Volk) 3 
Counteragent  
(2 / 66 %) 
Agent  
(1 / 33 %) 
 
(German) 
Population 
(Bevölkerung) 
4 
Agent  
(1 / 25 %) 
Experiencer 
 (1 / 25 %) 
Carrier  
(1 / 25 %) 
(German) 
Voters 
(Wähler) 
3 
Agent 
 (2 / 66 %) 
Counteragent 
 (1 / 33 %) 
 
The public 
(Öffentlichkeit) 
2 
Experiencer  
(2 / 100 %) 
  
 
Table 8 shows keywords relating to the German people with their various designations 
as either Deutsche, Bürger, Wähler, Volk or Bevölkerung. Even though the term 
Schwabe appears in this list, in the corpus it is however not used to refer to Germans in 
general, but merely to a certain type of attitude towards money. 
 
For these words there is a preference for the position of Experiencer (34 %), followed 
by those of Counteragent (27 %) and Agent (24 %). For both Deutsche and Bürger, the 
Experiencer role covers approximately half of all the instances. Deutsche are also fairly 
often occupying the Agent and Counteragent roles. In their aspect as voters (Wähler) 
and as a mass noun Bevölkerung the citizens of Germany have a proportional preference 
for the Agent role. The overall trend for the Experiencer and Counteragent role would 
indicate that the role of the German citizens and population is articulated more in terms 
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of thinking, feeling and perceiving and being an interaction, and less as a doer, in 
contrast to the government. However, since the word Deutsche can in some contexts 
refer to the whole nation, including the government, it is not a surprise that this word 
has a secondary preference for the Agent role.  
 
5.1.2 Europe and EU related keywords 
 
Figure 5 below is a semantic map of selected keywords relating to Europe and the EU. 
These relationships are slightly different than for Germany. First of all, Europe is a 
continent and not a state. The EU can be seen as an attempt to institutionalize the idea 
of Europe, but the denotative scope of the word “Europe” still as of now extends 
beyond the limits of the term “EU”. Southern Europe which is also mentioned in the 
corpus is a part of Europe in the geographic sense, but also has cultural connotations.  
 
The Commission is the executive organ of the EU, and Brussels is both the capital of 
EU as well as the Commission headquarters. Brussels is a same kind of metonymic 
index for the EU and the Commission as Berlin is for Germany. In the corpus, 
synonymous expressions used for the Commission are EU-Behörde (EU agency) and 
Brüsseler Behörde (Brussels agency).  
 
The Monetary Union is a part of EU, both in the geographic and legal sense. The near 
synonym Eurozone has more geographical connotations. Euro states are also member 
states of the EU but not necessarily vice versa.  
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Figure 6. Semantic map of Europe and EU related keywords 
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Table 9. Europe and EU related keywords 
 
                                    Semantic Roles (n / %) 
Word n Primary Secondary Tertiary 
EU 60 
Agent 
 (23 / 38 %) 
Locative 
 (11 / 18 %) 
Possessor  
(8 / 15 %) 
EU-
Kommission 
30 
Agent  
(15 / 50 %) 
Carrier  
(3 / 10 %) 
Experiencer 
 (3 / 10 %) 
EU agency 
(EU-Behörde) 
4 
Agent 
 (3 / 75 %) 
Patient  
(1 / 25 %) 
 
Brussels 
(Brüssel) 
8 
Locative 
 (5 / 71 %) 
Agent  
(1 / 14 %) 
Source  
(1 / 14 %) 
Brussels 
agency 
(Brüsseler 
Behörde) 
1 
Agent  
(1 / 100 %) 
  
José Manuel 
Barroso 
7 
Sayer  
(4 / 60 %) 
Possessor 
 (2 / 40 %) 
Experiencer 
 (1 / 14 %) 
Europe 
(Europa) 
54 
Locative 
 (12 / 22 %) 
Beneficiary  
(10 / 19 %) 
Possessor 
 (7 / 13 %) 
Southern 
Europe 
(Südeuropa) 
3 
Agent 
 (1 / 33 %) 
Locative  
(1 / 33 %) 
Beneficiary  
(1 / 33 %) 
Europeans 
(Europäer) 
14 
Agent  
(3 / 21 %) 
Identified/Identifier 
(3 / 21 %) 
Patient (2 / 14 %) 
Monetary 
Union 
(Währungs-
union) 
71 
Possessor  
(16 / 23 %) 
Patient  
(10 / 14 %) 
Affected Object 
(9 / 13 %) 
Euro zone 
(Euro-Zone /-
Raum) 
12 
Locative  
(6 / 50 %) 
Carrier  
(2 / 17 %) 
Beneficiary 
 (2 / 17 %) 
Euro 61 
Patient  
(31 / 51 %) 
Carrier  
(7 / 11 %) 
Identified  
(6 / 10 %) 
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   Table 10. Member states 
 
 
 
 
The above tables show the frequencies of words related to the EU and Europe. The EU 
and its executive organ, the EU Commission (also the referent of the words EU-
Behörde, “EU agency,” and Brüsseler Behörde, “the Brussels agency”) are 
predominantly occupying the Agent role, which means that they have an active role in 
the corpus. The Locative is also a common role for the EU, which can signify that 
something resides or takes place either within the organization or the area of the EU. 
                                       Semantic Roles (n / %) 
Word n Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Member states 
(Mitglied-
staaten) 
16 
Experiencer  
(5 / 31 %) 
Patient  
(3 /19 %) 
Carrier  
(3 / 19 %), 
EU states / 
countries (EU-
Staaten/-
Länder) 
6 
Patient  
(4 / 66 %) 
Agent  
(1 / 17 %) 
Experiencer  
(1 / 17 %) 
European states 
/ countries 
(Europäische 
Staaten / 
Länder 
3 
Agent  
(3 / 100 %) 
  
Euro states / 
countries 
(Euro-Staaten/-
Länder) 
15 
Agent 
(4 / 27 %) 
Patient 
 (2 / 13 %) 
Carrier (2 / 13 %) 
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For the EU, the Possessor role is the third most common role, and for the EU 
Commission the Carrier is the second most common role. The Possessor role of the EU 
is typically realized through constructs such as “Crisis of the EU”, “The core of the EU” 
or “the essence of the EU”. In the case of the Commission, the Carrier role is realized 
through expressions like “the Commission is too weak to…” or “is the Commission 
[…] really ready…” The Commission also has the Experiencer as the third most 
frequent semantic role, which means that in some instances it is represented as a 
cognitive entity that thinks, feels and perceives (e.g. “The longing of Commission after 
a greener and more social Europe”6). For the president of the Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso, the Sayer role is most predominant, which means that he is portrayed as giving 
statements rather than acting directly. 
 
It is worth noting that the words EU or EU Commission rarely enter the Counteragent 
position in the corpus: the only exception is the expression “erosion of trust in the EU”. 
The Counteragent role is hidden in some of the collocations of the adjective Brüsseler, 
such as sich Brüsseler Einmischungen in die Haushaltspolitik verbitten (refuse 
interventions from Brussels in budgetary policy) or sich gegen Brüsseler Vorschläge 
wehren (oppose proposal from Brussels). All this indicates that the EU is seen less as an 
interaction partner and more as something that either acts, is acted upon or things 
happen to, which are indicated by the Patient and Affected Object roles. This is in 
contrast to Deutschland, out of whose occurrences the Counteragent role accounts for 
10 %. It is also noteworthy that in contrast to Berlin, Brüssel is less something that acts 
(Agent) than a location where something is or takes place (Locative). 
 
What of Europe? It is most typically portrayed as a location where actions and 
processes take place (Locative). The second most popular role is however the 
Beneficiary, which means that Europe is often also represented as being the recipient of 
benefit or harm. This role manifests in expressions such as „In the name of Europe“7, 
                                                        
6 Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010 
7 Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010 
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“Whoever wants to bring Europe forward“8, “a sacrifice for Europe”9, “there would be 
no benefit to Europe”10. The tertiary role Possessor is often manifested in expressions 
such as “the future of Europe) (n = 3) or “the realities of Europe” (n = 2). 
 
Note that Southern Europe (Südeuropa) is also mentioned separately. This is due to the 
fact that most of the crisis countries were from Southern Europe, and they can thus be 
referred to collectively, such as in the phrase “South Europe has lived well out of low 
interest rates.”11 
 
Out of this list, by far the most frequent word is Währungsunion (Monetary Union).  Its 
preferred semantic roles are Possessor, Patient, Affected Object and Identifier. The 
frequency of the Possessor and Identifier roles means that it is often discussed in 
relation to its attributes (e.g. “principles of the Monetary Union”, “implications of the 
Monetary Union”, “character of the Monetary Union” or the quite common “fathers of 
the Monetary Union) or as identifying something else, the most common example being 
“member state of the Monetary Union”. The Patient and Affected Object roles again 
imply that the Monetary Union is frequently the target or object of actions and 
happenings, the most common being “protecting the Monetary Union” or “failure of the 
Monetary Union”.  
 
The euro is also a frequently occurring word in the corpus. The Patient role is by far the 
most common. The euro appears as a subject with verbs that denote failure or loss of 
value (scheitern = 5, sinken = 1), as something that is in danger (bedrohen = 1, 
gefährden = 1) and therefore needs to be rescued or defended (retten = 4, verteidigen = 
1) or stabilized (stabilisieren = 2). Very often the trust in the euro is at stake (n = 6).  
 
The Carrier and Identified roles again point towards the fact that the euro’s attributes 
are frequently under discussion or it is compared to something, e.g. “the destiny of the 
euro”, “the future of the euro”, “the euro is a political/supranational project”, “the euro 
                                                        
8 Die politische Währungsunion. FAZ July 1st 2010 
9 Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010 
10 Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010 
11 Im Schuldensumpf. FAZ June 2nd 2010 
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is not the same as the D-Mark”. Some of the adjective attributes associated with the 
euro are “weak”, “strong” and “healthy”.  
 
The member states are referred to either as such or as EU states / countries or – as EMU 
members – as euro states / countries, and also with the more inclusive terms “European 
states / countries”. They are on the whole found both in the active Agent role as well as 
in the passive Patient role. This is because they are often portrayed as having 
responsibility (e.g. “Far too long have the European states been practicing reality-
denying policies”) being the target of measures and influences (e.g. “The EU states’ 
room for action would be reduced through a stricter Stability Pact”). The word euro 
states is however also found in a more active role, and for the word member states the 
Experiencer role dominates, most often with the verbs of volition, acceptance and 
expectation.  
 
5.1.3 Deictic expressions 
 
This section lists the use of personal and spatial deixis in the corpus. These kinds of 
expressions are not frequently used. The following table shows the frequencies, whether 
the pronoun or adverbial is used in direct or indirect speech (such as quotations) and 
what the referent is. 
 
Table 11. Deictic expressions 
Deictic expression Frequency 
Direct / Indirect 
speech 
Referent (n) 
Wir (we) 1 Indirect EU 
Unser (our) 3 Direct 
EMU states (1), 
European citizens 
(1), 
Germans (1) 
Hier (here) 3 Direct Germany 
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As the table shows, the only time the third person plural appears as such is in indirect 
speech. This is a statement by the Commission president Barroso: “We will defend the 
euro, whatever it takes”. The referent in this case is the EU. The possessive 3rd person 
plural appears three times, each time in direct speech. In all these cases it is connected 
to money: “If the euro is our destiny”, “the money of all of us”, “our old currency”. 
With only the last example is the referent Germans. The adverbial here, whenever it is 
used in a spatial sense, refers to Germany, once also as a part of the expression 
hierzulande (over here).   
 
 
5.2 Qualitative analysis of keywords 
 
This sections consists of the qualitative analysis of the keywords in their context. This 
section is divided into eight subsections based on various themes that emerged during 
the analysis. As will be evident, some of these themes will be partially overlapping, and 
some of the textual examples or parts thereof will be analyzed more than once in order 
to bring different perspectives into focus.  
 
In the textual examples that are given, semantic roles and circumstantial elements will 
be featured as a subscript label attached to the word in questions. These labels will 
however be applied only to the words which are deemed necessary for any analysis that 
will follow, which always includes important keywords (Germany, Merkel etc.), but 
other non-keywords may be thus labeled if useful from the perspective of the analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Germany as an economically strong country 
 
In the corpus, we often find Germany articulated together with matters having to with 
economy and finances. This happens through the use of specific qualifiers with the 
country name Deutschland and through collocations appearing with the adjective 
attribute deutsch. The first two excerpts are from the article Im Schuldensumpf (FAZ 
June 26th 2010) and are meant to illustrate these phenomena.   
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(1)     Die Schuldner[Agent] werfen den Exporteuren[Counteragent] vor, sie mit 
Lieferungen ins Defizitverderben geführt zu haben. Dabei sind die 
Ungleichgewichte entstanden, weil einige Länder über Jahre hinweg 
mehr importiert als exportiert haben, weshalb deren 
Auslandsverschuldung hoch ist. Doch was folgt daraus? Sollen jetzt 
Überschüsse bekämpft werden? Jedenfalls steht Deutschland[Carrier] am 
Pranger[Attribute], zusammen mit China und Japan[Comitative]. Doch 
niemand[Agent] hat Amerikaner[Counteragent] dazu gezwungen, chinesiche 
Konsumartikel zu kaufen, und keiner[Agent] nötigt Franzosen[Counteragent], 
deutsche Autos zu fahren. (Im Schuldensumpf. FAZ June 26th 2010) 
 
 
The first thing to notice is that there is an opposition created between “debt makers” and 
“exporters” by means of the polarity of the semantic roles of Agent (“debt makers”) and 
Counteragent (exporters), where the former blame the latter for their deficit. The 
rhetorical questions “What follows from this [imbalance between exporters and 
importers]? Should surpluses now be fought?” and the sentence following them, starting 
with the conjunction jedenfalls (in any case) and assigning Germany the position of 
being the target of blame (stand in the pillory), locates Germany in the camp of the 
exporters, together with China and Japan, who are in the Comitative role. The last 
sentence creates another Agent – Counteragent opposition, where the occupant of the 
Agent role is in both instances “no one” and the verbs in questions are variations of the 
verb “to force”. This sentence puts into question whether it is the exporters who are to 
blame for the imbalances. Germany’s role as an exporter is further elaborated on in the 
next excerpt, which is a continuation of the same text: 
 
 
(2)     Dass vierzig Prozent der deutschen Produktion ausgeführt werden, ist 
keine Planerfüllung einer Bundesexportbehörde[Agent], sondern Resultat 
freier Marktkräfte[Carrier]. Über den deutschen Erfolg im Welthandel 
bestimmen unzählige Entscheidungen von Verbrauchern[Agent], 
Unternehmern[Agent] und Arbeitnehmern[Agent]. Neben der Qualität 
deutscher Produkte[Additive] entscheidet darüber auch die preisliche 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit[Agent]. Moderate Lohnabschlüsse[Agent] tragen zur 
Exportkraft Deutschlands[Beneficiary] bei. Wenn Frankreich[Agent] höhere 
Löhne im Hochlohnland Deutschland[Locative] fordert, zielt das vor allem 
auf höhere Kosten für die Konkurrenz. Doch damit stiege lediglich die 
Arbeitslosigkeit in Deutschland[Locative], für Europa[Beneficiary] wäre nichts 
gewonnen. (Im Schuldensumpf. FAZ June 26th 2010) 
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First we need to notice the multiple instances of the adjective deutsch, used in 
connection with the words Produktion, Erfolg and Produkte. Germany is also collocated 
with the words Exportkraft (“export strength”) and Hochlohnland (“high-salary 
country”). These collocations of course already invoke the strong image related to 
economy and industry. 
 
The first sentence identifies the high proportion of German products being exported not 
with the “fulfilment of the plans of a federal export agency”, but as the result of “free 
market forces”. “Federal export agency” is in the Agent role due to the nominalized 
verb (Planerfüllung, “fulfilment of plans”) it accompanies, while “free market forces” 
takes the role of a Possessor. A contrast is created between the conscious agency of the 
former and the less directed nature of the latter. The next sentence enumerates the actual 
agents that comprise these forces. The next sentences then involves many abstract nouns 
as Agents  ̶  the quality of German products, competitive prices and moderate salary 
agreements – which together contribute to German export strength. The implication is 
therefore that German success is not a state-driven affair, but is a result of several 
market-oriented factors.  
 
The second last sentence then features France in the Agent position, demanding higher 
salaries in Germany, for which the text insinuates the motive of competition. Although 
Germany is here in the Locative role, it can be also interpreted as another Agent – 
Counteragent opposition, since the meaning is the same as “demanding from Germany 
that it raise its salaries”. The use of the classifier Hochlohnland Deutschland would 
seem to indicate that from the point of view of the text, the salaries in Germany 
perceived to be are already high, and raising them in accordance with France’s demands 
would lead to no benefits for Europe as a whole. The notion articulated here is therefore 
that Germany is a strong export-oriented economy, the opposite of “debt maker” and 
that it is sometimes criticized for this. In the same text, this strong export economy is 
also referred to as Wirtschaftsmodell Deutschland (German economic model), which 
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allegedly causes upset. This same idea is also expressed in another text, where Germany 
is portrayed as receiving criticism both for its export surplus.12  
 
This can be compared with the following excerpt, where an opposition is created 
between Germany and so-called “soft currency countries”, and the latter are claimed to 
blame Germany for using the euro to gain economic dominance in Europe: 
 
 
(3)     Während sich die Deutschen[Experiencer] fragen, warum sie[Agent] für die 
Schulden der Griechen[Beneficiary] haften sollen, können viele Italiener, 
Spanier und Franzosen[Experiencer] nicht verstehen, warum die EU[Agent] 
nicht einfach neue Milliarden nach Athen überweist. [...]. Mit der 
kollektiven Erfahrung zweier Währungsreformen sehen die 
Deutschen[Experiencer] im versuchten Bruch des Maastrichter Vertrags (er 
verbietet den Eintritt eines Euro-Landes für die Schulden eines anderen) 
eine Gefahr für die Stabilität der Währung.  
            Ganz anders die Wahrnehmung in ehemaligen Weichwährungs-
ländern[Locative]: Dort wird unterstellt, die Deutschen[Agent] wollten sich 
durch den Euro die wirtschaftliche  Vorherrschaft in Europa sichern. 
(Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
 
 
 
In this text we find multiple collective nouns – Germans, Greeks, French, Spaniards and 
Italians – occupying the Experiencer position, which correlates with thinking, feeling 
and perceiving. This is seen in the verbs sich fragen (ask themselves), nicht verstehen 
können (cannot understand), in den Augen der (in the eyes of), sehen (to see) and 
unterstellen (accuse of having a motive). The clause structure gives rise to an 
oppositional line between Germans and “others” by way of the adversative conjunction 
während (whereas) in the first sentence and the similar adversative adverb ganz anders 
in the beginning of the second paragraph. What is contrasted here is attitudes towards 
money and currency stability, i.e. whether or not the EU should transfer funds to Greece 
(denoted by the capital name “Athens”), and whether there is a concern for the stability 
of the currency.  
 
                                                        
12 Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010 
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By way of the parallel clause structure between the first sentences of the first and 
second paragraph, the “others” become identified as “former soft currency countries”, 
and owing to the oppositional line Germany itself becomes identified as a “strong 
currency country”. The “soft currency countries” are the Locative role in a clause where 
the process has been nominalized (Wahrnehmung, perception) and the subject or the 
Experiencer has therefore been faded. In the following clause, which is an elaboration 
of this “perception”, the Agent of the verb unterstellen (to accuse) has again been faded. 
The origin of both the “perceiving” and the “accusing” is therefore diffuse. The 
Germans however appear as a distinct actor, where the target of the accusation is their 
volition of “wanting to secure economic dominance through the euro”. FAZ claims this 
debate to be fueled by power interests, and it is explained in the following excerpt: 
 
 
(4)     Hierbei geht es nicht um die Frage[Matter1], ob die Griechen weiter 
ungestraft über ihre Verhältnisse leben dürfen, sondern um die 
Realisierung[Matter2] des französischen Traums von einer „Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsregierung“, mit der[Instrument] die wettbewerbsstarke deutsche 
Industrie[Patient] eingefangen werden soll. (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ 
February 25th 2010) 
 
 
The debate mentioned here refers to the accusation directed towards Germans of 
wanting to secure economic rulership in Europe. These power interests are defined as 
being not about “whether Greeks can continue to live above their means unpunished”, 
but about “the realization of the French dream of a European economic government” 
(Matter2). This economic government becomes the Instrument in a relative clause, 
which has the purpose of curbing the competitive German industry. This French idea of 
an economic government is expressed and criticized elsewhere in the corpus as opposite 
to what the German view is13,14, and it is related to the idea of France demanding higher 
wages in Germany which we saw in excerpt 2.  
 
                                                        
13 Im Schuldensumpf. FAZ April 21st 2010 
14 Debakel. FAZ June 6th 2010 
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In the last few excerpts we have therefore seen German economic power defined in 
contrast to countries, especially France, who are claimed to envy it. In the next excerpt 
Germany is also identified as an economically strong country, albeit in a 
complementary rather than a contrastive role to France: 
 
 
(5)     Deutschland[Carrier] trägt in dieser Situation eine besondere 
Verantwortung[Attribute]. Das liegt wiederum nicht nur daran, dass 
Berlin[Agent] – aufgrund der deutschen Wirtschaftskraft[Reason] – einen 
besonders hohen Anteil zu tragen hätte, wenn Länder der Währungsunion 
herausgehauen werden müssten. Deutschland[Identified, Agent] war, 
zusammen mit Frankreich[Comitative], der Motor der Wirtschaft- und 
Währungsunion[Identifier] und hat ihr einen Stabilitätspakt  verordnet, dem 
seither viele Mitgliedsstaaten nicht genügen konnten (nicht zu vergessen: 
auch Deutschland[Agent] hat das mehrfach nicht geschafft). (Vor einer 
Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010)  
 
 
Here we find Germany (Carrier) attributed with carrying a special responsibility 
(Attribute). The reason for Germany’s special responsibility is attributed to the German 
economic power (Reason), due to which Berlin (in the Agent position as a placeholder 
for Germany’s seat of decision-making) would have an especially large role to play in 
the case that countries would have to be excluded from the Monetary Union. 
 
The next sentence features Germany in the position of Identified, where the Identifier is 
the noun “Motor of the Monetary Union”. This metaphor also expresses the idea of 
Germany as an economically powerful country.  Here France is also not positioned 
contrastively with Germany, but as sharing the role of the “motor” through the 
Comitative. 
 
 This excerpt also highlights the fact that the Growth and Stability Pact is of German 
origin and that many member states have not been able to live up to it, but that not even 
Germany could adhere to it at all times. The implication is that the responsibility 
Germany is attributed with is therefore not only due to the country’s economic strength, 
but also to the fact of being the main architect of the Stability Pact. 
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5.2.2 Germany as the “pay master” 
 
Germany is also often articulated in the position of being a net contributor or pay 
master, not only in the crisis but beyond. This role is also sometimes described as 
something that Germany or the Germans are not pleased with.  
 
 
(6)    Wer die Auktion griechischer Staatsanleihen durch Überweisungen aus 
Brüssel[Source1] oder Frankfurt[Source2] ablösen will, der lädt zu weiteren 
Spekulationen gegen den Euro ein, der überschätzt die Finanzkraft 
Deutschlands[Possessor] und der riskiert das Scheitern der Währungsunion. 
(Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
 
 
In this excerpt, Brussels and Frankfurt are used in a metonymic fashion for the EU and 
the German Bundesbank respectively. The text makes the claim that whoever wants to 
redeem the auction of Greek government bonds through transfers from either the EU or 
from the Bundesbank (i.e. Germany), will overestimate the financial strength of 
Germany and risk the failure of the Monetary Union. The implication is therefore that 
neither is Germany able to pay for everything nor is it necessarily desirable. The next 
excerpt makes this claim more explicitly: 
 
 
(7)     Deutschland[Agent] als wohlhabendes Land[Role] kann und muss seinen 
Beitrag leisten. Aber alle Lasten des Zusammenhalts kann es[Agent] nicht 
stemmen, dazu reicht seine Kraft nicht mehr. (Normales Deutschland. 
FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
 
Germany is here in the Agent position with the verb “make a contribution” (Beitrag 
leisten). This verb is however modified with the modal verbs kann and muss, which 
denote ability and necessity respectively. These modality expressions are linked to the 
identification of Germany as a “well-off country” in the Role position, although this 
link is not necessary: the sentence would function well without the identifying als 
construct. In its current form, the sentence carries the implicit meaning of “because 
Germany is a well-off country, it can and must make its contribution”. Both the ability 
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and the obligation of making a contribution follow from the identity as a well-off 
country. The next clause is an extension, however, which restricts the scope of this 
contribution: Germany cannot bear all the burden, because it runs out of strength. This 
latter idea is expressed in the following excerpt:  
 
 
(8)     Denn der Euro scheitert sicher, wenn aus der Währungsunion eine 
Haftungsgemeinschaft und Transferunion würde, die[Range] selbst 
Deutschland[Agent] nicht bezahlen könnte. (Im Sumpf. FAZ April 21st 
2010) 
 
 
Here the articulation is not as explicit as in the preceding examples. Like before, 
Germany is in the position of an Agent, with the verb bezahlen (to pay). The verb takes 
the words “liability community” and “transfer union” as its Range. These close 
synonyms denote the concept of a monetary union where financial burdens, including 
debts, are shared by all the members. It is this kind of monetary union that “even 
Germany would be unable to pay”.  
 
The word “even” has a special importance here, because it carries a similar idea as the 
preceding excerpt in a condensed form: Germany is able to make a big financial 
contribution, but even Germany cannot pay for everything. The following excerpt from 
a later part of the corpus also expresses the idea of Germany as a net contributor and the 
country’s ambivalent stance towards this role: 
 
 
(9)     Seit Jahrzehnten zahlt Deutschland[Agent] mehr ein, als es[Beneficiary] aus den 
diversen Beihilfetöpfen ausgezahlt bekommt  ̶ mal bereitwillig, mal 
murrend[Manner]. (Die politische Währungsunion. FAZ September 1st 
2010) 
 
 
In the first clause Germany in the Agent role with the verb einzahlen (to pay, make a 
contribution) and in the second clause it takes the role of the Beneficiary (ausgezahlt 
bekommen, to be paid something). The relationship between these clauses is 
comparative, whereby the contributions are described as exceeding the amount of 
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payments received. This sentence is modified by the adverbials of manner mal 
bereitwillig, mal murrend (sometimes willingly, sometimes grudgingly). This is an 
insofar untypical expression for the corpus in that it portrays a country undergoing an 
affective experience, whereas usually it is the people who are described as feeling 
subjects (e.g. Deutsche, Bürger: see the next excerpt for an example of this). 
 
In the context of the crisis, the reason for Germany having to pay is because of Greece’s 
and others’ reckless accumulation of debt (Schuldenmacherei), and it is often 
questioned why Germany would have to do this. Germany is also identified as 
Zahlmeister 15  (pay master) Geberland (contributing country) 16  or Einzahler 
(contributor)17, or otherwise linked in the Agent position with the verbs haften (to 
assume liability) 18  and zahlen (to pay) 19 , always with modal verb soll denoting 
obligation.  
 
While the use of the terms Einzahler, Geberland and especially Zahlmeister all carry a 
more or less negative connotation, not to mention the more subtle negative connotation 
attached to the modal verb soll in connection with verbs denoting payment, nowhere is 
dissatisfaction with the net contributor role expressed so strongly as in the following 
two excerpts: 
  
 
(10)   Apropos Nettozahler[Matter]: Es gibt nicht viele andere Themen, bei denen 
die Empörungsbereitschaft der Deutschen[Experiencer] so hoch ist. Und es 
war der zum Populismus neigende Kanzler Schröder[Sayer], der gegen das 
“Verbraten” deutscher Gelder[Patient] in Brüssel polemisierte. Deutsche 
Politik und Öffentlichkeit[Counteragent] lassen sich nur noch mäßig von dem 
Argument beeindrucken, das "Schmieren" der europäischen Milieus – die 
Fortsetzung der alten Zahlmeisterrolle – diene auch künftig deutschen 
(Export-)Interessen.[Beneficiary] (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 
2010) 
                                                        
15 In Haftung, FAZ May 7th 2010 
16 In Haftung, FAZ May 7th 2010 
17 Hilfe und Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010 
18 In Haftung, FAZ May 7th 2010 
19 Griechische Wette, April 25th 2010 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
(11)   Die übliche Methode, Risse und sich auftuende Abgründe in der 
EU[Locative] mit deutschem Geld[Instrument] zuzuschütten, ist nunmehr, da es 
um den Bankrott ganzer Staaten und das Aufeinanderprallen von 
Kulturen geht, jedoch an ihre Grenzen gelangt. (Im Namen Europas. FAZ 
May 7th 2010) 
 
 
In the first sentence of excerpt 9 we find the word Nettozahler (net contributor) as the 
Matter, signaled by the word apropos (Speaking of which, on the subject of). The 
double colon makes it clear that what follows is an elaboration. The next sentence 
features Deutsche as Experiencer with a nominalized adjective signifying the quality of 
being ready to anger, Empörungsbereitschaft. What causes them to anger is the fact of 
being a net contributor: the word “theme” (Matter) is linked to “net contributor” 
(Reason) by means of the colon.  
 
The former Chancellor Schröder appears here in the Sayer role, who is described as 
having highlighted Germany’s net contributor role in a polemical way. We also see the 
use of two metaphoric expressions related to money, which are both placed in quotation 
marks: “roasting” and “lubricating”.  The verb “roasting” evokes the image of a 
wasteful use of money, at least from some perspective; the verb “lubricate”, on the other 
hand, is another word for bribing. This “lubricating”, as a nominalized process in an 
Agent role, is here equated in a supplementary clause with the continuation of 
Germany’s alte Zahlmeisterrolle (old pay master role) also in the Agent role. This role 
would (allegedly, indicated by the subjunctive mode) serve German (export) interests 
(deutsche (Export-)Interessen).  
 
It is this equation of Germany playing the pay master and in turn getting a boost for its 
exports that is described as being no longer convincing for “German politics and public 
life” (deutsche Politik und Öffentlichkeit). These are in the position of Counteragent and 
the object of the verb beeindrucken (to impress). Making this kind of distinction 
between “politics” and “public” is typical for the corpus, and we will meet variations of 
this as we go on. It can be argued that this is a way to “split” a country into state and the 
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nation, the “elite” and the people, and to emphasize their alignment, like in this case. 
This is because the country name Deutschland can have connotations which refer only 
to the government, but here the text is zooming into the country, highlighting its layers 
and emphasizing their uniform view.  
 
In excerpt 10 Germany does not appear as an Agent in a nominalized form; rather, 
German agency is hidden in the adjective deutsch, collocated with the word Geld 
(money) and in the role of an Instrument. The use of this “instrument” to “stitch the 
cracks and gaping rifts in the EU” becomes identified as a “common method” and is 
given the circumstantial attribute of “being at its limits”. The same ideas are thereby 
expressed as in previous excerpts: although Germany is well capable of taking on the 
pay master role and has done so in the past, there are limits to that role.  
 
5.2.3 D-Mark and the stability promise of the euro 
 
This section demonstrates that the stability of the euro is articulated as the core German 
interest in the corpus. The wish for the currency’s stability and strength is based on the 
exceptional strength of the former German currency, the D-Mark, which for Germans 
was a national symbol. Giving up the D-Mark in favor of the euro was therefore seen as 
a sacrifice of a sort:  
 
 
(12)    In den Augen der meisten Deutschen[Experiencer] wurde mit dem 
Abschied[Instrument] von der identitätsstiftenden D-Mark[Patient] ein Opfer für 
Europa[Beneficiary] gebracht. Mit der kollektiven Erfahrung zweier 
Währungsreformen[Reason] sehen die Deutschen[Experiencer] im versuchten 
Bruch des Maastrichter Vertrags (er verbietet den Eintritt eines Euro-
Landes für die Schulden eines anderen) eine Gefahr[Phenomenon] für die 
Stabilität der Währung. (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
 
 
In the first sentence we see the noun Deutsche twice in the Experiencer position, seeing 
the departure from the D-Mark as a sacrifice for Europe. Important is also the adjective 
attribute “identity-fostering” given to the D-Mark, because it emphasizes the importance 
that the D-Mark had for the Germans.  In the second sentence Deutsche is also in the 
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Experiencer position with the perceiving verb to see as well. The object of this seeing 
(Phenomenon) is “danger for the stability of the currency“, contained in “the attempted 
breach of the Maastricht Treaty”, which in parentheses is explained as forbidding that 
euro countries step in for each other’s liabilities. The departure from the D-Mark and its 
strength is the subject of the next excerpt as well.  
 
 
(13)   Schliesslich ist den Deutschen[Counteragent] der Abschied von der bewährten 
D-Mark[Patient] mit dem Gegenteil[Instrument] der von Merkel[Sayer] 
gebetsmühlenartig wiederholten Rettungsfloskel schmackhaft gemacht 
worden. Kein Euro-Land[Agent] darf für die Schulden eines anderen 
haften, steht in den EU-Verträgen. Nur dadurch[Reason] werde der 
Euro[Affected Object] so stark[Attribute] wie die D-Mark[Comparison], versprachen 
die Väter[Sayer] der Währungsunion. (In Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
 
Here the citizens are in the first two instances occupying the Counteragent position: 
being convinced and having the departure from the D-Mark made “palatable” to them. 
Like in the last excerpt where the departure from the D-Mark was the subject matter, 
here it is again modified by an adjective, this time bewährt (reliable). 
 
The third sentence states that giving up the D-Mark was made palatable to the Germans 
with the “opposite of Merkel’s prayer-wheel-like repeated rescue clichés”. The fourth 
sentence elaborates on what this opposite is: no euro country is allowed to step in for 
another’s debt, according to the treaties. The fifth sentence expands on this by saying 
that only this way the euro (Affected Object) would become as strong (Attribute) as the 
D-Mark (Comparison), as promised by the “fathers of the monetary union” (Sayer).  
Based on the context, the citizens can be interpreted as occupying a hidden 
Counteragent position here as the recipient of the “fathers’” verbal action.  
 
This excerpt therefore explains that the D-Mark was given up in exchange for a 
“stability promise” that would ensure that the euro would become equally strong. This 
stability promise and the notion of it being broken in the crisis is a subject matter 
touched upon elsewhere in the corpus as well:  
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(14)  So sollen natürlich die Parteien im Bundestag zur Zustimmung zu den 
Notkrediten für das überschuldete Griechenland gebracht und die 
widerwilligen Deutschen[Counteragent] besänftigt werden. Denn die[Experiencer] 
sehen das einst gegebene Stabilitätsversprechen in puncto Euro 
dahingehen und fühlen sich zur europäischen Solidarität regelrecht 
erpresst. (Brandsätze. FAZ May 4th 2010) 
 
 
In the above excerpt the Germans, which in this context refers to the citizens as opposed 
to the political elite, are occupying first the Counteragent position (being appeased) and 
then the Experiencer position (seeing the stability promise of the euro being broken and 
feeling themselves being blackmailed to European solidarity). In the first sentence as 
well, because the Germans are described as “unwilling”, there is an additional quality to 
how they are positioned: in essence, they are first portrayed as feeling unwillingness 
(Experiencer), due to which they are being appeased (Counteragent).  
 
In excerpt 14 we saw a reference to the anonymous “fathers of the Monetary Union” 
who are behind the stability promise, and they make their appearance elsewhere in the 
corpus as well as the ones who were responsible for creating the stability pact.20, 21 
The next two excerpts from the text Der politische Stabilitätspakt however elaborate on 
the reasoning and the nature of the Stability Pact from a different perspective.  
 
 
(15)   Die Währungsverfassung für den Euro enthält ein Stabilitätsversprechen, 
das[Agent] vor allem die deutschen Ängste[Counteragent] vor der 
Einheitswährung beruhigen sollte. (Der politische Stabilitätspakt. FAZ 
July 3rd 2010) 
 
  
This excerpt states that the purpose of the stability promise is to appease the German 
fears of the common currency. Note that “German fears” is synonymous to “fears of 
Germans”, which is simply a way of expressing an affective process by means of an 
                                                        
20 Nicht mal ein Feigenblatt. FAZ  May 5th 2010 
21 Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion. FAZ  October 31st 2010 
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attributive expression. Here the “German fears” are in the Counteragent role, but the 
process of fearing itself is an instance of the Experiencer role. The positioning is 
therefore similar as in excerpt 12, where Germans were portrayed as “seeing a danger 
for the stability of the currency”, seeing a danger being almost equal to fear.   
 
The remainder of the text explains the meaning of the stability promise as making 
money “unpolitical” by means of “unalterable rules” that guarantee the independence of 
fiscal policy from political interventions and by preventing the member states from 
accumulating debt on each other’s costs. This idea of “unpoliticization” of money is 
itself explained as being based on the German idea of Ordnungspolitik. In a roundabout 
way, the stability promise that was meant to appease German fears is therefore itself 
articulated as being based on German ideas, even if they are elsewhere attributed to the 
anonymous “fathers of the Monetary Union”. These German ideas behind the stability 
pact and the whole Monetary Union are the subject of the next section.  
 
5.2.4 The German EMU and culturalization of divergences 
 
That the Monetary Union is fashioned after German ideas was already hinted at in 
excerpt 4, where Germany was identified as the motor of the Monetary Union and as the 
country that attached the Stability Pact to it. In the same excerpt it was also said that 
many member states have not been able to adhere to it, at times not even Germany.  
 
In this section we will have a look at how the Monetary Union is articulated as German-
inspired in its conception, and how Germany is therefore also attributed the role of 
imposing adherence to the rules of the Pact in an EMU that is portrayed as being highly 
economically divergent. The German view is contrasted against these other views, and 
the divergences depicted as having cultural origins (compare with excerpt 3 in 5.2.1).  
 
The first excerpt elaborates on this German architecture of the Monetary Union and how 
it was originally experienced as a “dictate” by some other countries in the EMU: 
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(16)   Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion[Result] ist nach deutschen 
Vorgaben[Quality] konstruiert worden, bis hin zur Verfassung der 
Europäischen Zentralbank mit Sitz in Frankfurt. Das[Phenomenon] wurde 
schon damals als „Diktat“[Role1] empfunden, aber als unumgänglicher 
Preis[Role2] bezahlt in der Hoffnung, im Zuge der Vergemeinschaftung 
könnten die Stabilitätskriterien aufgeweicht werden. (Vor einer 
Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010) 
 
 
Here we see the direct statement that the monetary union (Result) was built in 
accordance with German specifications (Circumstantial element of Quality). The 
excerpt also makes it clear that this was not looked upon entirely favorably: It was felt 
to be a “dictate”, although the text does not reveal by whom, since the Experiencer has 
been faded out due to the passive voice. One can assume that the hidden Experiencer 
are other countries in the Monetary Union. Parallel to being referred to as a “dictate, the 
German specifications are also described as a “necessary price to pay” which could be 
loosened in the course of further communitization. This refers to the idea that they were 
meant to bring about certain economic convergence. The German conditions and 
specifications are further highlighted in the next excerpt, which is a continuation of the 
text: 
 
 
(17)   Der Balanceakt[Agent], den Frau Merkel[Agent] derzeit unternimmt, läuft 
darauf hinaus[Purpose], den Euro[Patient] und die Eurozone[Patient] als Kern der 
EU[Role] zu stabilisieren und gleichzeitig die deutschen Bedingungen[Result] 
zu aktualisieren, also der Stabilitätspakt der Lage anzupassen. Die 
deutschen Vorgaben[Carrier] gelten weiterhin, es darf künftig in der 
Währungsunion keine Trittbrettfahrer mehr geben. (Vor einer 
Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010) 
 
 
Merkel is found here in the Agent position in a subordinate qualifying clause for the 
noun “balancing act”. This balancing act has the goal of “stabilizing the euro as the core 
of the EU (Role)” and at the same time “bringing it up to par with German conditions 
(Result)”. Furthermore, the German specifications are said to “still to apply”. Although 
there is no connecting conjunction between this sentence and the last (“no free riders are 
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allowed anymore”), the last sentence can be understood as an elaboration of what these 
specifications mean.  
 
It is mentioned many times in the corpus that the requirements of the Stability Pact are 
so strict that not even Germany has managed to uphold them, and in fact softened them 
at one point in time, together with France.22,23,24  The requirements are nonetheless 
articulated as something that separates “the wheat from the chaff”, so to speak, and on 
which the German position in the crisis stands, like the following excerpt from still the 
same text shows: 
 
 
(18)  Ob das realistisch ist, ob Länder[Agent], die[Possessor] in Währungs- und 
Finanzdingen eine andere Einstellung[Attribute1] und dazu noch eine 
weniger kompetitive Wirtschaftsstruktur[Attribute2] haben, dabei mithalten 
können, ist eine offene Frage. Dass die deutsche Position[Phenomenon] von 
Ländern[Experiencer], für die Griechenland pars pro toto steht, neuerlich als 
„Diktat“[Role] empfunden werden muss, ist verständlich. (Vor einer 
Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010) 
 
 
Here we have first of all the noun “countries”, which in a qualifying embedded clause is 
assigned with the attributes of having a different attitude towards currency and financial 
matters as well as possessing a less competitive economic structure. These countries are 
the Agent of another clause with the predicate “to keep up”. This verb takes the 
preposition bei, and the deictic preposition dabei refers to the aforementioned German 
specifications, which allow no free riders. Whether the said countries can keep up with 
the German specifications is said to be “an open question”. 
 
In the next sentence we also have the noun “countries”, this time in the Experiencer 
position in a passive subordinate clause. The noun is qualified by the non-restricted 
clause “which Greeks represent”. These countries (Experiencer) are said to perceive the 
                                                        
22 Vor einer Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010 
23 Die Währungsunion am Scheideweg. F0AZ May 13th  2010 
24 Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ May 20th 2010 
98 
 
German position (Phenomenon) as a dictate (Role). This German position can be 
understood to refer to the aforementioned specifications, according to which there shall 
be no free riders within the Monetary Union. The fact that the aforementioned countries 
may experience Germany’s position as a dictate is said to be “understandable”.  
 
Based on the analysis and the context it is not unreasonable to draw the conclusion that 
the “countries with a different attitude and a less competitive economic structure” are to 
a large extent co-extensive, even if not entirely identical with the “countries which 
Greece represents”. These countries could be the countries that are most hit by the 
crisis, which were mostly located in Southern Europe, but they could also be the “soft 
currency countries” referred to in excerpt 3 (5.2.1). These two possibilities are of course 
not mutually exclusive. Just like in excerpt 3, though, what we see here in excerpt 18 is 
an instance of “othering”: German views are given more strength by contrasting them 
against other views, of countries that perceive them as a “dictate”. 
 
In the next excerpts we will have a further look at the requirements of the Monetary 
Union, how Germany is described as enforcing them, and how the requirements thereby 
become implicitly or explicitly linked with “Germanness”: 
 
 
(19)   Vielleicht ist die Reaktion auf die Politik der Bundesregierung[Reason] so 
heftig ausgefallen, weil die Implikationen der Währungsunion endlich 
klargeworden sind: stabile Staatsfinanzen und eine liberale 
Wirtschaftspolitik, hohe Produktivität und eine wettbewerbsfähige 
Wirtschaft. Das sind Anforderungen, die große Disziplin erfordern. Aber 
wenn der Euro[Identified] unser Schicksal[Identifier] ist, dann darf man damit 
nicht Schändungen treiben. Und muss nicht ständig über das Fehlen einer 
Transferunion klagen. (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
 
Here the Federal Government is in the role of a Reason (cause), or to be more precise, 
its politics. The text states that this reaction is perhaps because the implications of the 
Monetary Union have become clear. The implications are listed as stable finances, 
liberal economic policy, high productivity and competitive economy. The next sentence 
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elaborates by identifying this list of implications as “requirements that demand great 
discipline.”  
 
The fourth sentence then extends the meaning of the said requirements and presents the 
justification behind them: “if the euro is our destiny, it must not be desecrated” and “one 
should not complain about the lack of a transfer union.” The first sentence is a 
metaphoric expression designating that something is spoiled as to make it lose its value. 
The “our” here is an example of personal deixis with a slightly unclear referent, but it 
can be taken to refer to all those countries sharing the euro: it is the shared destiny of all 
the euro countries, not just Germans. What links these sentences to the requirements is 
the conjunction aber (but), which highlights the necessity of the requirements from 
another point of view. Desecrating the euro and wishing for a transfer union can be 
taken as antithesis to the spirit of the requirements.  
 
This excerpt like excerpt 19 and excerpt 3 (see 5.2.1) also demonstrates the trend of 
“othering”: German views, attitudes and values are articulated by contrasting them to 
opposing views and attitudes. In this excerpt the “other” has been faded from view and 
what we see is only a reaction to the politics of the federal government. It is precisely 
this reaction which is used to highlight the requirements of the Monetary Union, and 
because it was caused by the federal government, it can of course be inferred that their 
policy, i.e. the policy of Germany, is in line with these requirements. The next excerpt 
shows how Germany – but not only Germany – is articulated as having the duty to 
“protect the European monetary union from harm”: 
 
 
(20)   Deutschland[Agent] wird sich seiner Verantwortung stellen, hat die 
Kanzlerin[Sayer] gesagt. Das ist richtig so. Aber zu dieser Verantwortung – 
und das geht nicht nur Deutschland[Matter] an – gehört auch die Pflicht, die 
Europäische Währungsunion[Patient] vor Schaden zu bewahren. Viel zu 
lange haben europäische Staaten[Agent] eine die Wirklichkeit verdrängende 
Politik betrieben, die aus einer theoretischen Möglichkeit eine reale 
Gefahr hat werden lassen: erst die Erosion des Vertrauens in die 
gemeinsame Währung und dann die Erosion des Vertrauens in die EU. 
(Brandsätze. FAZ May 4th 2010) 
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Here the Chancellor is making a statement (Sayer) on behalf of Germany, stating that 
Germany will face up to its responsibility, which in this case means making its 
contribution towards helping Greece. The text reminds that this responsibility includes 
the duty to protect the monetary union from harm. The European states are then 
depicted as the responsible Agents, who through their “reality-denying policies have 
turned a theoretical possibility into a real danger”, which is the erosion of trust in the 
euro and the erosion of trust in the EU. 
 
The cause for the crisis is often articulated as partly resulting from large economic 
divergences and attitudes towards state finances, which excerpts 18 and 19 also imply. 
In the text Vor einer Existenzkrise25, for example, it is mentioned that the EU has 
overextended itself through deepening integration, because the differences between the 
member states have become too great, “to the point of cultural alienation”. As excerpt 
19 shows, the discussion around economic divergence dovetails with articulations of 
divergences in mentality, which then gets translated to as having cultural origins. The 
next excerpt demonstrates this: 
 
 
(21)   Sowohl die Entstehungsgeschichte des Desasters als auch die 
Lösungsvorschläge zu seiner Überwindung offenbaren, wie groß die 
Unterschiede in der kulturellen Prägung der Völker Europas sind, wie 
unterschiedlich die Völker[Agent/Experiencer] und ihre Eliten[Agent/Experiencer] 
denken und handeln. Der Euro[Agent] hat, wie man sieht, die 
Griechen[Affected Object] nicht zu Deutschen[Result] umerzogen und die 
Deutschen[Affected Object] noch nicht ganz zu Griechen[Result]. 
Schuldenbremse hier und Staatsbetrug da kann man nicht wirklich als 
Zeichen der Konvergenz ausgeben. (Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 
2010) 
 
 
In this excerpt we can again witness the distinction between the nation (Völker, people) 
and what can be thought of as the state or government (Eliten). Noteworthy is that the 
people are portrayed as primary and the elites are described as their elites: this is 
                                                        
25 FAZ April 27th 2010 
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perhaps due to the fact that the cultural differences between the people are the subject of 
the preceding clause. Both people and elites are theoretically occupying both the 
Experiencer (thinking) and Agent (acting) roles, although the order of these predicates 
when compared with the order of the nouns may suggest that thinking pertains more to 
the people, whereas acting pertains more to the elites, although both predicates might 
also been as relating to both of the nouns. This interpretation would also confirm a 
common trend in the corpus that the nations (people or citizens) tend to be portrayed as 
Experiencers, whereas the governments and politicians tend to be portrayed as Agents. 
 
In the second sentence we find a juxtaposition of “Germans” and “Greeks”, which 
serves as an illustration of the cultural differences just mentioned. The Agent of this 
sentence is however the euro, which according to the text “has apparently not turned 
Greeks to Germans or Germans not quite to Greeks.” In the last sentence this 
comparison is elaborated on with the use of deictic expressions “here” and “there”. The 
word “debt brake” is associated with “here” (Germany) and the word “state fraud” with 
“there” (Greece). The implication that can be drawn from these two sentences is that the 
Germans and Greeks are in some way polar opposites of each other.  
 
This excerpt shows that the issues of economic convergence, which in the previous 
excerpt were put in terms of some countries “not keeping up”, are in essence attributed 
to cultural differences. These differences are both explicitly mentioned, but the cultural 
explanation also comes out in the use of the words denoting the people as well as the 
names of individual nations, instead of countries or states – Germans and Greeks.  
 
In the text Bis alle Schwaben sind (Until everyone is a Swabian) the vast differences in 
the attitudes, mentalities and economic strength of the countries within the EU are also 
highlighted. This is already hinted at in the title, which implies that not everyone is a 
Swabian, i.e. not everybody possesses the thrifty and disciplined attitude of a 
stereotypical inhabitant of Southeastern Germany. Similar to the text Vor einer 
Existenzkrise26 , the text states that the “EU pays now for its ambition to undertake giant 
                                                        
26 FAZ April 27th 2010 
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integration steps like the Monetary Union, although the necessary preconditions were 
not there”. By the lack of preconditions the text means “differences in not only 
economic strength, but also in mentalities and cultures.” These differences are then 
referred to as a “colorful European mix”, as the following excerpt shows: 
 
 
(22)   Diese europäisch-bunte Mischung[Counteragent] will die Kanzlerin[Agent] 
mittel- bis langfristig auf eine Linie zwingen – auf die der schwäbischen 
Hausfrau. Denn nur mit Sparsamkeit und Disziplin ließe sich das Feuer 
endgültig löschen. [...] Die EU[Patient] brauchte, wenn der Euro dauerhaft 
gerettet werden soll, tatsächlich eine gänzlich "neue Stabilitätskultur". 
Die EU-Mitglieder[Agent] dürften nicht länger über ihre Verhältnisse 
leben. (Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ May 20th 2010) 
 
 
Here the Chancellor is again occupying the Agent position, with the verb auf eine Linie 
zwingen. This is modified by the modal verb wollen, which means that she is being 
attributed with a motive. This motive is to “force the colorful European mix on the line 
of a Swabian housewife”. The rest of the excerpt elaborates on what this line means: the 
means to “extinguish the fire” is “thriftiness and discipline”; “if the euro is to be 
permanently saved, the EU truly needs a whole ‘new culture of stability’”. The main 
verb in all these sentences is in the subjunctive mood, which indicates either indirect 
speech, or distancing from the content of the speech, or both.  
 
Much like in excerpt 17, we see Merkel in the position of bringing stability to the EMU 
and the EU, by imposing her Swabian-like policy on other, less disciplined countries 
within it. The implication that because not everyone is a Swabian, Merkel has to enforce 
a “culture of stability”, which means that the EU countries no longer live above their 
means. Referring to Merkel as a Swabian housewife is not unique to this text, but takes 
place elsewhere in the corpus as well, where she is described as “not the worst kind of 
specter that could befall Europe.”27 
 
                                                        
27 Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010  
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So far these examples have shown us that the rules and architecture of the euro/EMU 
are articulated as something German-inspired. These rules imply certain requirements 
(stable finances, liberal economic policy, high productivity and competitive economy), 
which demand discipline to fulfill. It has also been made clear that not everyone in the 
EU or the EMU possesses this type of discipline in order to avoid “living above their 
means”. The Chancellor is therefore described as bringing about necessary stability by 
enforcing “Swabian-like” policies.   
 
In excerpts 17 and 19 it was stated that both Germany’s previous influence on the 
architecture of EMU as well as Merkel’s actions to enforce the German specifications of 
the EMU were perceived as a “dictate” by some member states. The conflict is also 
sometimes portrayed as taking place specifically between Germany and France, the 
largest member-states of the EU, over the view of what “model” Europe should follow. 
In excerpt 3 (5.2.1), it was claimed that the former “soft currency countries”, including 
France, would accuse Germans of “wanting to secure economic rulership in Europe 
through the euro.” In excerpt 4, it was also insinuated that the French idea of “European 
economic government” has the goal of curbing the “competitive German industry”. The 
next excerpt further elaborates on this conflict:  
 
 
(23)   Alle Beteuerungen von Gemeinsamkeit hier oder da können nicht 
darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass es zwischen Paris[Experiencer] und 
Berlin[Experiencer] einen tiefgehenden Dissens gibt, wie die Euro-Krise zu 
bekämpfen sei. Dabei ist der Streit, ob es dazu einer 
"Wirtschaftsregierung" der 16 Euro-Staaten bedürfte (das ist die 
französische Vorstellung) oder ob bessere Koordination und mehr 
Disziplin unter den 27 EU-Staaten der richtige Weg sei (was Frau 
Merkel[Agent] will), nur die Oberfläche des Problems. Im Grunde geht es 
darum, in welche Richtung sich die Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion[Affected Object] entwickeln, welchem "Modell" Europa[Agent] 
künftig folgen soll.  Frau Merkel[Counteragent] wird  ̶  natürlich nicht von 
offizieller Seite, sondern durch gezielt gestreute Informationen - in Paris 
vorgeworfen, sie wolle "une Europe germanique", ein nach dem 
deutschen Bild geformtes Europa. (Ein Debakel. FAZ June 6th 2010) 
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In the first sentence, the capital names Paris and Berlin are used metonymically to 
denote the respective governments. They are in the Experiencer position due to the 
cognitive-affective word Dissens (dissent) that is said to exist between them. Their 
respective positions, “economic government” and “better coordination and discipline” 
are identified as the “French idea” and “what Merkel wants” respectively, which gives 
the German position a more personalized flavor.  The deeper problem is however 
identified as dealing with the direction to which the Monetary Union should develop 
and what “model” Europe should follow. In the fourth sentence Merkel is in the 
Counteragent position, being accused in Paris of wanting a “Europe modelled after 
German ideas”. While this text in question does not take sides as to which side is 
correct, this excerpt merely serves to demonstrate how the conflict is shown to manifest 
on the official level, while on the level of discourse, as shown by other texts in the 
corpus, FAZ leans towards the view that the German view is indeed more ccorect one.  
 
At this point a counterexample should be named, however, that in some ways confirms 
the existence of an opposite trend. While in the above text no sides were taken, 
Germany’s right to dictate what form the Monetary Union or Europe should take is 
challenged in FAZ as well. The almost unspoken assumption behind that notion is 
likening the euro to the D-Mark, an idea that is mentioned in passing only once.28 The 
next excerpt demonstrates how this assumption and Germany’s “dictatorship” over the 
euro is challenged: 
 
(24)  Was bei dieser Reform herauskommt, wird nicht in jedem Fall den 
deutschen Lehrbüchern über Ordnungspolitik entsprechen. Der 
Euro[Identified] ist nun einmal, wie die gesamte EU[Comparison], ein 
supranationales Projekt[Identifier]. Da sind Kompromisse zwischen Staaten 
und Mentalitäten zu schließen. Man kann eine 
Gemeinschaftswährung[Patient] nicht als Diktat[Role] eines 
Mitgliedslandes[Possessor] betreiben, da haben sich Politiker und 
Volk[Experiencer] in Deutschland[Locative] lange etwas vorgemacht. Der 
Euro[Identified] war nie das Gleiche[Identifier] wie die D-Mark[Comparison], was 
übrigens nicht nur von Nachteil sein muss: Die Inflation, vor der die 
Deutschen[Experiencer] so große Angst haben, war mit dem Euro[Instrument] 
bisher niedriger als mit unserer alten Währung[Comparison]. (Die Krise 
durschstehen. FAZ June 19th 2010) 
                                                        
28In Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
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In the first two sentences we see something that can be interpreted as a concession: first 
it is admitted that “Whatever the results of these reforms, it will surely not correspond 
to German textbook ideals of Ordnungspolitik.” In terms of semantic roles, it is an 
Identified – Identifier structure. The next sentence, which has an identical structure, can 
be seen an elaboration of the statement: the euro as well as the EU are identified as a 
supranational project. The concessionary nature of this latter statement is evident from 
the expression nun einmal, which can be translated as “it just happens to be the case 
that...”.  The next sentences further clarify what it means that the euro is a supranational 
project: compromises between states and mentalities have to be made, and a common 
currency cannot be managed as a dictate of one member-state. The “politicians and 
people in Germany” are in the position of an Experiencer, described as having fooled 
themselves. Overall, these two sentences are a type of counter-articulation to the idea 
expressed in the previous excerpt, in which Germany/Merkel has to impose a “culture 
of stability” on the “colorful European mix”. Here we can also see an interesting 
distinction being made once again between the political elite and the people, perhaps 
with the aim of emphasizing their uniform attitude.  
 
The fifth sentence can be seen as further elaboration on what the politicians and people 
in Germany have been fooling themselves about: that the euro is the same as the D-
Mark. This sentence makes the claim that this was never the case. The second last 
sentence states that the non-sameness of the euro and the D-Mark is not only a bad 
thing, and the last sentence elaborates on this: the inflation of which the Germans 
(Experiencer) have been so afraid was so far lower with the euro than “with our old 
currency”. The last sentence is therefore in a way parallel to the fifth sentence, in that 
both feature the D-Mark in the position of Comparison, but in the last sentence it is 
referred to in a way that has more emotional connotations, as “our old currency”. This is 
a clear ‘national we’, by which the author identifies himself with the Germans.  
  
This kind of concession can be seen as an exception that confirms a rule. It is a type of 
counter-articulation which takes up an unspoken assumption and subjects it to re-
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negotiation. Thereby it confirms the existence of certain positions or assumptions, 
which may have been either explicitly or tacitly articulated in other texts within the 
corpus and outside of it.  
 
5.2.5 Transfer union, citizens and sovereignty 
 
So far we have been discussing the German-inspired ideas behind the Monetary Union, 
and how Germany is portrayed as enforcing these ideas during the crisis, based on the 
German concern for currency stability and likening the euro to the old D-Mark. The 
requirements for the Monetary Union introduced in the previous excerpts – discipline, 
no free riders, no living above one’s means – are statements about what the Monetary 
Union ideally should be, and these requirements are enshrined in the Treaties as well, as 
has been frequently pointed out.  
 
On the flip side of this there is what the Monetary Union is in danger of becoming: a 
transfer union. This has also already been alluded to in 5.2.2 in excerpts 6 and 8, where 
the euro was said to fail if the Monetary Union becomes a transfer union. Elsewhere in 
the corpus as well, for example in the texts Euro als Weichwährung 29  and die 
Währungsunion am Scheideweg30, it is stated that a transfer union will lead to a failure 
of the Monetary Union and the euro having no future due to an erosion of trust in the 
common currency.  
 
Such statements of course betray a concern for the stability of the currency and the 
concomitant fear of inflation, which has also been identified as a typically German fear 
(excerpts 15 and 23). Often it is the perspective of the citizens that is evoked, either of 
the Germans or European citizens as a whole. The trust in the euro that is at stake is 
portrayed as hanging from their willingness to pay for other countries’ debts via money 
transfers:  
 
 
                                                        
29 FAZ May 10th 2010 
30 FAZ May 13th 2010 
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(25)   Umso wichtiger ist, dass sich in den Köpfen der Bürger[Experiencer] nicht 
der Eindruck verfestigt, eine ehemals stabile Währungsunion[Affected Object] 
solle schrittweise zu einer Haftungsgemeinschaft und Transferunion[Result] 
umgebaut werden. [...] Solange die Deutschen[Experiencer] oder andere 
Einzahler[Additive] nicht bereit sind, über die bestehenden Kohäsionfonds 
hinaus für die EU[Beneficiary] zu zahlen, verbietet sich jeder 
Finanzausgleich, weil man sonst das Vertrauen in den Euro zerstört. 
(Hilfe und Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010) 
 
 
Here the noun Bürger (citizens) is in the Experiencer position (in this case, having an 
impression of something), which as we have seen is typical for nouns referring to 
citizens or nations (e.g. Germans) in the corpus. It is unclear however whether this 
refers to German citizens or European citizens more generally. The text states that what 
they should not have the impression of is that a “formerly stable Monetary Union 
(Affected Object) is being transformed into a liability community and a transfer union 
(Result).  
 
In the last sentence we find Germans identified as a contributor by means of the other 
contributors being in the Additive role. They are again in the Experiencer position 
(being ready, which can also be translated as being willing).  In the sentence a causal 
connection is established between their lack of readiness to contribute to the EU beyond 
the cohesion funds, the possibility of there being financial transfers, and loss of trust in 
the euro. It must be noted that the perspective is on the people throughout and on their 
willingness to pay, rather than on the state’s ability to pay (cf. 5.2.1). These two 
perspectives can be however highlighted within the same text, as the next excerpt 
shows: 
 
 
(26)   Deutschland[Agent] als wohlhabendes Land kann und muss seinen Beitrag 
leisten. Aber alle Lasten der Zusammenhalts kann es[Agent] nicht stemmen, 
dazu reicht seine Kraft nicht mehr. Gerade weil die Einigung Europas 
kostbar ist, dürfen seine Bürger[Experiencer], auch die Deutschen, nicht das 
Gefühl haben, sie würden überfordert.(Normales Deutschland. FAZ 
April 3rd 2010) 
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The first sentence we already encountered in excerpt 7. It expresses the notion of 
Germany not having the ability to carry all the burden in the financial sense. The second 
sentence, however, touches on the notion of willingness, where the citizens, both 
Europeans in general as well as the Germans, are again in the Experiencer position, 
where they “must not have the feeling of being overwhelmed”, for the reason that the 
“unification of Europe is precious”.   
 
Similarly, the text Von der Währungsunion in die Tranfesrunion states that although 
Chancellor Kohl understood the euro as a preliminary step towards a political union and 
although there might be good reasons for a political union, the attempt to reach a 
political union through the backdoor of a transfer union will put the existence of the 
Monetary Union at risk.31 The reason for this is that doing so would risk inviting the 
refusal of the citizens: 
 
 
(27)  Denn hierbei riskiert man die Verweigerung der Bürger[Experiencer]. Wer 
diesen Weg in die Transferunion[Goal] geht, der zerstört das Vertrauen in 
den Euro[Patient], zumindest dort, wo gespart und für die EU[Beneficiary] 
gezahlt wird. (Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion. FAZ October 
31st 2010) 
 
 
Given the context of the discussion, which is Europe instead of Germany, the “citizens” 
here refer to European citizens in general. The citizens are in the Experiencer position 
(refusal), as is typical. The argumentation here is similar to the previous excerpt: when 
there is no willingness present for a transfer union, then trust in the euro will be 
destroyed. The text adds a qualifier: “at least there where it is saved and paid for the EU  
takes place”. This deictic expression “there” can be taken to refer to countries; “saving 
and paying for the EU”, on the other hand, is the concept of a net contributor expressed 
in terms of verbs. The text can therefore be taken to say that it at least the trust of net 
contributors that will be at stake should the Monetary Union become a transfer union. 
                                                        
31 FAZ October 31st 2010 
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Again the perspective is on the citizens, not on countries, since it is the willingness of 
citizens at risk.    
 
So far we have seen examples of argumentation where references to the citizens are 
vague, in that they can be taken to refer to European citizens, but then the scope of the 
referent is narrowed down to encompass “citizens of net contributor countries”, among 
which Germany is also counted.  This pattern is also exhibited in the following passage: 
 
 
(28) Sollte das der Einstieg in eine hemmungslose Transferunion[Goal] sein, 
wird sie bald an ihre Grenzen stoßen. Denn die Bereitschaft, die Last für 
andere mitzutragen, ist innerhalb Europas[Locative] ungleich geringer als 
innerhalb Deutschlands[Locative]. Das ist keine deutsche Besonderheit. 
Viele mögen den Euro, schon weil er das lästige Umtauschen im Urlaub 
erspart. Aber man frage die Niederländer[Counteragent], ob sie[Experiencer] 
bereit sind, die griechischen Schulden zu begleichen. Oder man frage die 
Franzosen[Counteragent], wie groß ihr[Experiencer] Mitleid für überschuldete 
spanische Bauherren ist. Nicht wenn es um Hilfen in begrenztem 
Umfang geht, aber riesige Summen mit einem Federstrich zu übereignen, 
das werden auch die begeisterungsfähigsten Europäer[Experiencer] auf Dauer 
nicht akzeptieren. Wer Europa[Beneficiary] voranbringen und den Euro[Range] 
behalten will, darf das Projekt nicht überlasten. Zu einem gesunden 
Euro[Identified] gehört auch ein gesundes Maß an Eigeninteresse[Identifier]. 
(Die politische Währungsunion. FAZ July 1st 2010) 
 
 
Similarly to the previous excerpt, the transfer union is something that is entered (Goal), 
but it is also the Agent of a subordinate clause, “coming to soon face its limits”. The 
conjunction denn (because) introduces the reason why: “the willingness to bear the 
burden of others is even lower in Europe than in Germany”. This lack of willingness is 
identified as not a “German specialty”.  The adjective “willing” has been substantivized 
and is part of a circumstantial attributive clause, where the circumstantial attribute (i.e. 
Locative) is both Europe and Germany. Willingness is a mental state and would 
therefore afford an Experiencer, but here we find only “willingness” without a distinct 
experiencing subject, diffused within the “containers” of “Europe” and “Germany”.   
 
110 
 
However, the following sentences make clear that it is the citizens that are the 
experiencing subjects: this can be inferred from the down-to-earth example of being 
able to avoid exchanging currency while on holiday. The next sentence gets more 
specific: the Dutch, the French, the Greeks and the Spaniards are mentioned. In two 
rhetorical questions, it is asked whether the Dutch and the French (Counteragents) 
would be willing (Experiencers) to compensate for the debts of the Greeks and 
Spaniards, respectively. This is in fact a juxtaposition of two net contributor nations 
against two debt-ridden, net receiver nations. The pattern is therefore the same as in the 
previous examples: the question is about the willingness of European citizens “to carry 
the burden for others”, but especially the willingness of net contributors.  
 
The next sentence qualifies what has been said before: limited aid is not a problem, but 
it is “granting enormous sums with the stroke of a pen” that “will not be accepted by 
even the most enthusiastic Europeans”. The claim is therefore similar than the one made 
in the previous passage about a transfer union risking the refusal of the (European) 
citizens:  in both cases, Europeans are in the Experiencer position. The text then goes on 
to say that in order to “bring Europe forward” and “keep the euro”, the “project [of the 
European Monetary Union and the EU] should not be overburdened.” “Overburdened” 
can be taken to refer to money transfers that “risk the willingness of the citizens” and 
therefore analogous to “destroying trust in the euro”. The last sentence supports this 
conclusion, as it identifies a “healthy euro” with a “healthy amount of self-interest”: on 
part of all Europeans and not just Germans. 
 
It is not only a question of the failure of the monetary union or the willingness of the 
citizens, however. The question of the transfer union is intimately tied to considerations 
about the nature of the whole EU, concerning which the Constitutional Court of 
Germany is portrayed as the final arbiter: 
 
(29)   Solange es keinen europäischen Bundesstaat[Existential] gibt, bleibt 
glücklicherweise der Kommission[Counteragent] der Griff in die deutsche 
Steuerkasse verwehrt. Darüber wacht das Bundesverfassungs-
gericht[Agent], dessen Lissabon-Urteil nicht von nationalstaatlichem 
Denken, sondern von Sorge über die Demokratiedefizite im Verbund von 
Staaten geprägt ist. (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
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In this example, the Commission is denied access to German money as long as there is 
no European federal state. Concerning this state of affairs, the Constitutional Court is 
given the final say over what the EU is and what this entails, based on its Lissabon 
verdict concerning the nature of the EU.  This verdict is appealed to elsewhere in the 
corpus as well. In the text Normales Deutschland we find the following statement:  
 
 
(30)   Nicht neu ist zudem die Festlegung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts[Agent], 
die EU[Identified] sei kein Bundesstaat[Identifier1], sondern ein Verbund 
souveräner Staate [Identifier2]; sie stammt aus den frühen neunziger Jahren. 
Im vergangenen Jahr hat das Gericht[Sayer] nur noch einmal festgestellt, 
dass die EU[Affected Object] seitdem kein Bundesstaat[Result] geworden sei 
[...]. Man könnte hinzufügen: Und deswegen gibt es auch keine 
Transferunion[Existential], dafür aber ein paar rote Linien, was den Fortgang 
der Integration betrifft. (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
 
Here we find the decrees of the constitutional court paraphrased, in which the EU is 
denied to be a federal state, neither in the early 1990s nor in 2009.  Another text states 
that the “Constitutional Court has made clear many times that it cannot accept a 
creeping state-formation of Europe, which would the tantamount to the 
undemocratization of the German nation-state”32 In a yet another example, it is said that 
“the Monetary Union is not a state but an association of sovereign states, which have 
merely handed over their monetary policy to the ECB”33. In all these examples, the 
federal nature of the EU or the EMU is explicitly denied by appeal to a verdict of the 
Constitutional Court, and both are being attributed the form of a more lose association 
of sovereign states. All the preceding examples, taken together, establish the following 
types of logical connections, which are at the same time discursive articulations: 
 
                                                        
32 Vor einer Existenxkrize. FAZ April 27th 2010 
33 Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion. FAZ October 31st 2010 
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1) Transfer union  refusal of the citizens  no trust in the euro by the citizens  
the euro will be soft currency = the euro will have no future = the Monetary 
Union will fail 
 
2) The Constitutional Court declares that  
                    EU ≠ federal state, but instead 
                    EU   =  association of sovereign states, hence 
                    EU / EMU ≠ transfer union, because transfer union = undemocratization of    
                    the German nation-state 
   
These could also be combined and elaborated in the following way: 
EU = association of sovereign states, hence EU / EMU ≠ transfer union, because 
transfer union = non-sovereign states = undemocratization of the German nation-state 
 refusal of the citizens  
 
5.2.6 German interests and the government 
 
In the preceding three sections we have looked at the relationship between Germany, 
Germans, the euro and the Monetary Union. We found that the stability of the euro is 
close to German interests. This is to a great part justified by the importance the D-Mark 
had for the German national identity, on one hand, and by the German-inspired 
architecture of the Monetary Union itself, on the other hand. The from a German point 
of view undesirable alternative to the Monetary Union, a “transfer union”, is 
undesirable not just because of the threat it poses to the common currency’s stability, 
but also due to the unwillingness of the citizens – in Germany and elsewhere – and the 
loss of sovereignty a transfer union would entail.  
 
In this section we will look at how the German government’s actions are framed against 
the background of what the FAZ defines as German interests. Merkel’s activity in 
stabilizing the euro and imposing a “culture of stability” was already discussed in 
section 5.2.4 (excerpt 21), due to it being relevant to how the Monetary Union’s 
“Germanness” was articulated. Here the emphasis is slightly different, as what is of 
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interest is how the FAZ frames these actions and opens a conflict between the 
government and the citizens when the government’s actions are not in line with German 
interests from the FAZ’s point of view.   
 
 
(31)   In der Euro-Gruppe kämpft die Bundesregierung[Agent] zwar allein, aber 
sie[Carrier] ist in einer starken Position[Attribute/Locative]. Denn ohne 
Beteiligung Deutschlands[Agent] fällt am Kapitalmarkt jedes 
Rettungspaket für Griechenland durch. Wenn Bundeskanzlerin Angela 
Merkel[Agent] standhaft bleibt und eine Finanzhilfe für die Griechen nur 
über den Währungsfonds zulässt, kann sie[Agent] den Euro retten. (Wer 
den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
 
 
Here the federal government, Germany and Merkel all occupy the Agent position. The 
predicates assigned to each are kämpfen (to fight), sich beteiligen (nominalized as 
Beteiligung, to participate) and standhaft bleiben (keep firm). The verbs assigned to the 
government and Merkel both have to do with battle, sometimes used metaphorically in 
the context of negotiations. The fight here is about whether a bail-out package should be 
given to the Greeks in which the member states participate. Germany’s participation in 
the second sentence is linked to the government’s and Merkel’s actions, as without its 
participation every rescue package is said to fail. This is also the meaning of the “strong 
position” (Locative/circumstantial attribute) attributed to the government in a 
subordinate clause. In the final sentence, by means of the conjunction wenn (if), Merkel 
is attributed a major role in that it is her action (of keeping firm), as the head of the 
government, that will determine whether the euro will be saved. The government and 
Merkel are therefore implied as acting on behalf of Germany in a way that is beneficial 
for the euro.  
 
The next excerpt also deals with negotiations. Note that at this point the European 
leaders had agreed to prepare an assistance package for Greece, in cooperation with the 
IMF as per German wishes. They however also announced that the assistance would 
only be an ultima ratio and would be given at very punitive rates. This is reflected in the 
title of the article, Hilfe und Strafe (Help and punishment) 
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(32)   Das Rettungspaket für Griechenland ist geschnürt. Die Lösung[Possessor] 
trägt eine deutsche Handschrift[Attribute], die Grenzen für Hilfen sind eng 
und die Hürden hoch. In den Verhandlungen mit den anderen 
Regierungschefs hat Bundeskanzlerin Merkel[Agent] geschickt die engen 
Spielräume als Druckmittel eingesetzt, die das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht[Agent] in der Schicksalsfrage der gemeinsamen 
Währung gesetzt hat. Mit ihrer harten Verhandlungsführung[Instrument] hat 
sie den EU-Partnern[Counteragent] mehr abverlangt, als möglich schien. 
(Hilfe und Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010) 
 
 
Here we see three keywords: Angela Merkel, Germany and the adjective deutsch 
(German). Let us begin with the adjective attribute. It modifies the noun Handschrift, 
signature, carried by the rescue package for the Greeks. The sentence is in passive voice 
(“the bail-out package was tied”), but the “German signature” metaphorically attributes 
Germany the role of an Agent or a Causer. What this means is elaborated on in the next 
sentence: “the limits for aid are narrow and the thresholds high.”  
 
Merkel is again occupying the position of an Agent. The action she participates in is 
also again that of negotiation, where she (Agent) by using the tight leeway given by the 
Constitutional Court (another Agent) demanded from the EU-partners (Counteragent) 
more than seemed possible. The ultimate Agent can be seen to be the Constitutional 
Court that sets the parameters of what could be negotiated, and Merkel is simply using 
these limits as a “means of pressure”. Merkel is also identified as a skillful and tough 
negotiator. The text continues as follows: 
 
 
(33)   Dies ist keine neue Linie Deutschlands[Possessor], seine Ziele[Range] in 
Europa zu vertreten - und antieuropäisch ist es auch nicht. Indem Frau 
Merkel[Agent] den französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy überzeugt hat, den 
Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) im Euro-Raum helfen zu lassen, 
hält sie[Agent] zudem in der Tradition ihrer Vorgänger den deutsch-
französischen Motor der europäischen Integration am Laufen. (Hilfe und 
Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010) 
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This fact of being a demanding and skilled negotiator is the referent of the 
demonstrative pronoun dies in the next sentence, which states “This is not a new way 
for Germany to defend its interests in Europe– nor is it anti-European”. In this way, 
Merkel’s action becomes equated with Germany defending its interests in Europe 
(Identifier), which is also not anti-European (Attribute). 
 
In the last sentence Merkel is still acting as an Agent, this time convincing the French 
president Sarkozy (Counteragent) that he allows the IMF to help in the euro area. Just 
like Merkel’s negotiation results are equated with Germany defending its interests in the 
previous sentence, here Merkel convincing Sarkozy is equated as “keeping the German-
French motor of the European integration running in the tradition of her predecessors”, 
the latter being of course the former German Chancellors such as Schröder, Kohl and 
Adenauer. The cohesive element establishing this link is in this case the conjunction 
indem (by… doing something).  
 
There is in fact an additional link, if only an implied one, between this last sentence and 
the previous one about anti-Europeanness, which is established by the word zudem 
(furthermore). It means that not only is Germany defending its interests in Europe new 
nor anti-European, Merkel is also in some way upholding the spirit of her pro-European 
predecessors. 
 
So far we have seen the Chancellor’s and the government’s actions being aligned with 
German interests as interpreted by the FAZ, which means adhering to the no bail-out 
clause and to the integrity of the stability criteria This changes however when the 
financial assistance package is finally activated on April 21st, including bilateral credits.  
 
There is a shift in how Merkel and other governmental actors are framed. When before 
they were depicted as fighting to defend Germany’s interests, now they are portrayed as 
trying to justify their actions in the eyes of the citizens. In most of these cases the 
governmental actors are occupying Agent position, or more precisely that of a Sayer. In 
the text Griechische Wette, for instance, we find the following passage:  
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(34)   Bundeskanzlerin Merkel[Agent] gibt sich alle Mühe, die so gut wie 
beschlossene Milliardenüberweisung an Athen nicht als Bruch der 
gemeinsamen Verträge[Role1] und verbotene Finanzhilfe[Role2] erscheinen 
zu lassen.  (Griechische Wette. FAZ April 25th 2010) 
 
 
Merkel is here portrayed as trying to hide the fact that the bilateral credit could be 
thought of as breaking the treaties (Role 1) and as “forbidden financial aid” (Role 2). 
Merkel is therefore portrayed as acting in ways which goes against what is deemed 
acceptable from the point of view of the FAZ.  
 
Often the FAZ reminds about Merkel’s and other German politicians’ accountability to 
the voters and to the Constitutional Court. It is for example stated that “Because Merkel 
did not manage to keep the billions for the Greeks out of the campaign in Nordrhein-
Westphalen, could many a voter make their choice with their eyes on the dear money”34 
In another text that Merkel has “not only the German voters sitting on her neck, but she 
also has to take the position of the Constitutional Court into account.”35  
 
The text In Haftung36 also states that if Merkel turns the Monetary Union into a transfer 
union, the Germans will lose their trust in the euro, and that this will pose a risk not just 
for the euro but also for Merkel’s chancellorship. It therefore exemplifies the same kind 
of argumentation as in 6.2.5: if a transfer union takes place, the citizens will lose their 
trust in the euro and it will possibly fail. The only difference here is that Merkel, by her 
Agent role, is held directly accountable should that state of affairs come to pass. It is 
affirmed that she is accountable to the citizens, who would possibly not re-elect her, and 
the loss of trust in the euro by the citizens is framed as posing as much of a risk for her 
own chancellorship as for the future of the euro. 
 
                                                        
34 Griechische Wette. FAZ 25th April, 2010 
35 Vor einer Existenzkrise. FAZ 27th April 2010 
36 FAZ May 7th 2010 
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There is one instance in the corpus where the reminder about democratic accountability 
is made on a more general level, but still pertaining to Germany. In the text with the title 
Der Albtraum 37  (Nightmare), the automatic fashion in which civil servants of the 
Commission make decisions is compared to German politicians, who have to justify 
themselves before their constituency and should “look the truth in the eyes” if they wish 
to be re-elected.38 
 
Sometimes we find the opposition built between the Chancellor as Sayer and the 
German citizens as Counteragents. The Chancellor’s speech or explanations are 
attributed the purpose of trying to either appease or convince the citizens. The next two 
excerpts shed light on this: 
 
 
(35)   In ihrer Regierungserklärung hat die Bundeskanzlerin[Sayer] – das war das 
Berliner Vorspiel zu den Athener Krawallen – eine Sprache gewählt, die 
zwischen Vorwärtsverteidigung und Untergangstremolo schwankte: 
Europa[Carrier] am Scheideweg[Attribute]; es geht um Deutschlands[Possessor] 
Zukunft. So sollen natürlich die Parteien[Counteragent] im Bundestag[Locative] 
zur Zustimmung zu den Notkrediten für das überschuldete Griechenland 
gebracht und die widerwilligen Deutschen[Counteragent] besänftigt werden. 
(Brandsätze. FAZ May 5th 2010) 
                              
 
(36)   Warum soll Deutschland[Agent] für die Schulden Griechenlands haften? 
Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel[Sayer] versucht das so zu erklären: Es 
gebe zur Rettung der Griechen keine Alternative, es gehe um die 
Stabilität des Euro, nur mit einem harten Sparprogramm könnten die 
Hellenen das Vertrauen der Märkte wiedergewinnen. Die Beschwörung 
der Zukunft Europas mag im Bundestag und Bundesrat Gehör finden, 
wenn der Finanzminister ermächtigt wird, für fremde Staatsschulden zu 
bürgen. Aber die allermeisten Bürger[Counteragent] überzeugt das nicht. (In 
Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
     
 
In both excerpts the content of Merkel’s justifications is paraphrased as well. In the first 
excerpt it is an appeal to Europe’s and Germany’s future; in the second excerpt it is 
about the lack of alternatives, the stability of the euro and the importance of a harsh 
                                                        
37 FAZ April 23rd 2010 
38 Der Albtraum. FAZ April 23rd 2010 
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savings program for the Greeks. This content is given in the subjunctive mode, which 
indicates both indirect speech as well as distancing from what is said. In the second last 
sentence of the second excerpt we find the nominalized construct “appeal to the future 
of Europe”, which is a label given to the justifications that were enumerated in the 
preceding sentence. It is in the Agent position, but the true Agent – or Sayer – is 
Merkel. It is this appeal that is portrayed as being perhaps convincing for the majority 
of parliament, but not to most citizens (Counteragent). 
 
In an interesting parallel to the equation presented in excerpts 32 and 33, where 
Merkel’s tough negotiation style was equated with Germany advocating its goals in 
Europe, Merkel is in the text In Haftung portrayed as having failed Germany:  
 
 
(37)   Angela Merkel[Agent] hat dem Druck der europäischen Partner[Counteragent] 
nachgegeben. Von der eisernen Kanzlerin[Affected Object] ist nichts[Result] 
geblieben. (In Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
 
In this example, Merkel giving up to the pressure of the European partners is equated to 
“nothing remaining from the Iron Chancellor”. This is of course a historical allusion to 
the 19th century German chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who was a notably stern and 
tough leader. It therefore signifies that Merkel is no longer the hard and demanding 
negotiator who she was in excerpt 30.  
  
Excerpts 32 and 33 show that Merkel typically justifies her actions in terms of the 
overarching logic of saving the euro and the European unification. Many times she is 
quoted as saying “If the euro fails, Europe will fail”, the word Europe being a 
placeholder for the whole project of the European unification39, 40 For the FAZ there is 
however an inherent contradiction between her words and actions, since for the FAZ 
saving the euro and Europe would necessitate adhering to the treaties. Nowhere is this 
contradiction more clearly pointed out as in the text Im Namen Europas. The text 
                                                        
39 Im Dienst der Politik. FAZ April 13th 2010 
40 Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ April 20th 2010 
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describes Merkel as a bad European by her own definition, which she is quoted as 
putting forth: 
 
 
(38)   Angela Merkel[Identified] ist eine schlechte Europäerin[Identifier]  – wenn man 
der von ihr selbst aufgestellten Definition des guten Europäers 
folgt[Identifier]. Der, so sagte sie am Mittwoch abermals im Deutschen 
Bundestag, zeichne sich unter anderem dadurch aus, dass er[Agent] die 
europäischen Verträge achte. Die werden derzeit aber auch von der 
deutschen Regierung[Agent] gebogen und ignoriert wie selten zuvor, 
selbstredend nur zum höchsten aller Zwecke: nicht allein zur 
Rettung[Purpose1]  Griechenlands, sondern auch zur Bewahrung[Purpose2]  der 
Währungsunion und überhaupt der europäischen Einigung. (Im Namen 
Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
 
In Merkel’s words, a good European is a one that adheres to the European treaties, but 
as the text points out, these treaties are now being ignored by the German government 
itself. The expression selbstredend nur zum höchsten aller Zwecke indicates that 
although the government justifies its actions with a high purpose – rescuing Greece and 
saving the Monetary Union as well as the European unification – the FAZ does not take 
this justification seriously. For the FAZ, then, ends do not justify the means.  
 
Somewhat paradoxically though, a tightening of the stability pact is also sometimes 
depicted as something that would put the willingness of the citizens at risk, like in the 
texts Zwangsvertiefungs and Bis alle Schwaben sind.. 
 
 
(39)   Eines ist allerdings auch klar: Die Handlungsspielräume der EU-
Staaten[Maleficiary] würden durch einen "gehärteten" Stabilitätspakt[Agent] 
noch einmal reduziert. Dagegen wird es Widerstand geben, und das 
Gefühl von Fremdbestimmung wird auch in der Bevölkerung[Experiencer]  
zunehmen. [...] Frau Merkel[Sayer] sagte in Aachen, wenn der Euro 
scheitere, dann scheitere die Idee der europäischen Einigung. Werden ihr 
die Wähler[Experiencer] glauben? (Zwangsvertiefung. FAZ May 14th 2010) 
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The first sentence states that the freedom of action of EU states would be reduced by a 
stricter stability pact. The next sentence then claims that “there will be resistance 
against it and the feeling of being directed from outside will grow within the 
population”. The word population is again in the Experiencer role, and the referent of 
this word is most likely European population, since the preceding sentence referred to 
EU states. Merkel is in the role of a Sayer, who is quoted as saying “when the euro fails, 
the idea of European unification will fail”. The citizens, this time defined by the context 
as specifically German citizens in their aspect as voters, are in the Experiencer role 
(although since there is an implied interaction here, it could also be interpreted as the 
Counteragent role), and the text asks whether they would believe her. This at once 
highlights her democratic accountability and the fact that any action that leads to loss of 
national sovereignty is bound to invite the unwillingness of the citizens. A similar idea 
of Merkel’s wishes for deepening regulation as potentially causing resistance among 
European citizens and thereby making the future of the integration an open question 
(“The project of European integration is truly at a crossroads) is also expressed in the 
text Bis alle Schwaben sind.  
 
So far only some of the possible examples of this theme of the government being held 
accountable have been covered. While all of them will not be discussed here, one more 
example will be given of another perspective.  
 
 
(40)  Natürlich ist es bitter, dass Deutschland[Agent] jetzt Kredite an andere 
Euro-Staaten[Benefeciary] geben muss, um die Währung beisammen zu 
halten[Purpose]. Aber die Kanzlerin[Sayer] hat es nicht geschafft, dem 
Volk[Counteragent] in klarer und verständlicher Sprache darzulegen, dass 
sie[Agent] letztlich keine andere Wahl hatte. (Die Krise durchstehen. FAZ 
June 19th 2010) 
 
 
In this excerpt too, Germany’s action (giving credits to other euro states to keep the 
currency together) is attributed to the Chancellor, in that she is put in the position of 
having to explain that “she had no other choice”. The fact of giving credits is described 
as bitter, in a tone of an admission signified by the adverb of manner natürlich (of 
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course). According to the text, the Chancellor (Sayer) has not managed to explain to  the 
people (Counteragent) “in a clear and understandable language” that she had no choice.  
 
In the continuation of the text, we see Germans twice in the Agent position, first as 
having “tied their destiny with the other nations in Europe”.  This tying together of 
destinies is explained as being equivalent to a lack of “classical sovereignty”, which 
“does not exist anymore even for the largest member-state”.  
 
 
(41) Die Wahrheit ist, dass die Deutschen[Agent] ihr Schicksal, und zwar nicht 
nur in der Währungspolitik, schon seit sehr langer Zeit mit dem der 
anderen Nationen in Europa verknüpft haben. [...] Klassische 
Souveränität, verstanden als nationale Handlungsfreiheit, gibt es in einem 
Verbund, der von der Währung bis zur Grenzkontrolle fast alles teilt, 
auch für den größten Mitgliedstaat[Maleficiary] nicht mehr. (Die Krise 
durchstehen. FAZ June 19th 2010) 
 
 
In the second example below (42) there is a slight shift in the extension of the word 
Deutsche. Whereas in 36 it referred to the German nation as a whole, in 37 it again 
refers in a more restricted sense to the citizens, in contrast to politicians. This shift is 
due to the use of the word Bevölkerung in the first sentence, which focuses the 
perspective on the people. The word Bevölkerung is in the typical Experiencer position, 
whereas Deutsche is again in the Agent position, in their aspect as voters. Deutsche is 
also the referent of the personal pronoun sie in the third sentence, where the role is 
Experiencer, regretting the choice of politicians they have made; the same applies to the 
word Bürger in the subordinate clause, where the events of the crisis are portrayed as 
fueling the imagination of citizens concerning a more isolated existence for Germany as 
a “big Switzerland”.  
 
(42)  Offenbar hat die Euro-Krise das der Bevölkerung[Experiencer] zum ersten 
Mal richtig bewusstgemacht. Drei Generationen lang haben die 
Deutschen[Agent] solche Politiker gewählt, die sich für einen weitgehenden 
Kompetenztransfer nach Brüssel eingesetzt haben. Das scheinen 
sie[Experiencer] jetzt zu bereuen, denn die jüngsten Ereignisse haben 
offenbar bei vielen Bürgern[Experiencer] die Vorstellung genährt, man könne 
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behaglicher als eine Art große Schweiz leben: mit eigener Währung und 
starken Exporten, aber sonst zurückgezogen von den Zumutungen 
Europas und der Globalisierung. (Die Krise durchstehen. FAZ June 19th 
2010) 
 
 
While these passages demonstrate some trends concerning semantic roles, they also 
highlight another side of the democratic accountability that has been alluded to: it is the 
citizens who have chosen to vote for pro-European politicians in the past, even though 
they now, prompted by the crisis, seem to regret it. 
 
5.2.7 Renegotiation of Germany’s pro-European identity 
 
In excerpt 31 we saw the statement that Germany pursuing its goals in Europe is, to 
paraphrase, “nothing new nor anti-European.” 41  A continuity was also established 
between Merkel and her predecessor by framing her actions as “keeping the German-
French motor of European integration running.” Such statements must always been seen 
as a part of a larger conversation and negotiation about what it means to be “European”, 
and also what it means to be Germany in Europe. The renegotiation of this definition 
takes place in many places in the corpus, but especially in the text Normales 
Deutschland. Only two direct excerpts will be given, while the rest of the text will be 
summarized, since the whole text contributes to the same theme.  
 
 
(43)   In die Haltung der Bundesregierung[Experiencer1] und, ganz allgemein, der 
deutschen Öffentlichkeit[Experiencer2] in Sachen Griechenland, Euro und 
Währungsunion ist vielfach eine dramatische Wende in der deutschen 
Europapolitik[Matter] hineingelegt worden. Und ein kühler, eng an 
deutschen Interessen orientierter Pragmatismus[Patient] der Kanzlerin 
Merkel wurde der herzenswärmeren Europaliebe des früheren Kanzlers 
Kohl[Comparison] gegenübergestellt, der[Experiencer] sogar bereit war, die D-
Mark[Patient] herzugeben als Zeichen[Role] der Versöhnung von deutscher 
Einheit und europäische Einigung. Der Vorwurf, der heute gegen 
"Berlin"[Counteragent] erhoben wird, lautet: Deutschland[Experiencer] denke 
nicht mehr europäisch[Quality], sondern, eben, deutsch[Quality]. Es[Affected 
Object] sei ein "normales" Land[Result] geworden. (Normales Deutschland. 
FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
                                                        
41 Hilfe und Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010 
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The text describes ”a manifold dramatic change in attitude“ of the federal government 
and the German public “concerning German European policy in matters pertaining to 
Greece, euro and the Monetary Union.” This differentiation between the government 
and the public is similar to the distinction between the state or the politicians and the 
people, which has now been encountered many times in the corpus. By naming these 
actors the text ensures that the “whole” of the country is covered in the change of 
orientation, which would not be the case if it simply said “there has been a dramatic 
change in Germany’s European policy”: because the country name can often be used to 
denote just the government, this could be interpreted as merely the government 
changing its policy, and the attitudes of the people would not enter the picture.   
 
There is a contrast created between Merkel’s “cold pragmatism which is tightly bound 
to German interests” and former chancellor Kohl’s “heart-warming love for Europe”. 
The latter is exemplified by the fact that Kohl (Agent) was willing to give up the D-
Mark as a kind of a symbolic act of reconciliation between the unified Germany and 
European unification: recall that in excerpt 12 this act was described as “the Germans’ 
sacrifice for Europe”42  
 
In the end of this excerpt we see the capital name Berlin being used as a metonymic 
index for the German government in the Counteragent position, being accused of the 
fact that Germany does not think in a “European way” anymore but rather in a “German 
way”. This is a rare instance where the country name is found in the Experiencer 
position, but the referent can be taken to be the same as with the capital name Berlin: 
the government.  
 
The verbs are in the subjunctive mode, which indicates indirect speech.  The use of 
quotation marks around the capital name could signal that the author wants to make the 
use of this metonymic convention marked (as opposed to unmarked). The reason could 
be the distinction opened up in the opening sentence between the government and the 
                                                        
42 Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th.2010 
124 
 
general public, whereby the change of mind from thinking in a European way to more 
German way was implied not to pertain only to the government (= “Berlin”  state), but 
to the public as well ( the nation). The last sentence puts the accusation in another 
way: Germany is also accused of becoming a “normal” country. The word “normal” in 
quotation marks could again indicate distancing or indirect speech. This interpretation is 
lent credence by the use of subjunctive in both this and the preceding sentence.  
 
“Normal” in this context is equal to “thinking in a German way”, as opposed to a  
“European way”. It is thereby implied that being a normal country means being 
primarily concerned with self-interest. This accusation has its roots in Germany’s 
heretofore pro-European attitude. As the title of this text gives away, this issue of 
Germany’s “normality” is central to it. It mentions how Germany due to its past can 
never be as normal as other “middle powers”, but how its Atlantic partners (presumably 
the USA) has been urging it to give up its “historically motivated self-restraint” instead 
of being “normal” and clinging to an idealistic vision of neutrality, which is likened to 
behaving like a “big Switzerland”.  
 
The text then claims that such “normality” is often regarded in the EU as 
“renationalization”, but makes the point that the former pro-European chancellors 
Helmut Schmidt and Kohl also advocated German interests, since it was Kohl who 
established the stability rules of the Monetary Union. The text therefore challenges the  
interpretation that “normal” equals to self-interested, which eqauls non-European by 
proposing that Schmidt and Kohl, the most pro-European of recent German 
Chancellors, did also advocate German interests. The same articulation is therefore 
achieved as in excerpt 31, where Merkel defending German interests was framed as 
“nothing new nor anti-European”.43  
 
The text then claims that “to insist on the adherence to the treaties is neither divisive nor 
un-European”, and “neither it is egoistic to insist on a stable currency as the core of the 
union of Europeans“. In terms of semantic roles, “divisive”, “un-European” and 
“egoistic” are all attributes of the phrase “insistence on the adherence to the treaties”. 
                                                        
43 Hilfe und Strafe. March 26th 2010   
125 
 
 
Adherence to the treaties and the stability of the euro assured thereby was defined as the 
core German interest in sections 5.2.3 to 5.2.5. This statement can be seen as an attempt 
to reconcile “self-interest” and “Europeanness”, asserting that they are not 
contradictory. The next excerpts conclude the text: 
 
 
(44)   Es stimmt: Die öffentliche Meinung[Affected Object] in Deutschland hat sich 
dem allgemeinen Meinungsfeld[Result] angeglichen: Europapolitik ist 
nichts Selbstverständliches mehr, sondern steht unter Begründungszwang. 
Die veränderte Stimmung hatte schon Kohl[Experiencer] am Ende seiner 
Kanzlerschaft zu spüren bekommen. Jene, welche die Europapolitik 
früherer Bundesregierungen romantisieren, übersehen zweierlei: 
Geschichte steht nicht still. Das Deutschland[Identified] der sechzehn 
Bundesländer ist nicht mehr das vor der Wiedervereinigung[Identifier]. 
Seine Bevölkerung[Identified] ist (fast) so normal[Attribute1] oder 
selbstbezogen[Attribute2] oder europanörglerisch[Attribute3] wie jede andere 
auch. Und die EU[Identified] der 27 Mitgliedsländer ist nicht mehr die 
Gemeinschaft der Sechs[Identifier]. (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 
2010) 
 
 
In this excerpt we find several important statements: that the “public opinion in 
Germany” has become more like the “general field of opinion”, which means that 
“European policy is no longer self-explanatory, but needs to be justified anew.” The 
general field of opinion referred to here is likely the common public opinion in Europe. 
This change is something that even Kohl (Experiencer) got to feel towards the end of 
his chancellorship, so it is not portrayed as something sudden, but rather as something 
that has been in the works for a longer period of time. The reason for the need of re-
justification is that neither Germany nor the EU are the same as they used to be, i.e. 
“history does not stand still”.  In the case of Germany, this is elaborated by reference to 
its population: it is “(almost) as normal or self-interested or suspicious of Europe as any 
other population”. The public opinion in the first sentence and the need for re-
justification, then, can be understood as pertaining especially to the citizens. Like in the 
first sentence of the whole text (excerpt 39 above), the change in attitude is therefore 
explained concerning not just the higher echelons of the state, but as having a broad 
base in the general public. 
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(45)  Auch für die große Union gilt das Prinzip der Solidarität, es ist das Wesen 
jedweder Gemeinschaft. Deutschland[Agent] als wohlhabendes Land kann 
und muss seinen Beitrag leisten. Aber alle Lasten der Zusammenhalts 
kann es[Agent] nicht stemmen, dazu reicht seine Kraft nicht mehr. Gerade 
weil die Einigung Europas[Carrier] kostbar[Attribute] ist, dürfen seine 
Bürger[Experiencer], auch die Deutschen, nicht das Gefühl haben, sie würden 
überfordert. Ist das antieuropäisch? Und dennoch werden die 
Deutschen[Experiencer] damit leben müssen: Ganz normal[Attribute] sein sollen 
sie[Carrier] nicht. (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
 
Parts of excerpt 45 have already been encountered and analyzed before. What is of 
interest here are the last two sentences. The text asks the rhetorical question whether it 
is anti-European to want to protect the people from feeling overwhelmed. This 
overwhelm or unwillingness to carry other countries’ financial burden has been 
discussed already in section 5.2.5, and it was also mentioned in excerpt 14, where the 
German citizens were described as being “blackmailed to European solidarity”.   
 
The text then makes the conclusion that the Germans will nonetheless have to accept 
that they shouldn’t be quite “normal”. The Germans are here again in the Experiencer 
position (literally damit leben müssen, dass… =  accept the reality of). The subtext that 
can be read off this proposition is that they are always expected to be “more European 
than others” in some way.  
 
The Germans are referred to as “model Europeans” and “in love with Europe” in the 
text Im Namen Europas44  as well, where the theme of the “project Europe” needing 
new justification is also touched upon. The following two excerpts are from this text. 
The first excerpt starts off from a remark that the stabilization of the Monetary Union 
and the EU will only succeed “if the Greeks and all other Europeans, who now 
allegedly have no other choice but to give them aid, will know the purpose of their 
sacrifice that goes far beyond that which they have so far been asked to do in the name 
of Europe”: 
                                                        
44 FAZ May 7th 2010 
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(46)  Das wird schon im Falle der bisherigen Mustereuropäer, der 
Deutschen[Matter], zwingend notwendig. Für Deutschland[Beneficiary] war 
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg "Europa" der Königsweg zurück zu 
Frieden, Freiheit, Wohlstand und Ansehen. Dem alten Europa[Counteragent], 
das am Mittwoch im Pfalzbau zu Ludwigshafen in Gestalt von mehreren 
hundert grauhaarigen Häuptern aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Geistlichkeit 
zusammensass, um den grossen alten Europäer Kohl zu feiern, musste 
die Kanzlerin[Sayer] nicht lange erklären, warum sie[Agent] sich zur Hilfe für 
Griechenland durchrang. (Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
 
 
Germans are identified as ”model Europeans“: even for them, a rejustification is in 
order. Germans are referred to as model Europeans because of the meaning “Europe” 
had for the country, explained in the second sentence: the royal road to peace, freedom, 
welfare and recognition after World War II. “Europe” is in quotation marks because it is 
consciously used to refer to something other than the mere continent, to the ideal 
embodied in the project of European integration.  The expression “old Europe” as 
Counteragent refers to the generation of Germans which still remembers World War II 
and the subsequent embarking on the “royal road” referred to in the second sentence, 
who celebrated Chancellor Kohl. He himself is identified as a “great old European”, 
who in excerpt 40 was described as having sacrificed the D-Mark as a symbol of 
reconciliation between the re-united Germany and Europe. Chancellor Merkel is in the 
position of Sayer, portrayed as having to justify her actions, which in the case of the  
“old Europe” is not deemed necessary. The text continues:               
 
(47)   Im Falle des neuen, jungen Europas[Matter] aber muss sie[Sayer] es, auch 
hier im europaverliebten Deutschland[Locative]. Es sind Generationen 
herangewachsen, für die das, wofür Kohl und seine Weggefährten 
kämpften und arbeiteten, eine Selbstverständlichkeit ist. Die 
Nachgeborenen mussten keine Toten mehr aus zerbombten Häusern 
heraustragen. Europa[Identified] ist – so kann aus einem historisch 
unerhörten Erfolg ein Fluch werden – für sie keine Frage von Krieg und 
Frieden[Identifier] mehr. Für sie muss das Projekt Europa neu begründet 
werden. Ob dafür die Reisefreiheit, der Wegfall der Gebühren beim 
Geldwechseln und der Hinweis auf den Exportüberschuss reichen, für 
den Deutschland[Counteragent] von seinen Nachbarn kritisiert wird wie 
insgesamt für seine angeblich verbissene preussich-schwäbische Art? (Im 
Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
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As a counterpoint to “old Europe”, here we find the expression “new, young Europe”. 
For them Merkel needs to explain her actions, the text states, also “here in Europe-
infatuated Germany” (note the deictic expression here which establishes Germany as a 
point of reference).  For these generations, the work of Kohl and his contemporaries is a 
“self-evident fact” and for them, Europe is no longer a question of war and peace, and 
therefore for them the project Europe must be justified anew. A reference is then made 
to the typical justifications: loss of money exchange between euro countries and export 
surplus (cf. excerpt 10 in 5.2.2, where it was hinted that Germany’s “pay master role” 
had been formerly justified due to the benefits gained for exports). The export surplus is 
also named as something Germany is criticized for, along with its “Swabian-Prussian 
attitude” (cf. 5.2.1).  
 
We therefore find the same type of argumentation here as in the text Normales 
Deutschland: European policy is not a taken-for-granted matter anymore, especially 
from the point of view of the population. In this text the division between the population 
and the elite is even stronger, because the Chancellor is portrayed as having to justify 
actions to it that are not really in line with German interests from the point of view of 
FAZ (cf. 5.2.6). The division into “old” and “young Europe” is furthermore a similar 
kind of division as “Germany before reunification” and “Germany of the 16 states”: 
these divisions imply a change of conditions that has taken place, especially as far as the 
population is concerned, and therefore the old orientation has to be examined anew.  
 
5.2.8 EU, Europe and Germany 
 
This section deals with the depiction of the EU and its relationship to Germany, as well 
as the depiction of Europe. We will start with discussing the EU as a collective actor, i.e. 
as a combination of its member states’ governments. Whenever their actions are 
described in the corpus, it is not typically in a favorable light: 
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(48)   Mit einem flüchtigen Blick auf die Kosten haben die Staatschefs der 
EU[Agent] beschlossen, den Griechen müsse geholfen werden, angeblich 
lauere in deren Schuld eine systematisches Risiko für den Euro-Raum. 
[...] Nur wer[Agent] die griechische Staatsschuld zur Systemfrage erhebt, 
muss jetzt helfen. Wer[Identifed/Sayer] hingegen fragt, ob auch für 
Griechenland ein Austritt aus der Währungsunion besser wäre, muss kein 
schlechter Europäer[Identifier] sein. (Im Sumpf. FAZ April 21st 2010) 
 
 
This excerpt has the EU heads of state as the Agent, deciding to help Greece on the 
grounds of, as the text states, an “alleged systematic risk”. The text then states that only 
the one who frames the Greek debt as a systemic question must help, but the one who 
asks whether Greece should exit the EMU “is not necessarily a bad European”. This 
excerpt therefore constitutes another negotiation of what it means to be “European” (cf. 
5.2.7): to help or no to help?  
 
The EU leaders’ actions in the crisis are portrayed as incompetent elsewhere in the 
corpus as well45. In the following excerpt their collective action is referred to as EU-
Politik (EU politics): 
 
 
(49)   In der Brüsseler Krisennacht hat man den Euro[Maleficiary] seines besten 
vorbeugenden Schutzes, des Beistandsverbots und der unabhängigen 
Notenbank, beraubt – in dem vagen Versprechen, bald einen härteren 
Mechanismus zu ersinnen, der für Haushaltsvernunft sorgen werde. Doch 
deuten die fortgesetzten Attacken auf die "Spekulanten" darauf hin, dass 
die EU-Politik[Agent] dieses Versprechen weder erfüllen will noch kann, 
sondern ihr Heil lieber in einer übermäßigen Regulierung der Märkte 
suchen wird, um die disziplinierende Kraft der Marktpreise zu brechen. 
Darauf sollten die Bürger[Experiencer] nicht hereinfallen. Am Ende ist der 
Spekulant doch ihr letzter Verbündeter im Kampf gegen ausufernde 
Staatsverschuldung. (Der letzte Verbündete. FAZ May 10th 2010) 
  
 
The expression Brüsseler Krisennacht refers to the meetings of 7th–9th of May 2010, 
where the EU leaders decided to create the European Financial Stability Facility and the 
European Central Bank announced its intention to start buying the govenrment bonds of 
crisis countries on the secondary market. In the first sentence the Agent has been faded 
                                                        
45 Der Euro als Weichwährung. FAZ May 10th 2010 
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due to the passive construct, but the actors are the EU leaders, which in the second 
sentence are referred to with the abstract term EU-Politik. It is described as not fulfilling 
its promise of “a harder mechanism for budgetary control”, but instead “seeking its 
salvation in the excessive regulation of markets”. The citizens again make their 
appearance in the third sentence, defined as the European citizens by context and in the 
typical Experiencer position, and are advised to “not fall for this”, since “in the end the 
speculator is their last ally in the battle against escalating state debt”. A similar type of 
conflict is then opened up between the elite and the citizens as demonstrated in 5.2.6, 
but this time on the European level. 
 
Neither is the EU as an institution generally portrayed in a favorable light. When it is 
depicted as an actor, i.e. found in the Agent position, its action is typically not expressed 
in positive terms, either in itself or in terms of its consequences. The following 
examples are meant to demonstrate this: 
 
 
(50)  Wenn nun die EU[Agent] von den Griechen inmitten der schweren 
Rezession verlangt, Ausgaben und Gehälter zu kürzen und Steuern zu 
erhöhen, droht eine Depression. (Der Albtraum. FAZ April 23rd) 
 
(51)  Was wird, was kann die EU[Agent] tun, wenn die den Griechen verordneten 
Einschnitte "politisch nicht durchsetzbar" sind? (Der Blick nach vorn. 
FAZ May 1st 2010) 
 
(52) So bleibt der Eindruck, dass alle den Gürtel enger zu schnallen haben, nur 
die EU[Agent] nicht. (Der Euro als Weichwährung. May FAZ 10th 2010) 
 
(53)  Mit Schulden geht die Europäische Union[Agent] gegen Schulden vor. (Der 
letzte Verbündete. FAZ May 10th 2010) 
 
 
In all these examples the action taken by the EU is portrayed as having either negative 
consequences (46), being negative in itself (48, 49) or having doubt cast on it as to its 
efficacy (47). It is noteworthy that these examples, like further examples along these 
lines, show that the EU is articulated as an organization and institution that is somewhat 
distinct from its member states. This is most obvious in excerpt 47: it creates an 
opposition between “all” and “the EU”, where “all” refers to the member states. In 
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practice, “the EU” often (but not always, as we will see) becomes coterminous with the 
Commission as its executive organ. The negative evaluation of the EU’s actions extends 
to the Commission and its president as well. 
 
 
(54)   Das Preissignal für das höhere Risiko will die EU[Experiencer] nicht 
hinnehmen. Da sich der Markt dem politischen Willen zum Einheitszins 
nicht beugen will, plant die EU-Kommission[Agent] die Einführung 
gemeinschaftlicher Euro-Anleihen. Damit käme sie[Agent] ihrem Ziel, aus 
der Währungsunion eine Haftungs- und Transfergemeinschaft zu machen, 
einen großen Schritt näher. Denn Euro-Anleihen machen aus nationalen 
Schulden eine Gemeinschaftsschuld. Weil sich dadurch die deutsche 
Bonität verschlechterte, stiegen hierzulande die Zinsen für Staat, 
Unternehmen und Privatleute. Die EU-Kommission[Agent] fordert dies als 
Akt der Solidarität vom angeblichen Hauptnutzniesser[Counteragent] des 
Euro. [...] Von Solidarität ist nicht die Rede, wenn EU-
Kommissionspräsident Barroso[Sayer] den Deutschen[Counteragent] vorwirft, 
sie seien naiv, wenn sie erwarteten, dass nach der Finanzhilfe für 
Griechenland der Stabilitätspakt verschärft werde. (Im Schuldensumpf. 
FAZ June 2nd 2010) 
 
 
In the first two sentences the EU and the Commission are in the Experiencer and Agent 
role. In this example as well, the attitude (not accepting the price signal for higher risk) 
and plans (Euro bonds) of the EU and the EU-Commission are portrayed negatively as 
having the ultimate goal of a “transfer union” (cf. 5.2.5). The second sentence can be 
seen as an elaboration of the first one, which means that in this case the EU and the 
Commission are equated. The next sentences describe what the Euro bonds would mean 
for Germany: although the country is not directly mentioned, the words deutsche 
Bonität and hierzulande are indices. In the last sentence, the Commission is an Agent 
and Germany a Counteragent, referred to as “the alleged main benefiter of the euro”.In 
the last sentence the Commission president Barroso is in the role of a Sayer and 
Germans in the Counteragent role, where Barroso is accusing them of naivety. This time 
the word “Germans” likely refers not only to the German citizens, but to the Germans as 
a nation.    
 
The preceding excerpt showed that the relationship between the Commission and 
Germans is portrayed rather antagonistically. Another example of this is the text Wer 
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den Euro rettet, which states that “As long as there is no European federal state, the 
Commission is denied access to the German tax money.”46 The Commission is also 
blamed for being power hungry, as the next excerpts show: 
 
 
(55)  Der Verdacht, es gehe der Kommission[Agent] in Wirklichkeit 
ausschließlich um eine Mehrung der eigenen Kompetenzen, wird noch 
dadurch verstärkt, dass die EU-Behörde[Agent] ihren Sparappell nicht mit 
der Bereitschaft verknüpft, auch schmerzhafte Einschnitte ins eigene 
Budget hinzunehmen. (Die Währungsunion am Scheideweg. FAZ May 
13th 2010) 
 
(56)  Es wäre naiv zu glauben, die Kommission[Agent] agiere nur als 
unpolitischer Makler im Dienste solider Haushaltspolitik.[...]. Für den 
Portugiesen[Experiencer] steht nicht die Budgetdisziplin im Mittelpunkt, 
sondern die Tatsache, dass die zwingend notwendige Verschärfung des 
Pakts einen Machtzuwachs für die Kommission[Beneficiary] und ihn 
selbst[Beneficiary] bedeuten kann. (So unpolitisch wie möglich. FAZ 
September 28th 2010) 
  
 
In both examples, the clause where the Commission is the Agent is a subordinate clause 
in a sentence which deals with suspicion (50) or belief (51). They therefore more clearly 
express an evaluation on part of the FAZ concerning what the actions of the 
Commission or its president mean: increasing its own competences and power. In the 
first excerpt, this action is “not tying the calls for saving with the readiness to accept 
painful cuts in its own budget”; in the second excerpt, Barroso (“the Portuguese”) is 
attributed with equating the tightening of the Stability Pact with an increase in power 
for himself and the Commission. 
 
The EU as a whole is many times portrayed as having overextended itself in the 
integration process. The crisis itself is depicted as an existential crisis, raising questions 
concerning the essence of the EU or Europe: 
 
 
(57)   Die Griechenland-Krise zeigt unbarmherzig, dass sich die EU[Agent] in 
den vergangenen Jahrzehnten übernommen hat. [...] Europa[Patient] braucht, 
wenn die gegenwärtigen Schwierigkeiten – auf die eine oder andere Art – 
                                                        
46 Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010 
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gelöst sind, eine wirkliche Reflexionspause. Es[Experiencer] darf nicht nur 
darüber nachdenken, was aus ihm werden soll, es[Experiencer]  muss sich 
auch die Frage stellen, was aus ihm[Affected Object] werden kann. (Vor einer 
Existenzkrise. FAZ April 2010) 
 
 
The EU is in the Agent role, as an actor that has taken too big of a step in terms of 
integration. Similar articulations can also be found in three other texts in the corpus.47,  48, 
49 In the above text, “Europe” is put in the Experiencer role, having to reflect on its 
future. “Europe” in this case, like in the text Im Namen Europas50, can be understood as 
denoting the idea of Europe as an idealized collective that is the motivating principle 
behind the European integration. When Merkel is quoted as saying that “If the euro fails, 
Europe will fail”51, 52, 53 it refers specifically to the idea of European unification, of which 
the EU is manifestation.  In the above excerpt, the further progress of European 
integration is called into question, and considerations of the idealized state toward 
which Europe must aspire are prompted to give away for considerations about the limits 
of this process. This idea is also reflected in the text Im Namen Europas when it poses 
the questions “What is the essence of the EU, what is its goal, its purpose? What is the 
extent of European identity and solidarity?“   
 
We can also find statements in the corpus about what Europe should be: these are 
typically formulated only in economic terms. In bringing about these visions, the EU or 
the Commission is not attributed a very large role, even to the contrary:  
 
(58)  Was genau soll denn in der EU[Locative] koordiniert werden? Die Sehnsucht 
der Kommission[Experiencer] nach einer „grüneren“ oder „sozialeren“ Union 
hilft Europa[Beneficiary] jedenfalls nicht, den Wachstumsrückstand 
gegenüber dem Rest der Welt aufzuholen. (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ 
February 25th 2010) 
 
                                                        
47 Zwangsvertiefung. FAZ May 14th 2010 
48 Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ May 7th 2010 
49 Nur voran kann es gehen. FAZ November 15th 2010 
50 FAZ May 7th 2010 
51 Im Dienst der Politik. FAZ May 13rd 2010 
52 Zwangsvertiefung. FAZ May 14th 2010 
53 Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ May 7th 2010 
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“Europe” here again denotes something slightly more than the EU: the totality of the 
continent in distinction to “rest of the world”, including America and Asia. “The EU” in 
the first sentence in the Locative role refers to the EU as an organization encompassing 
the member states. The denotation is therefore slightly different than in excerpts 46 to 
49. The Commission is in the Experiencer position with the nominalized verb “longing”, 
with a “greener and more social Union” as the Phenomenon. This “longing” is stated 
not to be beneficial for Europe in terms of economic growth. The notion of an 
economically strong Europe is articulated elsewhere in the corpus as well, especially in 
the text Kratzer am europäischen Modell:  
 
 
(59)   Es gibt fast kein europäisches Land[Existential] mehr, das[Agent] sich nicht 
einer neuen Fiskaldisziplin unterwürfe, Übertreibungen des Sozialstaats 
korrigierte und sich an die demographische Entwicklung anzupassen 
versuchte. Griechenland ist nur das dramatischste Beispiel. [...] Über ihre 
Verhältnisse haben aber auch andere gelebt, die Weltfinanzkrise hat das 
offenbart. [...] Die europäischen Bürger[Experiencer] beginnen einzusehen, 
dass sozialstaatliche Vor- und Fürsorge nicht unabhängig von der 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung wachsen kann. (Kratzer am europäischen 
Modell. FAZ August 7th 2010) 
 
 
Here we see an existential clause with the noun “European country“, of which there is 
none “that would not submit to a new fiscal discipline...“ Greece is named only as the 
most dramatic example of a situation where “others as well have lived beyond their 
means.” European citizens in their rather typical passive Experiencer role “begin to see 
that the support provided by a social state cannot grow independently of economic 
growth”. The end of the same text contains the following passage: 
 
 
(60)   Wichtig ist, dass die europäischen Volkswirtschaften[Carrier] auf Dauer 
wettbewerbsfähig[Attribute] sind mit hoher Produktivität. [...] Ein 
Europa[Identified], das[Agent] sich einer Kultur wirtschaftlicher Stabilität 
verschriebe, wie es die Bundeskanzlerin[Sayer] vorschlägt, wäre kein 
schwaches Europa[Identifier1], sondern ein verlässlich starker 
Partner[Identifier2]. Apropos stark: Die deutsche Exportwirtschaft brummt 
wieder. (Kratzer am europäischen Modell. FAZ August 7th 2010)  
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In the first sentence the European countries are referred to as Volkswirtschaften 
(economies), which emphasizes their economic aspect. They are Carrier with the 
attribute wettbewerbsfähig (competent), and their being competitive and having high 
productivity is stated to be important. This statement can also be seen as the mirror 
image of the statement that the cause of the crisis is EU member states living above 
their means.54, 55, 56  
 
The text then makes a shift from the perspective from the individual countries (or 
“economies”) to the perspective of “Europe”, that commits itself to a “culture of 
economic stability”, “as proposed by the Chancellor”. The qualities and actions of the 
individual states are thereby aggregated in the Agent “Europe”, in a similar way that the 
collective actions of individual team members can be attributed to the team. In the main 
clause, Europe is Identified, and the action described in the subordinate clause 
conditions the main clause, in that committing to a culture stability would mean that 
Europe “would not be a weak Europe, but a reliably strong partner”. The connection 
between a strong Europe and an economically strong Germany is then established with 
the last two sentences, which remind of the strength of the German export industry that 
is “booming again.” 
 
The notion of a “culture of stability” is attributed here to the Chancellor (in the Sayer 
role), The Chancellor is also quoted as saying that Europe needs a “new culture of 
stability” in another text57 (cf. 5.2.4), where she is portrayed as “forcing the colorful 
European mix to the line of the Swabian housewife”. In another text, it is said that “The 
chancellor Merkel is hopefully correct in saying that almost all EU-states had joined the 
consolidation course of Germany” and “The chancellor needs to put a lot of negotiation 
and persuasion skills into play for a goal worth fighting for: a stability culture in 
                                                        
54 Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010 
55 Die Ursache der Krise. FAZ May 19th 2010 
56 Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ May 20th 2010 
57 Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ May 20th 2010 
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Europe.58 Taking this context into account, the implication made by the above excerpt 
would be that by following the German line, Europe will strong.  
 
Text Nur voran kann es gehen (The only way is forward) from the latter part of the 
corpus contains a similar articulation of the European states’ necessity to strive to make 
their economies more competent: 
 
 
(61)   Es gibt, man kann es mögen oder nicht, nur die Option, weiter 
voranzugehen. Auf diesem Weg sind erste Marken gesetzt worden: Von 
den Märkten gepresst und politisch unter Druck gesetzt, haben sich alle 
europäischen Staaten[Agent] zu einer Politik der Haushaltssanierung 
verpflichtet, verbunden mit Maßnahmen, die ihre Wirtschaft 
wettbewerbsfähiger machen sollen. (Nur voran kann es gehen. FAZ 
November 15th 2010) 
 
 
The European states are in the Agent position, “having committed themselves to 
policies of budgetary overhauls and measures that should make their economies more 
competitive”. They are however not described as having made this commitment freely, 
but “under market and political pressure”. In the continuation of this text, Merkel’s 
efforts to create a culture of stability is equated with Germany taking a leadership role 
in the crisis and beyond, whereby the EU and the member states are relegated to the role 
of either accepting or rejecting this leadership: 
 
 
(62)   Bundeskanzlerin Merkel[Counteragent] ist für ihre harte Position beim 
Aufspannen des Euro-Rettungsschirmes und für ihre Forderung nach 
härteren Sanktionsmechanismen in der EU[Locative] kritisiert worden. In 
einigen Details musste sie[Agent] nachgeben - so ist das nun einmal, wenn 
man mit 26 Partnern an einem Tisch sitzt -, aber was die Richtung 
angeht, hat sie[Agent]  sich durchgesetzt. Anders gesagt: Deutschland[Agent] 
hat, nach harten Auseinandersetzungen mit dem engsten Partner 
Frankreich[Comitative] und danach gemeinsam mit Paris[Comitative], in dieser 
Krise der EU[Identifier] die Führung übernommen. Dafür muss man sich 
nicht entschuldigen, denn diese Führung ergibt sich aus der 
Ankerfunktion, die Deutschland[Possessor] für den Euro hat. Berlin[Agent] hat 
                                                        
58 Allein in Brüssel. FAZ October 27th 2010 
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damit in die Hand genommen, was die EU[Agent] vor zehn Jahren schon 
einmal beschlossen hatte: zu einer der dynamischsten und 
wettbewerbsfähigsten Regionen in einer Welt zu werden, in der sich die 
wirtschaftlichen Gewichte gerade dramatisch verschieben. Wenn die 
EU[Experiencer] und ihre Mitgliedstaaten diese Führungsrolle nicht nur 
ertragen, sondern akzeptieren sollen, muss Deutschland[Agent] sich seinen 
Partnern[Counteragent] gegenüber allerdings nicht nur fordernd, sondern auch 
kooperativ und solidarisch verhalten. (Nur voran kann es gehen. FAZ 
November 15th 2010) 
 
 
 
First she is in the role of Counteragent, receiving criticism for her hardliner policy in the 
crisis. Then she is in the role of an Agent, having had to give in some details but having 
been able to assert herself “in terms of direction”.  Then, by means of the expression 
anders gesagt (in other words), her actions are equated with Germany’s actions: the 
country has taken a leading role in the crisis of the EU. The text then states that “this is 
nothing to feel sorry about”, because the “leadership owes itself to Germany’s anchor 
function for the euro.”  
 
In the next sentence, Berlin is again used for the German government in a metonymic 
fashion and in the Agent position, “seizing what the EU had decided 10 years earlier: to 
become one of the most dynamic and competitive regions in the world”. “The EU” is 
here denoting both the organization and the geographical area it encompasses. In the 
next sentence the EU is untypically in the Experiencer position, together with its 
member states, “tolerating and accepting [Germany’s] leadership role”. Because they 
are mentioned separately, a distinction is again drawn between the EU as an institution 
and the member states that belong to it. The condition for the said tolerance and 
acceptance is said to be that Germany act towards its partners “not only in a demanding 
but also in a solidary and cooperative way”. It is not clear whether the EU as an 
institution is also included among these partners. It however is clear that Germany is 
portrayed as being justified in holding a leadership role due to its economic strength, 
and Merkel’s actions are also framed as realizing what the goals the EU had set itself in 
terms of economic development.  
 
. 
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5.3 Summary of discursive articulations on the transtextual layer 
 
This section presents a summary of the findings on the transtextual layer of the 
DIMEAN model and in the framework of Waever’s (2002) three-tier layered structure. 
The summary will start on the first layer of the model (nation-state concept), where the 
German nation-state identity as it is articulated within the FAZ is discussed as a whole. 
The concepts of nation and state will be discussed separately to the extent that the 
analysis has revealed their separate articulations. The relationship between the nation-
state concept and “Europe” as well as the general presentation of the idea of Europe will 
then be discussed (second layer). On the third layer we then find the articulation of the 
concrete policies pursued by the national actors. Figure 2 below presents the results of 
this discussion in a graphical form, based on the figure by Bärenreuter (2005) presented 
in 2.5.1. 
 
The German nation-state is articulated as an economically powerful country with strong 
exports. This articulation is achieved through collocations of the word Deutschland with 
words like Wirtschaftsmodell, collocations of the adjective deutsch with words denoting 
economic strength, export success etc. and  also through contrast by comparing 
Germany to other, less economically strong countries and “debt accumulators”, 
especially those in Southern Europe. In parallel fashion, Germany is also articulated as a 
“strong currency country” as opposed to “former soft currency countries”. Germany is 
especially contrasted against France over the nature of what the Monetary Union should 
be like. Because of Germany’s economic strength, it is also called the “motor of the 
Monetary Union”, together with France, and is attributed with special responsibility for 
having set the Stability Pact to the Monetary Union.  
 
Germany is also described as a well-off country that because of this often plays the role 
of the “pay master”, i.e. net contributor. It is however stated that it cannot be expected 
to pay for everything, firstly due to limits in its strength and secondly due to the limits 
in the willingness of its citizens and politicians. Indeed, while the word Deutschland 
refers to the nation-state as a whole, whenever there is need to emphasize the uniformity 
of the elite and public, these are referred to as deutsche Politik und Öffentlichkeit, 
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Politiker und Volk in Deutschland or in related terms. This leads us to the articulation of 
nation, state and their relationship.  
 
The national collective noun Deutsche can refer either to the nation as a whole or 
merely the citizens, distinct from the “elite”. In most cases it is found as referring to the 
people, synonymously to the words Bürger, Volk and Bevölkerung.  All these words are 
most frequently found in the Experiencer position: thinking, feeling and perceiving. 
These words are more rarely found in the Agent position: action is mostly reserved for 
the state, not for the nation. The role of the people is therefore more passive than that of 
the state, unless their aspect of being voters is highlighted. The third most frequent role 
is that of the Counteragent, which is activated whenever the people are portrayed as 
recipients of the verbal action of the government and politicians. 
 
As a people, the Germans are articulated as the “model Europeans” and having 
sacrificed their “reliable D-Mark” for the euro, in exchange for the promise of the 
common currency’s stability. They are attributed with a fear of inflation and, having 
gone through two currency reforms, a concern for the stability of the euro that is tacitly 
articulated as another version of the D-Mark. German views towards state finances are 
contrasted against other, less disciplined attitudes, especially in the so-called “soft 
currency countries” and countries that might have trouble to keep up with the German 
specifications of the Monetary Union, which allow “no free riders”. Germans and 
Greeks are articulated as polar opposites when it comes to finances: The reason for 
economic divergences is articulated as having a cultural basis, and a correspondence is 
established between national character and the economic and financial state of affairs of 
a nation-state.  It can be said that the essence of “Germanness” is strongly articulated in 
connection to financial attitudes, and the “reliable” and “identity-giving” D-Mark can 
be taken as a symbol of this. This can therefore be taken as evidence of the discourse of 
D-Mark nationalism (see 2.5.2). 
 
The state actors are denoted by the words Bundesregierung, variations of Kanzlerin 
Merkel, deutsche Politik(er) and Bundestag. Merkel and the government are most often 
in the Agent role, and Merkel also often appears in the Sayer role. The Bundestag, 
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however, is overwhelmingly found in the Locative role. The state and the government 
are articulated as having the duty to protect German interests, which are defined as 
ensuring the stability of the euro. The right way to ensure this stability is by adhering to 
the no bail-out clause of the Treaty of Maastricht as well as to the regulations of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Advocating German interests is “nothing new nor anti-
European”, since even the former pro-European Chancellors are said to have advocated 
them; for instance, Kohl’s government set up the rules of the Stability Pact. As the 
federal chancellor, Merkel is portrayed as the primum motor of the state, who has the 
role of either acting in the name of the state (Agent role) or making public statements 
explaining her policy line (Sayer role). Merkel is referred to both as the “Swabian 
housewife” and “Iron Chancellor”, which invoke the qualities of thriftiness, discipline 
and power politics.  
 
Indeed, Germany defending its interests and its leadership role in the crisis and beyond 
is depicted as something that one should not feel sorry for. This role is justified by the 
conditions of the crisis, the changes that both the EU and Germany have undergone in 
the last decades, Germany’s anchor function for the euro and the goals of the EU itself 
to become a competitive region. Overall, the emphasis on German interests and 
“normality” (especially in the text Normales Deutschland) are reminiscent of the neo-
statist discourse (see 2.5.2). Even if the importance of solidarity and cooperation is 
emphasized as well, the emphasis on German interests and leadership are an indication 
that the articulation of the external dimension of the state as power state is to some 
extent normalized.  
 
Ultimately, though, the FAZ portrays the actorhood of the government being 
accountable to two instances: the Constitutional Court, which is the interpreter of the 
German national interest from the standpoint of the constitution, and the constituency, 
i.e. the voters. The Constitutional Court sets the framework within which Merkel can 
conduct external negotiations, and the perspective of the people is the ever present 
background against which every action which seemingly deviates from the generally 
defined “German interest” is judged. Especially important is the notion of the people 
“being overwhelmed” by having to take on the debt of other countries as taxpayers, 
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which does not apply only to German citizens but other European countries’ peoples as 
well. This notion of being overwhelmed due to being forced to share fiscal 
responsibility can be of course seen as evidence of the nationalist discourse that 
emphasizes the sovereignty of the people and therefore control over resources, 
including financial ones. The nationalist discourse is ultimately behind the assertion that 
the EU / EMU is an association of sovereign states, and therefore a transfer union is out 
of question.   
 
The citizens’ point of view is indeed important: from the point of view of the FAZ, the 
government can either be aligned with this (as it is in Normales Deutschland and in 
texts prior to Merkel’s decision to help Greece) or out of alignment (as it is in Im 
Namen Europas, for instance). Because of the references to the citizens as voters and 
the government’s accountability to them, the internal dimension of the state can be 
defined as liberal democracy.  
 
Because of the articulation of the state as a power state, the typical articulation of 
Germany’s relationship to Europe also becomes questioned. The logic of the power 
state is generally incompatible with a pro-European conception of Germany, which is 
why the meaning of European vs. non-European is being renegotiated, especially in the 
texts normales Deutschland and Im Namen Europas. This is not the only reason for the 
renegotiation to take place, however: Both texts highlight that there has been a shift in 
attitude in the people over generations in regard to Germany’s European policy. 
Although the value of the “idea of Europe” and its manifestation in the process of 
European integration and its importance for the post World War II Germany is not 
denied, there is a distinction made between “old Europe” as opposed to “new, young 
Europe”; the original EU of the six member states as opposed to today’s EU of 27 
members, as well as Germany before and after reunification. These distinctions that 
highlight the notion of generational change present a reason as to why Germany’s 
European policy requires new justification, especially in the eyes of the citizens.  
 
In the view of the FAZ, implicitly expressed, the logic of the power state allows for the 
effective realization of German interests: Maintaining the stability of the euro, which 
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due to the tacitly formulated equation Euro = D-Mark 2.0 is D-Mark nationalism 
transposed to the supranational level. Due to the meld of D-Mark nationalism in the 
nation concept and neo-statism in the state concept and the ensuring re-negotiation of 
the relationship between Germany and Europe, the idea of Europe is also articulated in a 
particular way. It is affirmed that the EU is an association of sovereign states instead of 
a federal state, an interpretation which has its basis in declarations of the Constitutional 
Court. Parallel to this, the EMU is articulated as not a state and therefore not a “transfer 
union”, defined as an arrangement where member states would be required to take 
liability for each other’s debts. The states instead have the responsibility to stop “living 
over their means”, to stabilize their finances and improve their economic competence. 
These are all qualities that the Monetary Union is said to require, which itself has a 
basis in German ideas. Germany is therefore attributed with a key role in re-enforcing 
the “German specifications” of the Monetary Union, establishing a “culture of stability” 
and thereby propelling Europe towards a future where it can effectively compete with 
the rest of the world. This is the third layer in Wæver’s model.  
 
Neither the actions taken by the EU leaders as a collective nor those of the EU itself as 
an institution is given much credit, but they are rather seen as irresponsible and breaking 
the EU treaties. Although the EU frequently appears in the Agent role, both its and the 
Commission’s actions are often framed negatively. The Commission is also accused of 
having power interests. Its president José Manuel Barroso, when he appears, mostly 
makes statements that are framed negatively. The EU is described as having 
overextended itself in the integration process, due the differences between the member 
states being too great in the end, “to the point of cultural alienation”. The differences in 
mentalities and cultures are described as “realities of Europe”, which the crisis forces to 
face. The crisis presents an existential crisis for the EU and for “Europe”, which forces 
them to reflect on what can become of them. Ultimately, no other vision for Europe is 
formulated except for it to become a strong continent through economic discipline, a 
goal towards which Germany can lead it.   
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 Figure 7. Discursive constructions of German nation-state identity and ‘Europe’ in       
the editorials and commentaries of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              1st Layer     Germany as economic export powerhouse and motor of the  
               Monetary Union 
 
                 Nation                       State  
- D-Mark nationalism              -  German interests as prime directive 
- Fear of inflation / concern for stability              -  legal accountability to Constitutional Court 
- Rejection of the “pay master” role                     - democratic accountability to citizens 
 
 External dimension of the state: power state 
 
 Internal dimension of the state: liberal democracy 
 
 
2nd Layer      EU as an association of sovereign states, weak and       
    incompetent EU, Europe as an economic area 
 
German architecture of the EMU / Euro as D-Mark 2.0 
- Germany has the duty to protect the stability of the euro 
- renegotiation of “European” vs. “un-European” 
- no transfer union 
 
 
3rd Layer   Merkel as a “Swabian housewife” bringing about a “culture of 
stability” / Germany’s leadership role in the crisis 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Against the background of the concerns raised both in international and German press 
about a change in Germany’s pro-European orientation during the euro crisis years, this 
study had as its aim to investigate whether and how his change was discursively 
articulated in one of Germany’s largest newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. More precisely, the aim was to discover how the German nation-state identity, 
which up until the 21st century had been regarded as thoroughly pro-European, was 
articulated vis-à-vis Europe and the EU in the editorial and economic commentary 
pages of the FAZ during the first year of the crisis. The analysis utilized a model based 
on post-structuralist discourse theory, which was operationalized with the help of the 
methodological framework of German discourse linguistics. The concrete analysis 
focused on relevant keywords: “Germany”, “Europe”, “EU” and closely related 
keywords. These keywords were analyzed in terms of their semantic roles using both a 
quantitative and a qualitative approach. 
 
The analysis revealed that “Germany”, “Germans” and “German” were defined in terms 
of economic capability and attitudes, typically in relation to other nations within the EU. 
Germany and the Germans were also defined by their role as a net contributor of the 
EU. The country’s former pro-European orientation was occasionally highlighted, 
especially when it was contrasted with the country’s actions during the crisis. Here the 
study discovered that a change in Germany’s nation-state identity and its relationship to 
Europe and the EU was indeed articulated: The former pro-European identity was 
contrasted with an identity that is characterized more by national interest and 
emphasizes the country’s leadership role in the EU especially in economic matters, 
owing to its own economic strength. Befitting this formulation of the nation-state 
identity, Europe and the EU were also described less as a community bound by 
solidarity and more in economic terms and in ways which emphasize the member-
states’ responsibility and sovereignty.  
 
Because the study focused on just one newspaper and on a period of one year, it has 
offered a merely cursory look, but in a way that can open avenues for further research. 
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A fruitful direction could be to analyze the articulation of the German nation-state 
identity across various German media pre- and post-crisis, in order to arrive at a more 
precise picture of whether and how a discursive change has taken place in various parts 
of the media landscape.  
 
As a conservative and business-oriented newspaper, the viewpoints articulated by the 
FAZ can be taken as closer to the political right: Previous research has established its 
attitude towards European integration and the European institutions are generally more 
critical than the majority of the other German media. Whether its view of the 
relationship between Germany and Europe is something confined to its pages alone or 
whether its views are shared by other German media, the general public and political 
actors themselves, as revealed by their public statements, remains also a matter to be 
determined by further research.  
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APPENDIX: Translations of the excerpts from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
 
(1) The debt accumulators are blaming the exporters for leading them into deficit ruin. The 
imbalances have arisen because some countries have for years imported more than they 
have exported, which is why their foreign debt is large. But follows from that? Should 
surpluses be fought now? At any rate, Germany is standing in the pillory, along with 
China and Japan. But no one has forced Americans to buy Chinese consumption articles 
and no one forces the French to drive German cars. (Im Schuldensumpf. FAZ June 26th 
2010) 
 
(2) That forty per cent of the German production are exported is not a result of the planning 
of a federal export agency, but rather of free market forces. German success in the 
global market is determined by countless decisions made by consumers, companies and 
employees. Both the quality of German products and competitive prices are a decisive 
factor. When France is demanding higher salaries in Germany that already has high 
salaries, the aim is to increase the costs for competition. But that would only result in 
higher unemployment in Germany, nothing would be won for Europe. (Im 
Schuldensumpf. FAZ June 26th 2010) 
 
(3) While Germans ask themselves, why they have to assume liability for the Greeks’, 
many Italians, Spaniards and French cannot fathom why the EU does not simply 
transfer new billions of euros to Athens. […] Having had the collective experience of 
two currency reforms, the Germans see a danger for the stability of the currency in the 
attempted breach of the Maastricht Treaty (it prohibits that euro countries from taking 
on each other’s debts). This is entirely contrary to the perception in the former soft 
currency countries. It is claimed there that the Germans would want to secure economic 
dominance in Europe through the euro.  (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
 
(4)  The issue here is not about whether the Greeks are allowed to continue to live above 
their means unpunished, but it is rather a question of the realization of the French dream 
of the “European economic government”, with which the competitive German industry 
is meant to be curbed. (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
 
(5) Germany carries a special responsibility in this situation. That is not only due to the fact 
that Berlin – thanks to the German economic power – would have an especially large 
share to assume in the case that countries would have to be thrown out of the Monetary 
Union. Germany was, together with France, the motor of the economic and monetary 
union and attached the stability pact to it, which since then could not be adhered to by 
many member states (not to forget: even Germany did not manage to do that many 
times). (Vor einer Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010) 
 
(6) Whoever wishes to redeem the auction of Greek government debt through transfers 
from Brussels and Frankfurt, invites further speculation against the euro, overestimates 
the financial power of Germany and risks the failure of the Monetary Union. (Wer den 
Euro rettet. FAZ February 25th 2010) 
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(7) Germany as a well-off country can and must make its contribution. But it cannot carry 
all the burden of togetherness, for that it lacks strength. (Normales Deutschland. FAZ 
April 3rd 2010) 
 
(8) For the euro will surely fail, if the Monetary Union turns into a liability community and 
a transfer union, even German could not afford. (Im Sumpf. FAZ 21st April 2010) 
 
(9) Germany contributes more to the different help funds than it gets for decades – 
sometimes willingly, sometimes crudgingly. (Die politische Währungsunion. FAZ 
September 1st 2010) 
 
(10) Speaking of net contributors: there is no other issue that causes as much 
upset with the Germans. And it was the Chancellor Schröder with a populistic bent who 
polemized against the “roasting” of German money in Brussels. German politics and 
public can only be moderately convinced by the argument that the “lubrication” of the 
European milie – the continuation of the old pay master role – would serve German 
(export) interests in the future as well. (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
 
(11) The regular method of stitching cracks and emerging chasms in the EU 
with German money has now reached its limits. (Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 
2010) 
   
(12) In the eyes of most Germans, giving up the identity-providing D-Mark 
constituted a sacrifice for Europe. Having had the collective experience of two currency 
reforms, the Germans see a danger for the stability of the currency in the attempted 
breach of the Maastricht Treaty (it prohibits that euro countries from taking on each 
other’s debts). (Wer den Euro rettet. February 25th 2010) 
 
(13) After all, the departure from the reliable D-Mark was made palatable to 
the Germans with the opposite of Merkel’s endlessly repeated rescue platitudes. The 
treaties state that no euro country is allowed to take on another’s liabilities. It is the only 
way for the euro to become as strong as the D-Mark, as promised by the fathers of the 
Monetary Union. (In Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010)  
 
(14) That is of course how the parties in the parliament are supposed to be 
made to agree to the emergency credits given to Greece and the reluctant Germans 
pacified.  They see the once given stability promise concerning euro broken and feel 
themselves being blackmailed to European solidarity. (Brandsätze. May 4th 2010) 
 
(15) The currency constitution for the euro contains a stability promise, the 
foremost purpose of which is to appease the German fears for the common currency. 
(Der politische Stabilitätspakt. FAZ July 3rd 2010) 
 
 
(16) The economic and monetary union was built in accordance with German 
specifications, extending to the constituting rules of the European Central Bank located 
161 
 
in Frankfurt. That was already then felt to be a “dictate”, but paid as an unavoidable 
price in the hopes that in the course of communitarization the stability criteria could be 
softened. (Der politische Stabilitätspakt. FAZ July 3rd 2010) 
 
(17) The balancing act currently undertaken by Merkel has the goal of 
stabilizing the euro and the euro zone as the core of the EU and simultaneously bring up 
to par with German conditions, in other words, adapting the Stability Pact to the 
situation. The German specifications still apply, no free riders are allowed in the 
Monetary Union in the future. (Vor einer Existenzkrise. FAZ April 27th 2010) 
   
(18) Whether that is realistic, whether countries that have a different attitudes 
concerning currency and financing and additionally a less competitive economic 
structures can keep up, is a open question. That the German position is now felt to be a 
dictate by countries that Greece represents is understandable. (Vor einer Existenzkrise. 
FAZ April 27th 2010) 
 
 
(19) Perhaps the reaction on the politics of the federal 
government has been so dramatic because the implications of the Monetary Union have 
finally become clear: stable state finances and liberal economic policies, high 
productivity and a competitive economy. Those are requirements that demand a high 
amount of discipline. But when the euro is our destiny, it should not be desecrated. And 
must not constantly be complaining about the lack of a transfer union. (Normales 
Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
(20) Germany will face its responsibility, the chancellor said. That is rightfully 
so. But this responsibility   ̶  and this applies not only to Germany   ̶ includes the duty to 
protect the Monetary Union from harm. Much too long have European states practices 
reality denying policies which have turned a theoretical possibility into a real danger: 
first the erosion of the trust in euro and then the erosion of trust in the EU. (Brandsätze. 
FAZ May 4th 2010) 
 
 
(21) Both the story behind the emergence of the disaster as well as the 
proposed solutions to overcome it betray how large the differences in the cultural 
characteristics of the peoples in Europe are and how differently the peoples and their 
elites think and act.  The euro has not, as one can see, turned the Greeks into Germans 
or the Germans just yet into Greeks. Debt break here and state fraud there can really not 
be given as a sign of convergence.  
(Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
 
(22) The Chancellor wants to force this colorful European mix into line – to 
that of a Swabian housewife. For it only through thriftiness and discipline that the fire 
can finally be extinguished. […] The EU would need, if the euro is to be permanently 
saved, a truly new “culture of stability”. The EU members would not be allowed to live 
beyond their means anymore. (Bis alle Schwaben sind. FAZ May 20th 2010) 
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(23) All assurances of commonality here and there can not hide the fact that 
there is a deep dissent between Paris and Berlin on how the euro crisis should be fought. 
The fight over whether an “economic government” of the 16 euro states is needed  (that 
is the French idea) or whether better coordination and discipline among the 27 EU states 
is the right way (what the Chancellor wants) is only the surface of the problem. The 
core issue concerns the direction to which the economic and monetary union should 
develop; the “model” that Europe should follow in the future. Merkel is – not officially, 
but through purposefully spread information – blamed in Paris for wanting “une Europe 
germanique”, a Europe fashioned after German image.   
(Ein Debakel. FAZ June 6th 2010) 
 
 
(24) Whatever comes out of this reform will in any case not correspond to 
German textbooks on Ordnungspolitik. The euro is after all, like the whole EU, a 
supranational project. There are compromises to be struck between states and 
mentalities. A common currency can not be managed as the dictate of one member 
state, the politicans and people in Germany have for long fooled themselves in this 
regard. The euro was never the same as the D-Mark, what incidentally is not only a bad 
thing: the inflation of which Germans are so afraid was so far lower with the euro than 
with our old currency. (Die Krise durschstehen. FAZ June 19th 2010) 
 
(25) It is all the more important that the citizens do not get stuck on the 
impression that the formerly stable monetary union is step by step being built into a 
transfer union. […] As long as the Germans or other net contributors are not ready to 
pay for the EU above and beyond the cohesion funds, every kind of financial 
compensation is out of the question, because trust in the euro will otherwise be 
destroyed. (Hilfe und Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010) 
 
 
(26) Germany as a well-off country can and must pay its part. But it cannot 
carry all the burden of togetherness, for that it runs out of strength. Precisely because 
the unification of Europe is precious, its citizens, the Germans included, are not allowed 
to feel overwhelmed.  (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
(27) For here one risks the refusal of the citizens. Whoever takes this road to a 
transfer union, destroys the trust in the euro at least there where saving and paying for 
the EU takes place. (Von der Währungs- in die Transferunion. FAZ October 31st 2010) 
 
 
(28) Should that be the entry point into an uninhibited transfer union, it will 
soon come to face its limits. For the willingness to bear the burden of others is all the 
greater within Europe than it is within Germany. That is no German specialty. Many 
people like the euro because it saves the trouble of exchanging money on vacations. But 
ask the Dutch, whether they are ready to compensate for Greek debt. Or ask the French 
about how large their pity is for Spanish constructors with excessive debt. It is not about 
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aid in limited amounts, but when it comes to transferring gigantic sums with a stroke of 
the pen, that will not be accepted even by the most enthusiastic Europeans in the long 
term. Whoever wants to bring Europe forward and keep the euro should not overburden 
the project. Part of a healthy euro is also a healthy dose of self-interest. (Die politische 
Währungsunion. FAZ July 1st 2010) 
 
(29) As long as there is not European federal state, the Commission will luckily 
be denied access to the German tax funds. The Constitutional Court supervises over 
that. Its Lissabon verdict is not characterized by nationalistic thinking, but by a concern 
over democratic deficits in the association of states. (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ 
February 25th 2010) 
 
(30) Neither is there anything new to the decree of the Constitutional Court, 
according to which the EU is not a federal state but an association of sovereign states; it 
stems from the 90s. In the past year the court declared once more that the EU has since 
then not become a federal state. […] And one could add: that is why there is no transfer 
union either, but instead there are some red lines concerning further integration. 
(Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
(31) The federal government is fighting in the euro group alone, but it is in a 
strong position. For without Germany’s participation any rescue package will fail on the 
capital market. When chancellor Merkel stays firm and allows help for the Greeks only 
through the International Monetary Fund, she can save the euro. (Wer den Euro rettet. 
FAZ February 25th 2010) 
 
(32) The rescue package for Greece has been tied. The solution carries a 
German signature, the limits for the aid are narrow and the thresholds high. In 
negotiations with the other heads of state the chancellor Merkel skillfully utilized the 
tight leeway given by the Constitutional Court in the question over the fate of the euro 
as an instrument of pressure. With her tough negotiation style she demanded from the 
EU partners more than seemed possible. (Hilfe und Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010) 
 
(33) This is not a new line for Germany to defend its interests in Europe – and 
neither is it anti-European. By convincing the French president Sarkozy to allow the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)  to help in the euro raum, Merkel is additionally 
keeping the German-French motor of integration running in the tradition of her 
predecessors. (Hilfe und Strafe. FAZ March 26th 2010) 
 
(34) Chancellor Merkel tries her best to make it appear as if the as good as 
decided upon billion transfer to Athen does not constitute a breach of the common 
treaties and a case of forbidden financial aid. (Griechische Wette. FAZ April 25th 2010) 
 
(35) In her governmental declaration the Chancellor – that was the prelude in 
Berlin to the riots in Athen – chose a language that balanced between frontal defence 
and doomsday tremolo: Europe at a crossroads; Germany’s future is at stake. That is of 
course how the parties in the parliament will be made to agree to the emergency credits 
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and the reluctant Germans appeased.  
(Brandsätze. FAZ May 5th 2010) 
 
(36) Why should Germany be liable for Greece debt? Federal chancellor 
Merkel tries to explain it as follows: there is no alternative to saving the Greeks, the 
stability of the euro is at stake, the Greeks can regain confidence of the markets only 
with a hard program of cuts and savings. Appealing to the future of Europe might find 
some resonance in the parliament and the federal council, when the minister of finance 
is authorized to stand bail for foreign sovereign debt.  It will not convince the majority 
of the citizens, however. (In Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
(37) Angela Merkel has given in to the pressure of the European partners. 
Nothing remains of the Iron Chancellor.  
(In Haftung. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
(38) Angela Merkel is a bad European – if you go by her own definition of a 
good European. As she repeated on Wednesday in the German parliament, a good 
European is characterized among other things by the fact that he adheres to the 
Euroepan treaties. They are however currently being bent and ignored by the German 
government like never before, self-evidently for the highest of purposes: not only for 
saving Greece, but also to protect the Monetary Union and the European unification on 
the whole. (Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
(39) One thing is clear, however: the EU states’ room for action would be 
further reduced by a “hardened” stability pact. There will be resistance against that and 
the feeling of being controlled from outside will rise among the population. […] Merkel 
said in Aachen that if the euro fails, Europe will fail. Will the voters believe her? 
(Zwangsvertiefung. FAZ May 14th 2010) 
 
(40) Of course it is bitter that Germany has to give credits to other euro states 
in order to keep the currency together. But the Chancellor has failed to explain to the 
people in a clear and understandable language that she had no other choice in the end.  
(Die Krise durchstehen. FAZ June 19th 2010) 
 
(41) The truth is that the Germans have for a long time tied their destiny, and 
not only in currency politics, with the fate of other nations in Europe.  […] Classical 
sovereignty, understood as  national freedom of action, does not exist in an association 
that shares almost everything from currency to border control. That applies to the 
largest member state as well. (Die Krise durchstehen. FAZ June 19th 2010) 
 
(42) Apparently the euro crisis is now making it really clear to the population 
for the first time. For three generations the Germans have voted for politicians who have 
advocated a comprehensive transfer of competences to Brussels. They seem to be 
regretting it now, for the recent events have apparently fed the idea in many of the 
citizens’ heads that it would be comfortable to live as a type of a big Switzerland: with 
its own currency and strong exports, but otherwise isolated from the impositions of 
Europe and globalization. (Die Krise durchstehen. FAZ June 19th 2010) 
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(43) The attitude of the federal government and in the German public in 
general in matters related to Greece, euro and Monetary Union has undergone a 
manifold dramatic shift in the German European policy. And the cool pragmatism  of 
the Chancellor Merkel, tightly bound on German interests, has been contrasted with the 
heart-warming love for Europe of the former Chancellor Kohl, who was ready to even 
sacrifice the D-Mark as a sign of reconciliation between German unity and European 
unification. The accusation that gets thrown at “Berlin” today, goes like this: Germany 
is not thinking in a European way anymore, but in a German way. It has become a 
“normal” country. (Normales Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
(44) It is true: the public opinion in Germany has become more like the general 
field of opinion: European policy is nothing self-evident anymore, but is in need of 
justification. Already Kohl got to feel the changed atmosphere towards the end of his 
chancellorhood. Those who romanticize the European policy of former federal 
governments are overlooking two things: history does not stand still. The Germany of 
sixteen states is no longer the same as Germany before reunification. Its populatin is 
almost as normal or self-interested or suspicious of Europe as any other population. And 
the EU of the 27 member states is no longer the community of the six. (Normales 
Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
 
(45) The principle of solidarity applies to the large Union as well, it is the 
essence of any community. Germany as a well-off country can and must pay its part. 
But it cannot carry all the burden of togetherness, for that it runs out of strength. 
Precisely because the unification of Europe is precious, its citizens, the Germans 
included, are not allowed to feel overwhelmed. Is that anti-European? Still, the Germans 
have to live with the fact that they are not supposed to be quite normal. (Normales 
Deutschland. FAZ April 3rd 2010) 
 
(46) That will be urgently necessary in the case of the heretofore model 
Europeans, the Germans. “Europe” was for Germany the royal road back to peace, 
freedom, prosperity and recognition after World War II. To the old Europe, gathered 
last Wednesday in Pfalzbau zu Ludwighafen in the form of several gray-haired heads 
from politics, economics and spirituality, the Chancellor did not need to explain for 
long why she fought her way to help Greece. (Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
 
(47) In the case of the new, young Europe, she must, however, here in the 
Europe-loving Germany as well. Generations have come forth for whom the things that 
Kohl and his compariots fought and worked for are something self-evident. The later 
born generations did not have to carry any dead out from bombed houses. Europe, for 
them – so can a historically outstanding success become a curse – is not a question of 
war and peace anymore. For them the project Europea must be justified anew. One asks 
whether the freedom of travel, the lack of fees when exchanging money or pointing out 
of the export surplus, for which Germany is criticized, as well as for its Prussian-
Swabian character, are enough for that? (Im Namen Europas. FAZ May 7th 2010) 
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(48) With a fleeting look at the costs the heads of state of the EU have decides 
that the Greeks must be helped. Allegedly their debt hides a systematic risks for the 
euro zone. […] Only those who turn the Greek state debt into a systematic risk must 
now help. On the other hand, whoever poses the question whether an exit from the 
Monetary Union would be better option for the Greeks, is not necessarily a bad 
European. (Im Sumpf. FAZ April 21st 2010) 
 
(49) In the crisis night at Brussels the euro was robbed of its preventive means 
of protection, the bail-out prohibition and the independent central bank – with the vague 
promise that a harder mechanism would soon be conceived of, which would ensure 
budgetary discipline. The continuous attacks on “speculators” are however pointing 
towards the fact that the EU politics will nor is able to fulfill this promise, but will 
rather seek its salvation in the excessive regulation of the markets in order to break the 
disciplinary power of market prices. The citizens should not fall for that. In the end, the 
speculator is their last ally in the battle against escalating state debt. (Der letzte 
Verbündete. FAZ May 10th 2010) 
 
(50) When the EU now demands from the Greeks in the middle of a strong 
recession to cut expenses and wages and raise taxes, it risks causing a depression. (Der 
Albtraum. FAZ April 23rd) 
 
(51) What will, what can the EU do, when the cuts prescribed to the Greeks are 
not “politically feasible”? (Der Blick nach vorn. FAZ May 1st 2010) 
 
(52) The impression remains therof that everyone has to tighten their belts 
except the EU. (Der Euro als Weichwährung. May FAZ 10th 2010) 
(53) The European Union fights debt with debt. (Der letzte Verbündete. FAZ 
May 10th 2010) 
 
(54) The EU will not accept the price signal for the higher risk. Because the 
market will not bend under the political will for one interest rate, the EU Commission 
plans the introduction of common euro bonds. They would bring it closer to its goal of 
turning the Monetary Union into a liability and transfer community. For euro bonds 
would turn national debt into common debt. Because it would diminish the German 
credit rating, interest rates for state, companies and normal people would rise here. The 
EU Commission demands this as an act of solidarity from the main beneficiary of the 
euro. […] Solidarity is not mentioned when the Commission president Barroso accuses 
the Germans of being naiv, if they think that the stability pact would be made stricter 
after aid has been given to Greece. (Im Schuldensumpf. FAZ June 2nd 2010) 
 
(55) The suspicion that the Commission is really most interested in increasing 
is competences is lend credence all the more by the fact that the EU agency does not 
combined its calls for cuts with the willingness to accept painful cuts into its own 
budget. (Die Währungsunion am Scheideweg. FAZ May 13th 2010) 
 
(56) It would be naive to believe that the Commission would act only as an 
unpolitical agent in the service of solid budgetary policy. […] For the Portuguese, 
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budgetary discipline is not the main point, but rather the fact that the urgently required 
tightening of the stability pact would mean increasing influence for him and the 
Commission. (So unpolitisch wie möglich. FAZ September 28th 2010) 
 
 
(57) The Greek crisis shows relentlessly that the EU has overextended itself in 
the past decades. […] After the current difficulties have been overcome one way or 
another, Europe needs to take a true pause for reflection. It must not only consider what 
must become of it, but it must also ask itself, what can become of it. (Vor einer 
Existenzkrise. FAZ April 2010) 
 
(58) What exactly should be coordinated in the EU? The longing of the 
Commission for a “greener” or a “more social” union will not anyhow help Europe to 
catch up with the rest of the world in terms of growth. (Wer den Euro rettet. FAZ 
February 25th 2010) 
 
(59) Almost no European country remains that would not submit itself to a new 
fiscal discipline, correct excesses of the social state and the tried to adapt itself to 
demographic developments. Greece is only the most dramatic example of this. […] 
Others too have lived beyond their means, the world financial crisis has revealed that. 
[…] The European citizens begin got see, that the services of the social state cannot 
grow independent of economic development. (Kratzer am europäischen Modell. FAZ 
August 7th 2010). 
 
(60) It is important that the European economies are consistently competitive 
and have high productivity. […] A Europe that would commit itself to a culture of 
economic stability would not be a weak Europe, but a reliably strong partner. Speaking 
of which: German exports are booming again. (Kratzer am europäischen Modell. FAZ 
August 7th 2010) 
 
(61) There is, like it or not, only one option, and that is to keep going forward. 
The first signs have been set on this direction: put under pressure from the markets as 
well as political pressure, all the European states have committed to policies of 
budgetary stability, together with measures that are meant to make their economies 
more competitive. (Nur voran kann es gehen. FAZ November 15th 2010) 
 
 
(62) Federal chancellor Merkel was criticized for her tough position when the 
euro stabilization mechanisms were put into place and for her demands for harder 
sanction mechanisms in the EU. In some details she had to give in – that is how it is 
when you sit at the same table with 26 partners – but direction-wise she could assert her 
position. In other words: Germany has, with hard conflicts with the closest partner 
France and then together with Paris, taken over the lead in this crisis of the EU. That is 
nothing to apologize for, since this leadership results from the anchor function of 
Germany for the euro. Berlin has thus taken into its own hands what the EU decided to 
do already ten years ago: to become one of the most dynamic and competitive regions in 
a world where economic balances of power are currently in a dramatic shift. If the EU 
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and its member states are not only to tolerate but also accept this leadership role, 
Germany must act towards its partners not only in a demanding way, but also in a 
cooperative and solidary way. (Nur voran kann es gehen. FAZ November 15th 2010) 
 
 
